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Abstract
Quantum cryptography is widely regarded as the most mature field within the con-
text of quantum information in the sense that its application and development has
produced companies that base their products on genuine quantum mechanical princi-
ples. Examples include quantum random number generators and hardware for secure
quantum key distribution. These technologies directly exploit quantum effects, and
indeed this is where they offer advantages to classical products.
This thesis deals with the development and implementation of quantum information
protocols that utilize the rather inexpensive resource of Gaussian states. A quan-
tum information protocol is essentially a sequence of state exchanges between some
number of parties and a certain ordering of quantum mechanical unitary operators
performed by these parties. An example of this is the famous BB84 protocol for secret
key generation, where photons in different polarization states are sent from one party
to the other and subsequently detected.
In particular we introduce the idea of measurement device independence for continu-
ous variable states and we present a proof-of-principle implementation of this protocol.
Measurement device independence with Gaussian states is a promising avenue for the
development of practical quantum key distribution with a relay network structure in
environments where the distances are relatively short and there is a high number of
users, such as an urban environment.
In addition to this we consider various point-to-point configurations that utilize Gaus-
sian states to achieve security. Notably, we also present a novel experiment demon-
strating the feasibility of delegated quantum computing on encrypted data, where we
show that we can reliably encrypt and decrypt input and output states when a server
with quantum computing capabilities performs Gaussian operations.
i
Dansk resumé
Kvantekryptografi bliver ofte betragtet som det mest modne felt indenfor kvantein-
formationsteknologi, i den forstand at dets anvendelse og udvikling har produceret
firmaer der baserer deres produkter på kvantemekaniske principper. Eksempler på
dette inkluderer kvantetilfældighedsgeneratorer og hardware til sikker kvantenøgle-
distribution. Disse teknologier udnytter specifikke kvanteeffekter, og det er nøjagtig
også i denne forstand at de er overlegne i forhold til de tilsvarende klassiske produkter.
Denne afhandling beskæftiger sig med udviklingen og implementationen af kvante-
informationsprotokoller der udnytter den relativt billige ressource udgjort af Gaus-
siske kvantetilstande. En kvanteinformationsprotokol er essentielt set en sekvens af
tilstandsudvekslinger mellem et vist antal parter og en tilsvarende ordning af kvante-
mekaniske unitære operatorer. Et eksempel på dette kunne være den berømte BB84
protokol til at generere hemmelige nøgler, hvor fotoner i forskellige polarisationer bli-
ver sendt fra en part til en anden og derpå bliver detekterede.
Vi introducerer i særdeleshed konceptet bag kvantekryptografi med målingsuafhæn-
gighed ved brug af koherente tilstande, og vi præsenterer en foreløbig implementation
af denne protokol. Målingsuafhængighed med Gaussiske tilstande er et lovende kon-
cept til udvikling af praktisk kvantenøgledistribution med en simplere netværksstruk-
tur, specielt i miljøer hvor afstandene er relativt korte og der er et højt antal brugere,
såsom en storby.
Udover dette betragter vi også flere punkt til punkt konfigurationer der har det til fæl-
les at de udnytter Gaussiske tilstande til at generere kvantesikkerhed. Vi præsenterer
desuden et nyt eksperiment der demonstrerer effektiviteten af uddelegerede kvante-
beregninger. Vi viser at vi kan kryptere og dekryptere input og output tilstande på
en konsistent måde når serveren benytter sig a Gaussiske operationer.
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Introduction
The quantization of the electromagnetic field, as originally proposed by Planck to
explain black-body radiation [1], was an attempt to dispel one of the two famous
dark clouds of physics [2], a concept promoted William Thomson, also known as Lord
Kelvin. This discovery motivated Einstein to develop a theory explaining the photo-
electric effect, which would later earn him the Nobel prize in physics. With these two
achievements, the development of quantum mechanics could begin in earnest.
It was soon realized that the very essence of quantum mechanics, the quantization,
allowed for a host of phenomena that could not be explained with classical models.
Describing light as photons was useful for Planck in describing black-body radiation,
but a simple double slit experiment reveals that light can still exhibit wave behaviour
and display interference patterns. This was explained by Bohr through the comple-
mentarity principle, which allows for both wave and particle behaviour depending on
the measurement performed. It was particularly this focus by Bohr and his associates
on the action of measurements and observers that caused much debate.
The superposition principle was exemplified by Erwin Schrödinger in his attempt to
discredit the Copenhagen interpretation of Bohr and Heisenberg, with the famous cat
that was dead and alive at the same time. Another famous paradox was that of Ein-
stein, Podolsky, and Rosen in their argument for why quantum mechanics could not be
regarded as complete, or describing physical reality [3]. In their gedanken experiment
two particles with indeterminate position and momentum were to be sent far away
from each other, for instance separate ends of the galaxy. Then a measurement on one
particle, because of momentum conservation, would instantly give information on the
other particle. This, Einstein contended, was a violation of locality and indicated the
incompleteness of quantum mechanics. This phenomenon, which Einstein famously
referred to as "spooky" action at a distance, is what we today name entanglement.
This problem of completeness was later addressed by Bell [4], who showed that a
violation of his famous inequality would rule out the proposed model of local hidden
variables. Einstein and his associates introduced the hidden variables as parame-
ters that, if they were known, would give complete knowledge of the behaviour of
the system and permit a deterministic prediction of its properties. In this way they
hoped to avoid the purely probabilistic predictions that quantum mechanics offered.
The term local refers to the assumption that the parts of the investigated system
1
Chapter 1: Introduction
are not allowed to communicate faster than the speed of light. This leads in to a
larger philosophical debate about the implications of the varying interpretations of
quantum mechanics and the meaning of realism, which we will not be concerned with.
Suffice to say that while quantum mechanics only provides the probabilities of cer-
tain events and no certainties, it is also this which gives the effects that we will exploit.
It was only much later that the quantum weirdness was merged with the ideas of
information theory. A mathematical description of information was first developed
by Shannon [5]. Classical information theory deals with the problem of how to ef-
ficiently encode a message to save space and makes fundamental statements about
achievable error rates. In this theory information is quantified through the entropy,
or uncertainty, of some probability distribution. Given the connection of quantum
mechanics and probabilities it is therefore perhaps not surprising that the ideas that
were used to develop information theory also turn out to be useful within quantum
theory. The merging of these two fields has been named quantum information theory.
Since Weisner introduced the concept of quantum money in the early 70’ies [6], and
with the subsequent invention of quantum key distribution (QKD) through the BB84
protocol by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [7], the field of quantum information has
seen explosive growth. Development of a universal quantum computer, as envisioned
by Feynman [8], is pursued by researchers around the world, with many different
physical systems as candidates [9].
Universal quantum computing is [10, 11, 12], however, by far not the only useful
application of quantum mechanics to the world of information theory. Bit commit-
ment [13, 14], secret sharing [15, 16], quantum key distribution [7, 17, 18], error
correction [19], teleportation [20], boson sampling [21], generation of quantum ran-
dom numbers [22], properties of black holes [23] and fundamental tests of physical
reality [24, 25] are but some of the fascinating subjects that make up quantum infor-
mation processing.
Initially, many of these ideas were developed with quantum bits or qubits in mind. In
other words the basic constituents that carry the information are superposition states
of the form
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) ,
which can be represented using many different degrees of freedom, such as pres-
ence/absence of photons, polarization or electron spins. While classical bits can only
take the values 0 and 1, quantum bits are allowed, through the superposition princi-
ple, to be 0, 1 and any combination in between. This difference hints at why quantum
information processing is superior to what can be achieved classically in some scenar-
ios [26].
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An obvious example of this is the BB84 QKD protocol, where a sender Alice prepares a
state |ψ〉 to be one of the four states |H〉, |V 〉, |+〉 = 1√
2
|H〉+|V 〉 or |−〉 = 1√
2
|H〉−|V 〉,
where H and V denote horizontal and vertical polarizations, respectively. Alice sends
several states, randomly picked from this set, to the receiver Bob, who measures the
incoming states either in a |H〉, |V 〉 or |+〉, |−〉 basis. Knowing that it is not possible
to reliably distinguish all four states at the same time, he picks his detection basis
randomly. The protocol uses the properties of this 2-dimensional Hilbert space of
linear polarization to provide quantum security. The security of the scheme is essen-
tially a consequence of the no-cloning theorem due to Wootters and Zurek [27]. When
Bob picks his detection basis uniformly randomly, he should expect to pick the right
basis only half the time. If an eavesdropper attempted to intercept the qubit states
when they travel from Alice to Bob, she will have to reproduce her state so Bob does
not realize that something is missing. Since the no-cloning theorem states that she
is unable to clone the state she steals, she will make errors in her copying procedure.
These errors will be apparent to Alice and Bob when they compare the measurements
with the prepared states, since the error rate will be above 50 %.
Following the invention of BB84, a host of related protocols were introduced [17, 28,
29] that exploit the properties of single photons in a similar way. We shall label
protocols that use the particle properties of light as discrete variable (DV) protocols,
with BB84 being the prime example of a discrete variable quantum key distribution
(DVQKD) protocol.
In 1991 Ekert demonstrated [18] that quantum mechanical correlations between parts
of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) states, i.e. entanglement, could provide the same
quantum security that BB84 provides, since disturbance by an eavesdropper would
prevent a genuine Bell violation [4] between the measurement outcomes of the honest
parties [30, 31]. QKD using discrete variables has since developed into a vast field,
leading to interesting concepts such as device independence [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37] and
counterfactual communication [38]. At the same time, experimental realizations of
these ideas have produced incredible results in terms of achievable distances [39] and
viable in-field implementations [40, 41], which ensures that quantum cryptography is
regarded as the most mature sub-field of quantum information processing.
It was not immediately realized that one does not need to resolve the particle like
properties of light to exploit its quantum nature. If one can resolve the noise that
results from the quantization of electro-magnetic fields, the so-called quantum or shot
noise, it is possible to use continuous states of light to store quantum information, by
encoding information in the complex amplitude of the electro-magnetic field. These
states are collectively referred to as continuous variable states. This technique of
storing information in the phase or amplitude of a laser beam is used in the classical
world of optical communication, but here there is no need to build detectors that can
resolve the quantum noise of the light or even use sources that allow it to be resolved
in the first place.
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Using these continuous variable (CV) states for QKD was proposed independently by
Hillery, Reid, and Ralph [42, 43, 44]. The idea of using squeezed states to encode
quantum information was further developed [45, 46], and not much later coherent
states were also used for this purpose [47, 48], as they are simpler to produce ex-
perimentally. Since then, alternative protocols have been proposed, for example a
simplified two-state protocol [49, 50], reminiscent of the original BB84 or B92 proto-
col. In 2004, a protocol without quadrature switching in the detection was introduced
by Weedbrook et al. [51, 52]. More recent developments include the use of modulated
entangled states [53], a continuous variable EPR source giving one-sided device in-
dependence [54], free space implementations in atmospheric channels [55], and new
distance records in fiber [56, 57, 58].
On the theoretical side continuous variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) works
differently from its single photon counterpart. In practice the only difference between
a discrete variable protocol with weak coherent pulses and a continuous variable pro-
tocol with coherent state encoding is the way the states are detected, but this has a
profound impact on the theoretical treatment, as is true for much of quantum me-
chanics [59]. For discrete variable protocols the Hilbert space is typically of some
finite dimension, but for continuous variables such a truncated space is not possible,
which may significantly complicate the analysis [60, 61].
Aside from this difference, protocols in both regimes follow the same basic steps:
1. Alice and Bob connect via an authenticated channel. This step is crucial to
avoid so-called man-in-the-middle attacks where the eavesdropper pretends to
be Bob. This will usually require that Alice and Bob exchange some sort of
password or key that they agreed on beforehand.
2. Exchanging randomly chosen quantum states. This step is where most of the
variation between different protocols occurs.
3. Parameter estimation. Here Alice, or Bob, communicate some subset of their
data to the other party to estimate errors.
4. Error correction. Error correction algorithms are applied to the data that was
not revealed.
5. Privacy amplification. The key material produced by the protocol is distilled
into a secure key using a certain family of two-universal hash functions [62, 63,
64, 65].
Initially, in step 4 a technique called direct reconciliation was used for CVQKD. Here
Alice reveals some of her prepared states and lets Bob correct his measured subset
of data to match this. This then lets Bob infer how to perform error correction on
the measurements that were not revealed. Reverse reconciliation was conceived by
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Grosshans et al. [66, 67], and was found to be superior to direct reconciliation, where
the transmission loss is intrinsically limited to 3 dB. Here the roles are exactly re-
versed such that Bob reveals some of his measurements and lets Alice check with what
she prepared and correct accordingly.
The sending of the message itself from Alice to Bob then takes place after the key
material has been exchanged. In this final step all protocols go back to the only
known encryption procedure which is known to have information theoretical security,
the Vernam cipher or one-time pad [68]. Indeed, information theoretical security is
exactly the motivation for this heavy investment in resources for the development of
robust in-field QKD protocols.
Modern cryptography is divided into two parts. Firstly, the public key algorithms
which are based on mathematical problems where checking solutions is easy but find-
ing new ones is believed to be hard, such that it is easy to encrypt, but hard to decrypt
unless one knows some initial parameter. Secondly, the private key algorithms where
key material has been exchanged beforehand, such that Alice and Bob share a key.
They then use a private key algorithm and knowledge of the key to encrypt and then
decrypt a message. All of these protocols provide what is known as computational
security, where security is achievable if one assumes that the eavesdropper has limited
computing. So far, only the Vernam cipher is able to provide information theoretical
security, where no assumptions on the power of the eavesdropper are made.
The Vernam cipher falls within the category of private key algorithms. It is, com-
pared to the modern crypto algorithms, remarkably simple to implement. The secret
key and the message are represented in a binary alphabet. Then, given that the key
length is at least that of the message, perform an exclusive-or operation on all bits in
the message. This is especially convenient for Bob because the decryption operation is
another exclusive-or operation between the bits in the padded message and the secret
key. The secret key may only be used once in this way, because a second use allows
an eavesdropper to consider the exclusive-or of two padded messages, which is equiv-
alent to an exclusive-or of the plaintexts. Using this fact may give the eavesdropper
additional information and information theoretical security can no longer be guaran-
teed. Other more complicated algorithms allow for the recycling of key material and
the process of breaking them is known as differential cryptoanalysis [68]. For certain
types of attacks one may set up probability bounds for the likelihood of a security
breach, but in general the security of these schemes is unproven.
In this context, QKD may be seen as an attempt at providing information theoret-
ical security, by exchanging key material without limiting the eavesdropper. As an
additional motivation, one of the most ubiquitous algorithms in modern cryptosys-
tems, the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman algorithm [68] relies on the difficulty of factorizing
prime number products. However, Shor has shown [26] that if a universal quantum
computer is ever constructed, there exists an algorithm that can do this factorization
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efficiently, rendering this encryption technique obsolete.
In this thesis we will mainly be focused on the security provided by CVQKD protocols,
and variations in the implementation of the quantum state exchange. In discussing
the security of these CVQKD schemes the eavesdropping strategies available to any
malicious party on a continuous variable protocol are usually divided into three broad
categories. These are, from weakest to strongest, individual attacks, collective attacks,
and coherent attacks [69, 70, 30, 71, 72]. When an asymptotic limit of infinitely many
exchanged states is taken, one is able to make arguments from symmetry such that
the two categories of collective and coherent attacks become equivalent [73]. However,
if this assumption is not made the security proofs of continuous variable protocols are
not as far along as for their discrete variable counterparts, and in particular the
security bounds they provide are not known to be tight, which limits the effective
distance [74, 75, 76, 77].
If this challenge is overcome then CVQKD offers interesting advantages over the cor-
responding DVQKD protocols. Firstly, CVQKD can typically be performed with
equipment that is already used for classical optical communication, and so it is tech-
nologically closer to an already well developed industry. Secondly, CVQKD could
potentially offer much higher rates for the generation of secure keys that comparable
DVQKD protocols. This is because DVQKD protocols tend to be limited by the
source repetition rate, but CVQKD does not suffer from this problem as the light
phase and amplitude can be modulated well into the GHz range.
An interesting subclass of continuous variable states, especially for the purpose of
QKD, are the Gaussian states, that is states where the probability distributions of
the components of the complex electro-magnetic field amplitude are Gaussian distri-
butions [71]. Indeed, many of the protocols described above make use of exactly this
class of states.
It turns out that such states can be described rather simply and conveniently by
the so-called covariance matrix formalism and symplectic spaces [71]. If the detec-
tion scheme can also be described in a Gaussian way there are no-go theorems that
somewhat limit what can be achieved with these states [78, 79, 80]. In spite of this
however, these systems have several satisfying properties in the context of information
theory [5, 81]. This thesis deals with protocols that employ these states and detection
schemes, particularly continuous variable quantum key distribution protocols.
We shall in particular investigate relay configurations of three parties for the purposes
of QKD, the effects of correlated noise in such relay configurations and how this affects
the distribution of entanglement, the effects of trusted thermal noise in standard co-
herent state protocols, a way to simplify the practical implementation of the standard
coherent state protocol, the use of squeezing together with coherent state alphabets,
and the use of thermal noise for one-party encryption.
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This one-party encryption is motivated by the wish to implement secure delegated
quantum computing. Secure in this context means that the server providing the
quantum computing capabilities cannot be trusted, and so the input and output
states are hidden from it, through an encryption procedure that uses purely Gaussian
operations.
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Thesis structure
• Chapter 2 serves as an introduction to the theory behind the field of Gaussian
quantum information.
• Chapter 3 introduces the experimental techniques and tools that were used in
the experiments described in the later chapters
• Chapter 4 presents the theory and proof-of-principle experiment of the first ever
continuous variable measurement device independent quantum key distribution
(CVMDIQKD) protocol.
• Chapter 5 presents the theory of the measurement device independent quantum
key distribution (MDIQKD) protocol in the context of non-Markovian noise and
what this noise implies for other related protocols that utilize, either virtual or
real, entanglement. These predictions are investigated through an experiment
on a noisy MDIQKD protocol which is also presented.
• Chapter 6 restates a theoretical prediction regarding the performance of point-
to-point CVQKD protocols with coherent states in the presence of preparation
noise and tests this prediction through an experimental implementation.
• Chapter 7 presents the theory behind and the first experimental implementation
of a CVQKD protocol utilizing a continuous coherent state alphabet in only one
quadrature.
• Chapter 8 presents a novel approach to decoupling a potential eavesdropper from
a quantum channel through the use of squeezed states. The conditions for the
validity of this decoupling scheme are discussed and it is tested experimentally.
• Chapter 9 introduces the idea of delegated continuous variable quantum com-
puting with encrypted input states, and the encryption scheme is tested on a
number of relatively simple gates from the continuous variable universal quan-
tum computing set.
• Chapter 10 provides a comprehensive conclusion on the work performed in the
previous chapters.
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Theory
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical tools we require to describe
Gaussian quantum states. We follow mainly the review of Weedbrook et al. [71].
Quantization of the electromagnetic field
The first section of this chapter deals with the theory describing the various optical
elements and tools that are available in the laboratory for performing experiments
with continuous variable states of light. Consider the electromagnetic field of a light
beam confined to propagation in a cavity of length L along the z-axis [29],
Ex(z, t) =
√
2ω2
V ε0
q(t) sin(kz) , (2.1.1)
where the field is polarized along the x-axis. ω is the angular frequency of the light,
k = ω
c
is the wave number and V is the cavity volume. c is the speed of light in
vacuum and ε0 is the vacuum permittivity. q(t) is a time dependent factor, that we
shall essentially use as a rescaled field amplitude. It serves the purpose of a canonical
position. The corresponding magnetic field is
By(z, t) =
µ0ε0
k
√
2ω2
V ε0
q˙(t) cos(kz) , (2.1.2)
where q˙(t) = p(t) is the canonical momentum and µ0 is the vacuum permeability. The
energy of this field can be represented by a Hamiltonian H, such that
H =
1
2
(p2 + ω2q2) . (2.1.3)
This expression is immediately recognized as a harmonic oscillator. The procedure
for the quantization of the harmonic oscillator is well known [59], and we therefore
introduce the ladder operators,
aˆ =
1√
2~ω
(ωqˆ + ipˆ) , aˆ† =
1√
2~ω
(ωqˆ − ipˆ) , (2.1.4)
where ~ is the reduced Planck constant. These operators fulfil the relation,
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[aˆ, aˆ†] = 1 . (2.1.5)
These operators are not Hermitian and are therefore not observable variables. We
may further define the photon number operator,
nˆ = aˆ†aˆ . (2.1.6)
Setting ~ = 2, for normalization purposes, we may write the unitless Hermitian
quadrature operators for the electromagnetic field as,
Qˆ = aˆ+ aˆ† , Pˆ = i(aˆ† − aˆ) , (2.1.7)
and their commutation relation is,
[Qˆ, Pˆ ] = 2i . (2.1.8)
This commutation relation implies that Qˆ and Pˆ are canonically conjugate operators,
such that they fulfil a Heisenberg inequality of the form,
Var(Qˆ) · Var(Pˆ ) ≥ 1 , (2.1.9)
where the variance of an operator Aˆ is defined such that,
Var(Aˆ) = 〈Aˆ2〉 − 〈Aˆ〉2 , (2.1.10)
where 〈Aˆ〉 is the mean or expectation value of Aˆ [59]. In general, we may consider
the electromagnetic field as having a complex field amplitude, where Qˆ and Pˆ are
components of this complex number. In this sense, we may choose to view Qˆ as an
operator governing the amplitude of a complex number, and Pˆ as the operator gov-
erning the phase of this complex number. The fact that the mathematical structure
of these operators mimics that of a quantum harmonic oscillator is part of what has
made quantum optics such a rich field [82].
We are typically interested in interactions between electromagnetic fields, and to
describe these interactions we shall have need of the concept of a mode. The concept
of a mode is sometimes ambiguous and used for various purposes in the literature. A
mode is in this thesis understood to refer to one or more of the following:
• Spatial mode. Various patterns of light intensity distribution in the plane or-
thogonal to the polarization. Transverse electromagnetic modes (TEMs) are a
common example of this [83].
• Frequency mode. States of light generated at varying frequencies occupy differ-
ent modes even though they might be spatially identical.
• Polarization mode. The orientation of the electromagnetic field oscillations with
respect to the direction of propagation.
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2.1 Quantization of the electromagnetic field
Each mode has its own creation and annihilation operators, aˆΩ,σ,p and aˆ†Ω,σ,p, where
the subscripts are used to denote frequency, polarization and spatial profile. These
subscripts are typically understood from the context. Operators in different modes
commute by default, such that we only expect interactions between modes with the
same features, i.e. for two electromagnetic fields to interfere, they need to have iden-
tical spatial, frequency and polarization mode numbers.
It is convenient to vectorize the commutation relations above, such that for N modes,
we have the vector of ladder operators and the vector of quadrature operators,
aˆ =

aˆ1
aˆ†1
aˆ2
aˆ†2
...
aˆN
aˆ†N

, Xˆ =

Qˆ1
Pˆ1
Qˆ2
Pˆ2
...
QˆN
PˆN

. (2.1.11)
Then the commutation relations become,
[aˆi, aˆj] = Ωij , [Xˆ i, Xˆj] = i2Ωij , (2.1.12)
where Ω is a matrix of the form
Ω =
N⊕
k=1
ω , ω =
[
0 1
−1 0
]
. (2.1.13)
For a single mode the quadrature operators have the eigenstates,
Qˆ|Q〉 = Q|Q〉 , Pˆ |P 〉 = P |P 〉 . (2.1.14)
The eigenvalues Q and P form a continuous spectrum, such that Q ∈ R and P ∈ R,
i.e. they are continuous variables as opposed to the number of photons in the state,
which takes integer values. These quadrature states form a complete and orthonormal
basis, such that the conditions for orthogonality,
〈Q|Q′〉 = δ(Q−Q′) , 〈P |P ′〉 = δ(P − P ′) , (2.1.15)
and completeness, ∫
|Q〉〈Q| dQ =
∫
|P 〉〈P | dP = 1 , (2.1.16)
are fulfilled. The spectral decompositions of the quadrature operators are
Qˆ =
∫ ∞
−∞
Q|Q〉〈Q| dQ , Pˆ =
∫ ∞
−∞
P |P 〉〈P | dP . (2.1.17)
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We may express any state |Ψ〉 in the basis formed by the quadrature states, such that
we obtain the quadrature wave functions,
Ψ(Q) = 〈Q|Ψ〉 , Ψ˜(P ) = 〈P |Ψ〉 , (2.1.18)
which are related by the Fourier transform,
Ψ(Q) =
1
2
√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−iPQ/2Ψ˜(P ) dP . (2.1.19)
In fact, for the quadrature states,
|Q〉 = 1
2
√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−iQP/2|P 〉 dP (2.1.20)
|P 〉 = 1
2
√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−iQP/2|Q〉 dQ . (2.1.21)
The probability distributions |Ψ(Q)|2 and |Ψ˜(P )|2 determine the measurement out-
comes Q and P respectively. Continuous variable detection methods such as ho-
modyne and heterodyne detection, described in Sections 3.7.1 and 3.7.2, have the
variables Q and P as measurement outcomes, and so with successive measurements
of the same state they generate statistics that follow the distributions |Ψ(Q)|2 and
|Ψ˜(P )|2.
Phase space
Classically, phase spaces are employed to depict the evolution of two or more parame-
ters, for example position and momentum, bound to each other by some mathematical
constraint describing a physical process, such as a set of differential equations. One
famous example of this is the Lorentz attractor from the field of chaos theory [84]. In
quantum optics, phase spaces are also used for illustrative purposes, but in a some-
what different manner. Because of the inherent uncertainty in quantum mechanics a
physical state is never located in a specific point in phase space, but is rather smeared
out over an area to indicate the probability distribution of the particular variable. In
the case of continuous variable quantum optics, the two operators of importance are
the quadrature operators Qˆ and Pˆ . To define a phase space of N modes, suppose we
have a vector X ∈ R2N of eigenvalues of Xˆ,
X =

Q1
P1
Q2
P2
...
QN
PN

. (2.2.1)
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2.3 The density matrix
We define a real symplectic space by K = (R2N ,Ω), such that the vector X takes
its values in this symplectic space, and Ω is defined in Equation (2.1.13). This space
is also called phase space [71]. Loosely speaking, the symplectic form enforces a
structure on phase space, that forces it to obey the vectorized commutation relation
defined in Equation (2.1.12). To see this, consider two arbitrary vectors X and ξ,
that each have 2N real values and live in the symplectic space. The scalar product
in the symplectic space is defined as [85],
(ξ,X) = ξT ·Ω ·X =
2N∑
i,j=1
ΩijξiXj . (2.2.2)
Basis changes in the symplectic space must preserve the scalar product. For some
arbitrary basis change matrix S we may therefore write,
ξT ·Ω ·X = (Sξ)T ·Ω · (SX) (2.2.3)
m
ξT ·Ω ·X = ξT · STΩS ·X . (2.2.4)
We require that this holds for all ξ,X, and therefore arrive at the condition,
Ω = STΩS . (2.2.5)
In other words, any transformation in the symplectic space must preserve the com-
mutation relation in Equation (2.1.12). Any transformation that does not preserve
this structure of phase space is considered unphysical.
The density matrix
In general we describe a quantum state by its density matrix [59],
ρˆ =
∑
i
pi|φi〉〈φi| , (2.3.1)
such that the state ρˆ is constructed from the basis states |φi〉 in the Hilbert space H,
weighted with the probabilities pi. These probabilities must sum to one, such that∑
i
pi = 1 . (2.3.2)
A proper density matrix fulfils three properties, those of hermiticity ρˆ = ρˆ†, pos-
itive semi-definiteness 〈u|ρˆ|u〉 ≥ 0, where |u〉 is a state in an arbitrary basis, and
normalization Trρˆ = 1. Here the trace of an operator Aˆ is the sum of the diagonal
elements,
TrAˆ =
∑
i
〈ui|Aˆ|ui〉, (2.3.3)
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where |ui〉 is an arbitrary set of complete orthonormal basis states for the Hilbert
space in which Aˆ is defined. Thus, the trace is invariant under basis changes. In
particular,
TrAˆ =
∑
i
λi , (2.3.4)
where λi are the eigenvalues of Aˆ. For a pure state we have ρˆ = |φ〉〈φ|, and equiva-
lently, a density matrix representing a pure state fulfils Trρˆ2 = 1.
We generalize the mean value of an arbitrary operator Aˆ, where for pure states 〈Aˆ〉 =
〈φ|Aˆ|φ〉. For a density matrix, that may or may not be pure, we instead define the
mean value as [59],
〈Aˆ〉 = Tr(Aˆρˆ) . (2.3.5)
Fidelity
We define the fidelity between two quantum states, ρˆ0 and ρˆ1, by the expression [71,
86, 87],
F =
(
Tr
√√
ρˆ0ρˆ1
√
ρˆ0
)2
, (2.3.6)
which is a real number between 0 and 1, that indicates how close two states are to
each other. When F = 0, the two states are orthogonal, and when F = 1, the two
states are exactly identical. This serves as a distance measure between states, and is
typically used to quantify the performance of a protocol, a common example being
that of quantum state teleportation [20]. In particular for Gaussian states we have,
F = 2√
∆ + δ −√δ exp
(
−1
2
XT∆(Γρˆ0 + Γρˆ1)
−1X∆
)
, (2.3.7)
with the determinants ∆ = det(Γρˆ0 + Γρˆ1) and δ = (det Γρˆ0 − 1)(det Γρˆ1 − 1), and the
vectorized mean value X∆ = X ρˆ1 −X ρˆ1 .
Wigner functions
The main object of interest in the quantum mechanical phase space is the Wigner
function. To define the concept of the Wigner function, we introduce the Weyl, or
displacement, operator [29, 71],
Dˆ(ξ) = exp(iXˆ
T
Ωξ) , (2.4.1)
where Xˆ is the vector of quadrature operators of N modes, and ξ is a vector that
contains the displacements in phase space. We further introduce the characteristic
function,
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χC(ξ) = Tr(ρˆDˆ(ξ)) , (2.4.2)
where ρˆ is a density matrix describing the state in question. To define the Wigner func-
tion, we take the Fourier transform of the characteristic function in Equation (2.4.2)
of N modes,
W (X) =
1
(2
√
pi)2N
∫
R2N
exp(−iXTΩξ/2)χC(ξ) d2Nξ , (2.4.3)
In this way, for an arbitrary ρˆ, there exists a unique Wigner representation of the form
given in Equation (2.4.3). The Wigner function is a pseudo-probability distribution,
in the sense that it may take negative values for some ρˆ, and this negativity is a clear
sign of a non-classical state, which occurs for example for the single photon state. It
is also normalized so that, ∫
R2N
W (X)d2NX = 1 . (2.4.4)
For a single mode, we may rewrite Equation (2.4.3), such that it depends explicitly
on ρˆ,
W (Q,P ) =
1
4pi
∫ ∞
−∞
eiPx/2〈Q+ x/2|ρˆ|Q− x/2〉 dx . (2.4.5)
The marginal distributions of W (Q,P ),
WQ(Q) =
∫ ∞
−∞
W (Q,P ) dP , WP (P ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
W (Q,P ) dQ , (2.4.6)
are exactly the quadrature probability distributions defined through Equation (2.1.18).
For Gaussian states, the measurement outcomes Q and P are probabilistically dis-
tributed according to Gaussian distributions defined purely by their first and second
moments, i.e. mean value and variance. In particular for a Gaussian state of N modes
with a 2N ×2N covariance matrix Γρˆ and a mean value vector X¯ of 2N components,
we have
W (X) =
1
(2pi)N
√
det Γρˆ
exp
(
−1
2
(X − X¯)TΓ−1ρˆ (X − X¯)
)
, (2.4.7)
such that the Wigner function itself is also a Gaussian. For a single mode, the
covariance matrix is,
Γρˆ =
[
Tr(ρˆQˆ2)− Tr(ρˆQˆ)2 Tr(ρˆQˆPˆ )− Tr(ρˆQˆ)Tr(ρˆPˆ )
Tr(ρˆQˆPˆ )− Tr(ρˆQˆ)Tr(ρˆPˆ ) Tr(ρˆPˆ 2)− Tr(ρˆPˆ )2
]
. (2.4.8)
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Fock states and the vacuum
With the creation and annihilation operators defined, we may consider a special basis
of the Hilbert space that contains the wavefunctions for the quantum harmonic os-
cillator. These special basis states are directly related to the number of excitations,
in this case photons, in the oscillator, and we call these states the Fock states. They
are labelled as |n〉, where n ∈ N. They form a complete and orthonormal basis in the
Hilbert space and so they fulfil,
〈n|m〉 = δnm ,
∑
n
|n〉〈n| = I . (2.5.1)
The creation and annihilation operators act on these states such that,
aˆ|n〉 = √n|n− 1〉 , aˆ†|n〉 = √n+ 1|n+ 1〉 , (2.5.2)
with the special case,
aˆ|0〉 = 0 . (2.5.3)
|0〉 is also called the vacuum state, and is the state which contains no photons, but
has 1
2
~ω energy, also called the zero point energy. Measuring a vacuum state in the
quadrature basis gives a Gaussian marginal distribution, that is rotationally sym-
metric in phase space. By finding the quadrature wavefunction 〈Q|0〉, and using
Equation (2.4.5), we can calculate the Wigner function for a vacuum state,
Wvac(Q,P ) =
1
2pi
exp
(
−1
2
(Q2 + P 2)
)
. (2.5.4)
We recognize this as a Gaussian of zero mean and covariance,
Γvac =
[
1 0
0 1
]
. (2.5.5)
Another important state, expressed in the Fock basis, is the thermal state,
ρˆth =
∞∑
m=0
n¯m
(n¯+ 1)m+1
|m〉〈m| . (2.5.6)
It is a statistical mixture of Fock states, with no correlations between the excitations.
Indeed, it directly follows the form of Equation (2.3.1), as a statistical mixture of
Fock states, and we see that the probability of a certain photon contribution is given
by the factor,
pm =
n¯m
(n¯+ 1)m+1
, (2.5.7)
which is determined solely by the mean photon number n¯. In phase space, the thermal
state is described by the Wigner function,
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Wth(Q,P ) =
1
2pi(2n¯+ 1)
exp
(
− 1
2(2n¯+ 1)
(Q2 + P 2)
)
. (2.5.8)
It is a Gaussian distribution of mean value 0 and covariance matrix,
Γth =
[
2n¯+ 1 0
0 2n¯+ 1
]
. (2.5.9)
The vacuum state and the thermal state may be regarded as the most fundamen-
tal Gaussian states, and we will see in Section 2.7 that the vacuum state can be
transformed into any Gaussian state.
Coherent states
We introduce the coherent state, as it is what we shall use to store our quantum
information in many of the protocols described later. The coherent state is defined
as the eigenstate of the annihilation operator,
aˆ|α〉 = α|α〉 , (2.6.1)
where α ∈ C. This relation can be used to show that, in the Fock basis,
|α〉 = e− 12 |α|2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉 . (2.6.2)
From this, we can show that for two coherent states, |α〉 and |β〉, the overlap is [29, 71],
|〈β|α〉|2 = e−|β−α|2 . (2.6.3)
This is important for quantum key distribution, because it implies that no two co-
herent states are perfectly orthogonal. This provides security through the no-cloning
theorem [27]. It also implies that the coherent states form an overcomplete basis for
the Hilbert space, so the identity becomes [29],
I =
1
pi
∫
C
|α〉〈α| d2α . (2.6.4)
The coherent state |α〉 has the Wigner function,
Wcoh(Q,P ) =
1
2pi
e−
1
2
((Q−<[α])2+(P−=[α])2) , (2.6.5)
which we recognize as a 2D Gaussian of variance 1 and mean value α = (<[α],=[α])T .
For this reason, coherent states are also referred to as displaced vacuum states. They
are generated from the vacuum state by the Weyl operator,
|α〉 = Dˆ(α)|0〉 , (2.6.6)
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from Equation (2.4.1). We can express a thermal state as a Gaussian distribution
of coherent states, since a properly weighted summation over coherent state Wigner
functions will produce the Wigner function of a thermal state [11]. In that sense we
may consider a thermal state as an alphabet, where every coherent state is a letter.
We call this a Gaussian continuous alphabet, and we will see in Section 2.13, that
this choice of alphabet maximizes the information content if there is a constraint on
how large α is allowed to be, which must be the case physically, since having no limit
on α implies infinite energy.
Covariance matrices in symplectic spaces
Covariance matrices are a useful way of describing Gaussian states. Any 2-dimensional
Gaussian function can, up to a mean value, be described by a 2 × 2 matrix contain-
ing the variances and the correlations between the variables. More simply, we may
uniquely describe any Gaussian state in a phase space of the quadratures by a 2× 2
matrix and a 2-component vector of mean values. In the context of quantum mechan-
ics, these covariance matrices live in the symplectic space defined in Section 2.2. We
may set up a 2N × 2N covariance matrix which describes N Gaussian modes, and we
can use symplectic transformations to represent interactions between these modes, or
transformations on the individual modes.
Covariance matrices have two useful forms, which they may always transform into.
One is called the Simon normal form [88, 89, 90], and is related to the separability of
multi-mode states. For two modes it has the form
ΓSNF =

a 0 c1 0
0 a 0 c2
c1 0 b 0
0 c2 0 b
 . (2.7.1)
In this form, the covariance matrix expresses how two 2D Gaussian distributions,
rotationally symmetric in their subspaces, are correlated through the covariance co-
efficients c1 and c2. Another useful form is the Williamson form [91], which is a
diagonalization that has a special structure due to the symplectic space. There exists
a transformation SW such that,
SWΓS
T
W =
N⊕
k=1
νkI2 , (2.7.2)
where the values νk are the moduli of the spectrum of eigenvalues of the matrix iΩΓ.
The Heisenberg inequality is also easily expressed through the symplectic matrix [92],
Γ + iΩ ≥ 0 . (2.7.3)
There are several ways to determine if this inequality holds. The easiest is usually to
check that all the eigenvalues of the matrix Γ + iΩ are bigger than or equal to zero.
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Alternatively, we may check that νk ≥ 1 ∀ k.
All Gaussian operations that can be performed on a Gaussian state can be repre-
sented by symplectic transformations on the corresponding covariance matrix. These
transformations all have the property that they preserve the symplectic space, so they
fulfil the condition of Equation (2.2.5). For an input with covariance matrix Γ and
mean value vector X¯, the mapping is,
X¯
′
= SX¯ + d , Γ′ = SΓST , (2.7.4)
where d and S are a vector and matrix respectively, representing the transformation.
The set (d,S) is called a symplectic map. The transformations that will be required
are displacement, single mode rotation, the beamsplitting operation and the single
mode squeezing operation.
Displacements
The displacement operation, through the use of the Weyl operator, is defined by the
map,
ddisp = α , Sdisp = I2 , (2.7.5)
This transformation enables the description of a Gaussian state purely through the
covariance matrix, since the mean value may always be displaced to zero, without loss
of generality.
Rotations
We define local single mode rotations through the map,
drot = 0 , Srot =
[
cos(θ) − sin(θ)
sin(θ) cos(θ)
]
, (2.7.6)
where θ ∈ [0, 2pi]. This transformation is implemented through single mode phase
shifts, and it allows us to always bring a state into the Simon normal form.
Beam splitters
The beam splitter is a transformation on two modes, which are coupled with a trans-
mission T ∈ [0, 1].
dBS = 0 , SBS =
[ √
T I2
√
1− T I2
−√1− T I2
√
T I2
]
, (2.7.7)
It is implemented either through a T/(1 − T ) beam splitter or a combination of a
waveplate and a polarizing beam splitter.
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Squeezing
Squeezing of a single mode is defined through the squeezing parameter r, and the
transformation,
dsqz = 0 , Ssqz =
[
V 0
0 V −1
]
, (2.7.8)
where V = e2r, with r ∈ R. This transformation is difficult to implement in general.
Generation of vacuum squeezing is well established [93, 94, 95, 96], while the squeezing
transformation of an arbitrary input state is significantly harder to achieve.
EPR states
With the operations described above, one can represent any Gaussian state that can
be produced in the laboratory. Most importantly, they can be used to construct the
famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen state [3], which has a special role in proving security
in quantum key distribution protocols with continuous variables, due to Ekert showing
that testing for a Bell inequality violation is the same as certifying security between
two honest parties [18, 71]. We generate the EPR state by interfering two squeezed
states on a 50/50 beamsplitter. We use the two mode vacuum state as an input state,
Γvac =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 . (2.8.1)
We squeeze these two vacuum modes, but in conjugate quadratures, with the outcome,
Γsqz =

V 0 0 0
0 V −1 0 0
0 0 V −1 0
0 0 0 V
 . (2.8.2)
These squeezed modes are then interfered on a 50/50 beam splitter, with the sym-
plectic operation SBS(T ), where T = 12 ,
ΓEPR =

V
2
+ 1
2V
0 −V
2
+ 1
2V
0
0 V
2
+ 1
2V
0 −V
2
+ 1
2V−V
2
+ 1
2V
0 V
2
+ 1
2V
0
0 −V
2
+ 1
2V
0 V
2
+ 1
2V
 . (2.8.3)
Introducing the parameter µ = V
2
+ 1
2V
, this matrix can be rewritten into,
ΓEPR =

µ 0
√
µ2 − 1 0
0 µ 0 −√µ2 − 1√
µ2 − 1 0 µ 0
0 −√µ2 − 1 0 µ
 , (2.8.4)
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where the variance µ ≥ 1 quantifies the size of the state. We will discuss a way to
quantify the amount of entanglement in Section 2.9. Consider now the situation where
Alice has distributed such an EPR state between herself and Bob. Suppose Alice
performs a heterodyne measurement on the mode she kept for herself. Conditioned on
her measurement, Bob will then receive a coherent state with a mean value determined
by Alice’s measurement outcome [97]. From Bob’s point of view there is therefore no
difference between Alice exchanging the EPR states with him and Alice performing
some conditioning, or Alice preparing coherent states by some random process and
sending these. This is, roughly speaking, the argument for the equivalence between
entanglement based protocols and prepare-and-measure protocols [67, 98, 99].
Separability and logarithmic negativity
A sufficient condition for the separability of a two-mode state is that the partial
transpose of the state is positive (PPT) [100, 101],
ρˆTB ≥ 0 . (2.9.1)
Conversely, having,
ρˆTB ≤ 0 , (2.9.2)
is a sufficient condition for ρˆ to be entangled. For an N×M bipartite Gaussian state,
where Γ has a block matrix A of N modes and a block B of M modes, the partially
transposed state has the covariance matrix,
Γ˜ = ΛPPTΓΛPPT , (2.9.3)
where ΛPPT = IA ⊕ΛB, ΛB = ⊕Mk=1Z and,
Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
. (2.9.4)
If Γ˜ is not a physical covariance matrix, the positivity of the partial transpose (PPT)
does not hold. For the mode partition 1 × M , this is a necessary and sufficient
requirement for entanglement [102]. The logarithmic negativity,
N (ρˆ) = log ||ρˆTB ||1 , (2.9.5)
where ||ρˆTB ||1 is the trace norm of the partially transposed state, is an attempt to
quantify how much the PPT condition is violated [103]. For Gaussian states it can be
calculated in terms of the symplectic eigenvalues of the partially transposed covariance
matrix,
N (ρˆ) =
∑
k
f(ν˜k) , (2.9.6)
where,
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f(x) =
{
− log2(x) when x < 1
0 when x ≥ 1 (2.9.7)
Thus, for every physical eigenvalue, νk ≥ 1, the logarithmic negativity is unchanged,
while for every unphysical eigenvalue, νk < 1, the logarithmic negativity becomes
further negative.
Homodyne measurements
Homodyne detection is a fundamental tool for quantum optics in continuous variables.
The practical description of homodyne detection is done in Section 3.7.1. We will here
be especially concerned with conditioning one mode on the outcome of another, in this
case where the outcome is measured through homodyne detection. For this purpose,
consider a Gaussian state of N + 1 modes described by the covariance matrix,
ΓAB =
[
A C
CT B
]
, (2.10.1)
where A is a 2N ×2N block matrix, B is a 2×2 block matrix and C is a rectangular
block of the form 2N × 2. A and B describe the reduced states in modes A and
B respectively, while C describes the correlations between them. Suppose that we
project mode B onto the squeezed vacuum state,
Γd =
[
d 0
0 1
d
]
, (2.10.2)
so we get the projected state
ΓABd =
[
A C
CT D
]
, (2.10.3)
with D = B + Γd. We wish to condition this on the outcome of the measurement of
the projected mode D, by considering the zero mean Wigner function corresponding
to this covariance matrix and integrating out the quadrature variables in this single
mode subspace of the symplectic space [104],
WA|B(XA) =
1
(2pi)N
√
det ΓABd
∫
R2
exp
(
−1
2
XTΓ−1ABdX
)
d2XD , (2.10.4)
whereX = (XA,XD)T , withXA having 2N quadrature coordinate components and
XD = (QD, PD)
T . Partitioned in this way, the inverted covariance matrix is given by,
Γ−1ABd =
[
U V
V T W
]
m
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Γ−1ABd =
[
(A−CD−1CT )−1 −A−1C(D −CTA−1C)−1
−D−1CT (A−CD−1CT )−1 (D −CTA−1C)−1
]
. (2.10.5)
We rewrite the integrand product in terms of the renamed sub-matrices,
XTΓ−1ABdX = X
T
AUXA +X
T
AV XD +X
T
DV
TXA +X
T
DWXD . (2.10.6)
The first term is independent of the integration variables, so
WA|B(XA) =
1
(2pi)N
√
det ΓABd
exp
(
−1
2
XTAUXA
)
×
∫
R2
exp
(
−1
2
(XTAV XD +X
T
DV
TXA +X
T
DWXD)
)
d2XD , (2.10.7)
The exponent inside the integration can be further rewritten,
XTAV XD +X
T
DV
TXA +X
T
DWXD =
(XD +W
−1V TXA)TW (XD +W−1V TXA) +XTAVW
−1V TXA . (2.10.8)
With this rewriting, the integral becomes,
WA|B(XA) =
1
(2pi)N
√
det ΓABd
exp
(
−1
2
XTA(U + VW
−1V T )XA
)
×
∫
R2
exp
(
−1
2
(XTAV XD +X
T
DV
TXA +X
T
DWXD)
)
d2XD , (2.10.9)
which evaluates to,
WA|B(XA) =
1
(2pi)N−1
√
det ΓABd detW
× exp
(
−1
2
XTA(U + VW
−1V T )XA
)
, (2.10.10)
so we recover a Wigner function of the remaining N modes of the projected state with
the covariance matrix,
ΓA|B = (U + VW−1V T )−1 = A+CD−1CT . (2.10.11)
We now wish to let d go to zero, as this corresponds to projecting mode B onto
an infinitely squeezed state, which is equivalent to a homodyne detection [78, 79].
Expressing D in terms of the elements of B,
D =
[
B11 + d B21
B21 B22 +
1
d
]
. (2.10.12)
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We see from Equation (2.10.11) that D−1 is the relevant quantity. We find that
lim
d→0
D−1 = (ΠBΠ)MP = B−111 Π , (2.10.13)
where
Π =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, (2.10.14)
and the superscript MP denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of a singular ma-
trix [105]. We therefore arrive at the following formula for conditioning homodyne
detection in the Q quadrature,
ΓA|B = A+B−111CΠC
T . (2.10.15)
For homodyne detection in the phase quadrature, we choose instead,
Π =
[
0 0
0 1
]
, (2.10.16)
and Equation (2.10.15) becomes,
ΓA|B = A+B−122CΠC
T . (2.10.17)
Heterodyne measurements
In a manner similar to Section 2.10, we wish to investigate how the outcome of a
heterodyne detection transforms the remaining modes. The practical description of
heterodyne detection is done in Section 3.7.2. We consider a Gaussian state of N + 1
modes with the covariance matrix,
Γ =
[
A C
CT B(2)
]
. (2.11.1)
A is a matrix of N modes, the 4× 4 block B(2) is,
B(2) =
[
B 0
0 I2
]
, (2.11.2)
whereB is the covariance matrix of the mode to be measured by heterodyne detection,
and I2 is in the other block as the vacuum that enters through the balanced beam
splitter. C is a 2N × 4 matrix that contains the correlations between A and B(2). It
may be decomposed into
C =
[
C1 0
]
, (2.11.3)
since A is not correlated with the vacuum mode, and C1 contains the correlations
between A and B. Applying the balanced beamsplitter operation between mode B
and the vacuum, we get the global state
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Γ′ =
 A
1√
2
C1 − 1√2C1
1√
2
CT1
1
2
(B + I2) 12(I2 −B)
− 1√
2
CT1
1
2
(I2 −B)T 12(B + I2)
 . (2.11.4)
Now, performing homodyne conditioning in opposite quadratures in each of the mixed
modes that do not belong to A, after some algebra we get [71, 105],
ΓA|B = A− 1
θ1
C1(ΩBΩ
T + I2)CT1 , (2.11.5)
where θ1 = detB+TrB+1. This expression may be rewritten into the simpler form,
ΓA|B = A−C1(B + I2)−1CT1 , (2.11.6)
which is essentially a quadrature symmetric version of Equation (2.10.15), with the
addition of the vacuum variance.
Bell measurements
Bell detection may be regarded as a generalization of heterodyne detection, in the
sense that the vacuum mode introduced for heterodyne detection may also contain a
signal, such that the two signal modes are interfered before being measured in orthog-
onal quadratures with homodyne detection. We here investigate the transformation
realized by such a conditional measurement. Consider a Gaussian state of N + 2
modes with the covariance matrix,
Γ =
[
A C
CT B(2)
]
, (2.12.1)
where A is a matrix of n modes and the 4× 4 block B(2) is,
B(2) =
[
B1 D
DT B2
]
, (2.12.2)
which is to be measured by the Bell detection andD contains the correlations between
the measured modes. C is a 2N × 4 matrix that contains the correlations between A
and B(2). It may be decomposed into
C =
[
C1 C2
]
, (2.12.3)
where C1 contains the correlations between A and B1, and C2 between A and B2.
Then, the N mode conditional state is found to be [105],
ΓA|B = ΓA − 1
2 det Θ
2∑
i,j=1
Ci(X
T
i ΘXj)C
T
j , (2.12.4)
where Θ = 1
2
(ZB1Z +B2 −ZD −DTZ) and,
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X1 =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, X2 =
[
0 1
−1 0
]
(2.12.5)
A compact way to implement this detection method is described in Section 3.7.2.
Classical information theory
This section deals with the mathematical concepts of information theory without ref-
erence to any quantum mechanical phenomena. An excellent reference on this topic
is the book by Cover and Thomas [5].
We begin by introducing the concept of Shannon entropy H(A) of some random vari-
able A, the outcomes of which are distributed according to the probability distribution
P (a). Inspired by statistical mechanics,
H(A) = −
∑
a∈A
P (a) log2 P (a) , (2.13.1)
where a are then the outcomes of the random variable A that belong to the alphabet
A. For continuous probability distributions we have the analogous definition,
H(A) = −
∫
S
P (a) log2 P (a) da . (2.13.2)
Here P (a) is a continuous probability distribution, and S is the support of the random
variable A. The support is the set for which P (a) > 0. We limit the integral to this
set, since log2(x) is ill defined when x = 0. For a Gaussian distribution of 2N modes
with zero mean and covariance matrix Γ,
H(Γ) =
1
2
log2((2pie)
2N det Γ) . (2.13.3)
We will typically be interested in the entropy of the encoded signal rather than the
quantum state itself. For a collection of coherent states that form a single mode
thermal state with the variance VS + 1, we shall call VS the signal variance. The
entropy of the encoding is therefore the entropy of the thermal state generated by the
encoding minus the entropy of the vacuum,
H(S) = H(Γ)−H(Γvac) = 1
2
log2 VS . (2.13.4)
In fact a Gaussian probability distribution is guaranteed to maximize this entropy
out of all probability distributions with the same variance.
To see this, let P (X) be a classical probability distribution of N modes, where it has
a covariance matrix with its components defined through the integral,
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Γij =
∫
S
P (X)X iXj dNX . (2.13.5)
Since this is an arbitrary distribution it may have arbitrary values for its k’th moment.
We then define a unique Gaussian probability distribution, G(X), with the covariance
matrix Γ and zero mean. The difference between these two distributions may be
quantified through the Kullback-Leibler distance [5],
D(P ||G) =
∫
S
P (X) log2
(
P (X)
G(X)
)
dNX ≥ 0 , (2.13.6)
which is zero if and only if the distributions are identical. Using the definition of the
entropy on this expression, we obtain the inequality,
H(P ) ≤ H(G) . (2.13.7)
A similar result exists in quantum information theory, where a Gaussian Wigner func-
tion will maximize the von Neumann entropy described in Section 2.14 [71, 81].
We may also consider the probability distribution of two variables, which gives us the
joint entropy,
H(AB) = −
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈B
P (a, b) log2 P (a, b) , (2.13.8)
Conditioning distribution A on the outcomes of distribution B, we get the conditional
entropy,
H(A|B) = H(AB)−H(B) = −
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈B
P (a|b) log2 P (a|b) , (2.13.9)
which for Gaussian states is,
H(A|B) = 1
2
log2
(
VA − C
2
VB
)
, (2.13.10)
where C is the covariance between the distributions, and VA and VB are the variances
of Alice’s Gaussian input alphabet and Bob’s measurements respectively. With these
quantities defined, we may also define the mutual information,
I(A : B) = H(A)−H(A|B) , (2.13.11)
which quantifies the entropy reduction on distribution A by the measurement of dis-
tribution B. The quantity is symmetric such that,
H(A)−H(A|B) = H(B)−H(B|A) . (2.13.12)
For a two-mode Gaussian distribution, the mutual information is,
I(A : B) =
1
2
log2
(
VA
VA − C2VB
)
. (2.13.13)
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Quantum information theory
This section considers what consequences the existence of quantum mechanics has
upon information theory and extends these principles accordingly. Useful introduc-
tions to this topic are the book by Wilde [11] and the book by Nielsen and Chuang [12].
We first define the notion of von Neumann entropy of a quantum state ρˆ, in analogy
with Equation (2.13.1),
S(ρˆ) = −Trρˆ log2 ρˆ . (2.14.1)
This entropy is a measure of the amount of uncertainty that remains after a measure-
ment of the state ρˆ. For a pure state, where Trρˆ2 = 1, we have that
S(ρˆ) = 0 , (2.14.2)
so if one picks a proper basis to measure ρˆ, no uncertainty remains. Von Neumann
entropy is invariant under unitary operations, such that,
S(ρˆ) = S(Uˆ ρˆUˆ †) . (2.14.3)
This also implies that von Neumann entropy does not change under symplectic trans-
formations, since these transformations have a corresponding unitary operator that
transforms the associated density matrix. For separable states von Neumann entropy
is additive such that
S(ρˆA ⊗ ρˆB) = S(ρˆA) + S(ρˆB) . (2.14.4)
For a general two-mode state ρˆAB we define the joint entropy as,
S(ρˆAB) = −Tr(ρˆAB log2 ρˆAB) , (2.14.5)
and the marginal entropies,
S(ρˆA) = −Tr(ρˆA log2 ρˆA) , S(ρˆB) = −Tr(ρˆB log2 ρˆB) , (2.14.6)
where ρˆA = TrBρˆAB is the density matrix after a partial trace over mode B, and
similarly for ρˆB. Consider a general two-mode pure state written in its Schmidt
decomposition [10, 29],
|ψ〉AB =
∑
n
an|λn〉A|φn〉B . (2.14.7)
Expressed as a density matrix,
ρˆAB = |ψ〉AB〈ψ| =
∑
nm
ana
∗
m|λn〉A|φn〉B〈λm|A〈φm|B . (2.14.8)
Taking the partial trace over mode A and B, respectively,
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ρˆA = TrBρˆAB =
∑
i
〈φi|B
∑
nm
ana
∗
m|λn〉A|φn〉B〈λm|A〈φm|Bφi〉B (2.14.9)
m
ρˆA =
∑
n
|an|2|λn〉〈λn| , (2.14.10)
since we may take the trace in any basis. Similarly, we have,
ρˆB =
∑
n
|an|2|φn〉〈φn| . (2.14.11)
Using the definition from Equation (2.14.1), we see that
S(ρˆA) = S(ρˆB) = −
∑
n
|an|2 log2 |an|2 , (2.14.12)
such that the reduced states of a two-mode pure state have the same von Neumann
entropy, while the global state has S(ρˆAB) = 0. This property generalizes to any
number of modes, such that, for example, for a pure three-mode state ρˆABE, we have
S(AB) = S(E), S(A) = S(EB) and S(B) = S(AE). This property is sometimes
referred to as self-duality [11, 85].
For Gaussian states there is a straightforward way of calculating von Neumann en-
tropy. Consider the Gaussian N -mode state described by the covariance matrix Γ of
size 2N × 2N . We know that there exists a transformation SW that transforms this
matrix into the Williamson form,
SWΓS
T
W =
N⊕
k=1
νkI2 . (2.14.13)
In this form, the state is equivalent to N uncoupled thermal states with mean photon
numbers n¯k = 12(νk−1). Using the additive property of von Neumann entropy, defined
in Equation (2.14.4),
S(SWΓS
T
W ) =
N∑
k=1
S(νkI2) . (2.14.14)
Recalling also that von Neumann entropy is invariant under unitary transformations,
S(Γ) =
N∑
k=1
S(νkI2) , (2.14.15)
since S(SWΓSTW ) = S(Γ). From Equation (2.5.6),
ρˆth =
∞∑
m=0
n¯m
(1 + n¯)m+1
|m〉〈m| , (2.14.16)
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the von Neumann entropy of a single thermal state of mean photon number n¯ can be
calculated through the definition in Equation (2.14.1). Since ρˆth is already diagonal
this yields,
S(ρˆth) = − 1
1 + n¯
∞∑
m=0
(
n¯
1 + n¯
)m
log2
n¯m
(1 + n¯)m+1
(2.14.17)
m
S(ρˆth) =
1
1 + n¯
(
−
∞∑
m=0
(
n¯
1 + n¯
)m
m log2 n¯
+
∞∑
m=0
(
n¯
1 + n¯
)m
(m+ 1) log2(1 + n¯)
)
. (2.14.18)
The identities,
∞∑
m=0
(
n¯
1 + n¯
)m
= 1 + n¯ ,
∞∑
m=0
(
n¯
1 + n¯
)m
m = n¯(1 + n¯) , (2.14.19)
permit a rewriting into the expression,
S(ρˆth) = n¯ log2
1 + n¯
n¯
+ log2(1 + n¯) . (2.14.20)
To express this in terms of the symplectic eigenvalues νk, we introduce the bosonic
information function,
g(x) =
x+ 1
2
log2
(
x+ 1
2
)
− x− 1
2
log2
(
x− 1
2
)
, (2.14.21)
such that for a single mode thermal state, and by extension an arbitrary Gaussian
state, we have,
S(ρˆth) = g(ν) , (2.14.22)
with ν = 2n¯+ 1. In general we therefore have,
S(Γ) =
N∑
k=1
g(νk) . (2.14.23)
In this way we have conveniently expressed the von Neumann entropy of an arbitrary
Gaussian state through the symplectic spectrum of its covariance matrix. The condi-
tional von Neumann entropy is defined in analogy to the conditional Shannon entropy
in Equation (2.13.9),
S(A|B) = S(AB)− S(B) . (2.14.24)
Unlike classical conditional entropy, conditional von Neumann entropy can be nega-
tive. The EPR state from Equation (2.8.4) is pure when considered as two modes but
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any single mode by itself, not conditioned on the outcome of the other, is a thermal
state. Therefore, the conditional entropy for an EPR state of size µ is,
S(A|B) = −g(µ) , (2.14.25)
which is negative. This is a significant departure from classical information theory.
The property of self-duality also applies to conditional entropies. Consider the pure
tripartite state ρˆABE and suppose that a conditional measurement is performed on
mode B that leaves the state ρˆAE|B pure. The entropy of the conditional state is then,
S(AE|B) = 0 , (2.14.26)
but the entropies of the conditioned reduced states maintain self-duality such that,
S(A|B) = S(E|B) . (2.14.27)
With the conditional entropy defined, we may also define the quantum mutual infor-
mation,
S(A : B) = S(A)− S(A|B) = S(B)− S(B|A) , (2.14.28)
which has the same symmetry properties as the classical quantity, and where we have
the bound,
I(A : B) ≤ S(A : B) . (2.14.29)
Related to the mutual information, we introduce the Holevo quantity [11, 12, 71],
χ(A : B) = S(ρˆB)−
∑
x
PA(x)S(ρˆ
x
B) , (2.14.30)
where Alice prepares the quantum state ρˆxB with probability pA(x), such that Bob
receives the state,
ρˆB =
∑
x
PA(x)ρˆ
x
B . (2.14.31)
The purpose of the Holevo quantity is to bound the amount of information extractable
by an optimal measurement of the state ρˆB. This quantity is particularly relevant
for quantum key distribution, where we wish to bound the amount of information
available to the eavesdropper without knowing what strategy she is going to employ.
For a typical Gaussian QKD configuration with the two honest parties Alice and Bob
exchanging states and Eve implementing some Gaussian unitary through the quantum
channel, the Holevo bound on Eve’s information gain is [97, 106],
χ(E : X) = S(E)− S(E|X) , (2.14.32)
where X is either A or B, depending on the reconciliation [71, 107]. For reverse
reconciliation [48] X = B. Here the outcomes of Bob’s measurements are estimated
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by Alice. Conversely, for direct reconciliation [47, 108] X = A and it is up to Bob to
estimate the initial states prepared by Alice. We then have, for a generic quantum key
distribution protocol, the secret key rate bound in the limit of infinite state exchanges,
R = I(A : B)− χ(E : X) . (2.14.33)
This bound is sometimes referred to as the Devetak-Winter bound [109]. Since Eve’s
modes are not known to the honest parties, this quantity is hard to estimate in
practice. However, assuming that Eve is able to purify the global state ρˆABE we
arrive at the bound,
χ(E : X) = S(AB)− S(X˜|X), (2.14.34)
where X˜ is the opposite of X, so if X = A, then X˜ = B. This assumption sets a
further upper bound on Eve’s information gain as it is the most pessimistic choice
possible. When an infinite identically and independently distributed (iid) number of
state exchanges are assumed, the law of large numbers ensures that all the entropy
quantities defined here are valid [5, 12]. Additionally, symmetry considerations and
the use of the so called de Finetti theorem [110] lead to the conclusion that coherent
attacks reduce to collective attacks [73, 107] when there are infinite iid state exchanges.
Collective attacks allow for the eavesdropper to apply any quantum unitary to the in-
dividual exchanged states, but this selected unitary must be applied to all the states.
Eve is then allowed to save her output states in a quantum memory and measure
them collectively once the state transfer is complete. Coherent attacks are a step up
from this in that for each exchanged state, Eve may select a new optimal unitary
operator and still perform a collective measurement at the end. In addition to the
equivalence of coherent and collective attacks, we may also use the fact that Gaus-
sian distributions maximize entropy to show that Gaussian attacks are optimal in this
limit [81], which limits Eve to attacks that use Gaussian states. This will be exploited
extensively in the chapters on QKD protocols that follow.
It is unknown if similar symmetry considerations imply the equivalence of collective
and coherent attacks if infinite state exchanges are not assumed. In fact, one impor-
tant caveat of the Devetak-Winter bound is that it does not guarantee composability
of the generated secret key in the finite state exchange limit [76, 77, 111], though this
complication is outside the scope of this thesis. In spite of these difficulties, finite size
security proofs for continuous variable quantum key distribution have made a number
of recent advances [60, 61, 74, 75, 112].
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Laser light generation
The experiments described in this thesis all made use of a 1064 nm Nd:YAG laser
from Coherent, with a 400 mW output beam. The laser had a built in cavity with a
lithium niobate (LiNbO3) crystal to generate 532 nm light. This was used to pump the
optical parametric oscillator (OPO) described in Section 3.5. The cavity for second
harmonic generation was locked with a Pound-Drever-Hall (PDH) lock [113], and the
modulation at 12 MHz and servo controller was integrated into the laser control unit.
The PDH locking technique is described in detail in Section 3.6.1. Figure 3.1 shows
the arrangement of optical elements inside the laser.
PD
Nd:YAG
1064 Source
LiNbO3
E
O
M
1064 nm
Output
532 nm
Output
12 MHz
Figure 3.1: An Nd:YAG crystal in a non-planar ring cavity functions as a 1064 nm
laser source. The output was split with one part going to the experiment, and the
other part being phase modulated at 12 MHz to generate a sideband for locking a
linear cavity with a lithium niobate crystal. The crystal is pumped by the 1064 nm
source beam to power the second harmonic generation, producing photons at 532 nm,
which are a secondary output from the laser housing. PD: Photo detector, EOM:
Electro-optical modulator, PID: Servo controller, LiNbO3: Lithium Niobate crystal.
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Sidebands
The carrier beam generated by the laser source is quite noisy because of amplitude
and phase noise, which comes about from a number of sources, one of which is the
so-called relaxation noise [114]. Typically, the quantum states under investigation
are produced at a frequency shifted away from the frequency of the carrier to avoid
this noise, as it generally decays with increased frequency. By selecting a sufficiently
high frequency, one can ensure that the only remaining noise at that frequency is the
quantum shot noise that originates from the quantization of the harmonic oscillator.
We call states generated at these frequencies away from the carrier frequency sideband
states.
The frequency of a sideband state is always described relative to the carrier, and
mathematically all calculations take place in a frame rotating with the laser carrier
frequency. For this particular laser source 10.5 MHz is a convenient choice for a side-
band frequency as the laser noise decays sufficiently fast for 10.5 MHz to be prepared
in a vacuum state. We then say that the laser is shot noise limited at this frequency,
since the shot noise can be resolved. This might be confirmed experimentally by
checking that the noise power doubles with a doubling in the carrier power.
We denote the sideband operators, aˆΩ and aˆ−Ω, where we have suppressed the other
mode indices, and Ω is the sideband frequency. Because every mode has separate
operators we may also define separate phase spaces for them, and so the theory
developed in Chapter 2 applies directly to phase spaces on these sidebands. Shot
noise limited sidebands are convenient because they are automatically prepared in
the vacuum state |0〉. We may then use the experimental techniques described in this
chapter to transform this vacuum state into some other Gaussian state.
Modulation of light
To encode information onto the carrier beam we use electro-optical modulators (EOMs)
that change the phase and amplitude quadratures. In this sense they function as the
displacement operator Dˆ(ξ), defined in Equation (2.4.1). Electro-optical modulators
utilize a birefringent crystal with a significant electro-optical effect to change the re-
fractive index as a function of applied voltage. This is also sometimes called the
Pockels effect and it is potentially very fast. The modulators used in the laboratory
can generate displacements on sidebands anywhere between direct current (DC) and
200 MHz with respect to the carrier frequency.
A change in the refractive index directly translates into a phase shift of the signal beam
relative to the local oscillator corresponding to a displacement in the P quadrature.
For a classical plane wave the electromagnetic field changes from,
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E(t) = E0e
iωt , (3.3.1)
into,
E(t) = E0e
i(ωt+η sin(Ωt)) , (3.3.2)
which, expanded in Bessel functions [113, 114], becomes,
E(t) ≈ E0
(
J0(η)e
iωt + J1(η)e
i(ω+Ω)t − J1(η)ei(ω−Ω)t
)
, (3.3.3)
where ω is the angular carrier frequency, Ω is the sideband frequency, η is modulation
depth, and Jk is the k’th Bessel function [115]. This expression implies that there
are sidebands oscillating at ±Ω with respect to the carrier frequency. Homodyne and
heterodyne detection methods are not able to distinguish these sidebands. In fact, en-
tanglement between sidebands is what generates quadrature squeezing when detected
with homodyne detection [114].
It is less obvious why a phase modulation can be used to modulate the amplitude
or Q quadrature. Here it is useful to remember that the crystal is birefringent. If
the input beam is split between horizontal and vertical polarization modes, these will
experience different phase shifts. A polarizing beam splitter after the modulator will
then perform a projective measurement on the output, and the modes will interfere
destructively or constructively depending on the relative phase shift induced by the
modulator, the net effect being that the amplitude is modulated [114]. The crystal,
together with the polarizing beam splitter, essentially realizes a Mach-Zender inter-
ferometer [83]. The birefringence is highly temperature dependent, but rather than
control the temperature of the crystal, manufacturers usually use two crystals, with
their optical axes perpendicular to each other, which causes this drift to average out.
EOM
PBS
EOM
Figure 3.2: Modulator configuration where the first EOM functions as an amplitude
modulator, and the last EOM functions as the phase modulator. The polarizing beam
splitter (PBS) after the first EOM interferes the polarization components exiting the
EOM and dumps half the power. The incoming polarization is adjusted through a
combination of a half-wave and a quarter-wave plate.
To make sure that such a modulator only shifts the sideband along Q, it is quite im-
portant that the input polarization is clean. The reason for this is that a slight misad-
justment leads to the amplitude modulator also modulating the conjugate quadrature.
Typically, one wants there to be no correlations between the quadratures, since this
complicates the analysis. Therefore, it is important to secure the orthogonality of the
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two modulations. This orthogonality also depends on the modulation depth, such that
it becomes hard to obtain it above 15 to 18 dB of modulation relative to the shot noise.
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Figure 3.3: A zero span spectrum analyzer measurement of an asymmetric ther-
mal state, caused by unbalanced input polarization into the amplitude modulator.
The measurement is performed with a homodyne detector, where the relative phase
between the signal and local oscillator is continuously scanned, which gives a time
dependence on the measured quadrature. The sinusoidal pattern appears because
once quadrature is significantly more noisy than the other.
We consider a configuration of an amplitude and a phase modulator as shown in Fig-
ure 3.2. Detecting a modulation along one axis in phase space with a quadrature
scanned homodyne detector, both modulators will be able to produce such a quadra-
ture asymmetric signal, but the recorded signal does not show what the alignment
relative to our preferred coordinate system is, or even how the two modulations are
orientated relative to each other if both modulators are enabled at the same time. We
can however make use of a geometrical argument to show orthogonality. Suppose both
modulations are of the same absolute magnitude. If we enable them simultaneously
and they are orthogonal we would expect to produce a symmetric thermal state. If
they are not, we create an elliptical noise shape in phase space. On the spectrum
analyzer this will look like in Figure 3.3.
Now the task is simply to adjust the incoming polarization to flatten this line. This
will typically require a combination of a half-wave and a quarter-wave plate. In the
configuration shown in Figure 3.2, the phase modulator is located after the ampli-
tude modulator. This means that when adjusting the polarization going into the
amplitude modulator, one is also adjusting the power going into the phase modula-
36
3.3 Modulation of light
Time
−70
−65
−60
−55
−50
−45
N
oi
se
[d
B
m
]
Shot noise
Amplitude
Figure 3.4: A zero span spectrum analyzer measurement of a symmetric thermal
state, where the input polarization into the amplitude modulator is chosen correctly.
The measurement is performed with a homodyne detector, where the relative phase
between the signal and local oscillator is continuously scanned, which gives a time
dependence on the measured quadrature. Here, the sinusoidal pattern is mostly gone
because the two applied modulations are close to being orthogonal.
tor, affecting the size of the modulation there. Since this approach of attempting to
flatten the line only works if the modulations are equal, this is important to keep in
mind. One therefore has to adopt an iterative approach where the wave plates are
adjusted, followed by a check of the individual modulation depths and then further
wave plate adjustment. This can be partially remedied by monitoring the amount
of power dumped after the amplitude modulator. If this stays constant, then the
power forwarded to the phase modulator will also stay constant, and so the modula-
tion will stay the same. However, to do this one needs to compensate with the half
wave plate, and this will shift the transfer function of the amplitude modulator, and
effectively change the modulation depth. So either way it is important to monitor the
relative modulation depth. Typically, the fluctuations in the flatness can be reduced
well below 1 dB for 15 dB of modulation relative to the shot noise, but this depends
critically on the purity of the incoming polarization. The zero span measurement
will then look like on Figure 3.4. It is often useful to use a series of polarizing beam
splitters in transmission to properly "clean" the polarization before the modulators.
To sum up, the algorithm to orthogonalize two polarizations consists of the following
steps:
1. Input two independent noise signals to the pair of modulators shown in Fig-
ure 3.2
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2. Measure these modulations on a scanned homodyne detector
3. Adjust input polarization with the half wave plate such that the PBS after the
modulator removes half the optical power
4. Check that the modulations have equal absolute magnitude
5. Measure both modulations simultaneously
6. Adjust the quarter wave plate to minimize the oscillation seen in Figure 3.3
7. Go to step 3 and repeat the procedure until the measurement looks like Fig-
ure 3.4
Mode cleaning cavity
One type of cavity that was used extensively in the laboratory was the mode cleaning
cavity. This was a travelling wave type cavity with an arrangement of three mirrors
as shown in Figure 3.5. The purpose of this type of cavity was, as the name implies,
to function as a filter for the light beam. The cavity filtered the spatial and polar-
ization modes, and it effectively dampened any laser noise beyond its bandwidth. It
was also used as a reference when interfering beams. Two beams that both fit into
such a cavity are guaranteed to have the same mode characteristics, and so they will
automatically interfere well.
The rear mirror was curved with a radius of curvature of 1 m, which ensured a focus
between the two incoupling mirrors. The effective cavity length was 0.5 meters, and
this length was scanned within a single wavelength by having a piezo electric actuator
push the mirror back and forth depending on the applied voltage. For locking the
cavity the reflected input was used to generate an error signal through a PDH scheme
as described in Section 3.6.1. Unlike a linear cavity the reflected beam was returned at
an angle to the incoming beam. It was therefore quite simple to measure the reflected
input without the use of a Faraday rotator.
Squeezing cavities
Bowtie cavity
Figure 3.6 shows the squeezer that was initially used in the laboratory to generate
squeezed states. This was subsequently replaced by the linear squeezer described in
Section 3.5.2. The bowtie cavity had an arrangement of 4 cavity mirrors, with a
periodically poled potassium titanylphosphate (PPKTP) crystal located between the
two internal mirrors on a copper stage, temperature controlled by a Peltier element
to stay near 30 ◦C. The pump beam was dumped directly after passing through the
crystal. The effective cavity length was 25 cm with a tight beam waist in the center
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EOM
PD
Figure 3.5: Sketch of the ring cavity with three mirrors used as a mode cleaning
cavity. The input beam is phase modulated on a sideband, and the reflected part of
the input beam is detected, mixed down and low-pass filtered to generate an error
signal for a PDH lock, described in Section 3.6.1. This cavity has a high finesse and
filters polarization, spatial mode and sideband noise. The rear mirror is actuated by a
voltage controlled piezo crystal, to change the effective cavity length, thereby changing
the resonance condition. EOM: Electro-optical modulator, PD: Photo detector, PID:
Servo controller.
of the crystal. The incoupling mirror was highly reflective at 99.8 % while the outcou-
pling mirror had a reflectivity of 90 % resulting in a cavity finesse of 55 and a cavity
bandwidth around 25 MHz [116].
The seed beam was injected into the cavity and served as a carrier for the generated
squeezing, while the cavity was held resonant for this beam by counter-propagating
a phase modulated TEM 01 beam, which had been frequency shifted by an acousto-
optical modulator to coincide with the frequency of the seed beam, such that these
modes overlapped in the cavity spectrum. The locking beam was kept in a differ-
ent spatial mode to prevent interference between the locking and seed beams. The
outcoupled locking beam was measured in cavity transmission by a photo detector
and the output of this measurement was mixed down from the sideband frequency to
generate an error signal, as described in Section 3.6.1.
The phase of the injected pump relative to the seed was locked by tapping off 1 %
of the output squeezing and measuring it on a photo detector. The 12 MHz pump
sideband that was also used for the second harmonic generation in the laser was
imprinted on the squeezed output, and so the photo detector measurement of the
tap-off was mixed down with this signal to generate an error signal that was able to
lock the pump phase.
Linear cavity
Figure 3.7 shows the scheme for generating squeezing with a semi-monolithic linear
cavity. The outer crystal face was coated to be highly reflective at 99.9 % for 1064 nm
light. The curved mirror had a curvature of -20 mm, a reflectivity of 90 % for 1064 nm
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Figure 3.6: Scheme for producing vacuum squeezing with a bowtie cavity. The cavity
is locked with a beam which propagates counter to the seed beam. The pump is
dumped after the first crystal pass. EOM: Electro-optical modulator, AOM: Acousto-
optical modulator, PD: Photo detector, PPKTP: Periodically poled potassium titanyl
phosphate crystal, PS: Phase shifter, PID: Servo controller.
light, and 20 % reflectivity for 532 nm. The crystal was kept at a constant 36.7 ◦C, by
a having a Peltier element heat a copper mount thermally coupled to the crystal by a
layer of Indium foil, to satisfy the phase matching criterion [117]. The airgap between
the crystal and the curved mirror determined the cavity length, which was chosen to
be 23 mm. The airgap was adjustable by exchanging the PolyMethylMethAcrylate
(PMMA) spacer plate with one of a different thickness. The cavity length was varied
on the order of the light wavelength by the actuation of the curved mirror through a
piezo electric transducer receiving an input from a high voltage amplifier.
An EOM modulated a sideband in the phase quadrature onto the 1064 nm control
beam, at 37 MHz. This was sent to the side of the cavity with the highly reflective
(HR) incoupling mirror, while a pump beam at 532 nm was sent in from the non-HR
side. The reflection was sent to a photo detector by a Faraday rotator and a polar-
izing beam splitter. The two outputs of the detector were demodulated with a sine
and a cosine respectively, both with a frequency of 37 MHz. This was achieved by
adjusting the relative phases ∆ϕ and ∆θ from Figure 3.7, respectively. One signal
was used as an error signal for locking the cavity length through a servo controller.
The other signal was used to fix the phase of the pump relative to the injected control
beam, to prevent the squeezing ellipse from rotating in phase space. The squeezed
beam exited through the non-HR side, and was reflected by a dichroic beam splitter
such that it could be safely detected without the pump beam influencing the detector.
If the seed beam is shot noise limited, this scheme generates vacuum squeezing, and so
it typically does not represent the general transformation defined in Equation 2.7.8.
The experiment described in Chapter 9 required an in-line squeezing transform of an,
in principle, arbitrary input state. For this purpose the control beam was injected from
the non-HR side to minimize loss to the input state, which necessitated a different
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Figure 3.7: Scheme for producing vacuum squeezing with a linear cavity. The control
beam was phase modulated by an EOM and was largely reflected by the HR coated
incoupling crystal facet, before being redirected to a photo detector by a Faraday
rotator. The photo detector generated two out of phase error signals to lock the
cavity length and relative pump phase. The pump was sent in from the non-HR side,
encountering a weak cavity with 20 % reflectivity at the incoupling mirror and 99.9
% at the outer crystal face. The squeezing propagated out of the cavity through the
non-HR side and was separated from the pump beam by a dichroic beam splitter.
EOM: Electro-optical modulator, FR: Faraday rotator, PD: Photo detector, PPKTP:
Periodically poled potassium titanyl phosphate crystal, PS: Phase shifter, PID: Servo
controller, DBS: Dichroic beam splitter, PBS: Polarizing beam splitter.
locking scheme. This scheme is shown in Figure 3.8. Here, having two error signals
out of phase turns out to not be possible, because the resonant cavity induces an extra
phase shift of the sideband locking modulation that cannot readily be compensated
for. Instead, the cavity length was locked with a Hänsch-Couillaud locking technique,
described in Section 3.6.2, and the pump phase was locked through the conventional
sideband lock.
Locking techniques
Pound-Drever-Hall
To show the working principle of the Pound-Drever-Hall locking technique [114, 118,
119], we follow the analysis of Black [113]. Consider an empty Fabry-Perot cavity, as
depicted in Figure 3.9. In front of the incoupling mirror to this cavity, we have the
electric field components,
Ein = E0e
iωt , Eref = E1e
iωt , (3.6.1)
where E0 and E1 are field amplitudes represented by complex numbers with some
relative phase, ω is the angular frequency, and t is time. Ein is the incoming field and
Eref is the field component reflected from the incoupling cavity mirror. The reflection
coefficient is,
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Figure 3.8: Scheme for producing vacuum squeezing with a linear cavity, with reverse
injection of the control beam. The control beam was phase modulated by an EOM. For
reverse injection, the beam was coupled into the cavity by the 90 % reflectivity piezo
mounted mirror, and the output of the cavity was redirected by a Faraday rotator.
The output beam had a 2 % tap-off, which was split in two, one for a Hänsch-Couillaud
cavity length lock, and one for a sideband pump phase lock. The squeezing propagated
out of the cavity through the non-HR side and was separated from the pump beam by
a dichroic beam splitter. EOM: Electro-optical modulator, FR: Faraday rotator, PD:
Photo detector, PPKTP: Periodically poled potassium titanyl phosphate crystal, PS:
Phase shifter, PID: Servo controller, DBS: Dichroic beam splitter, PBS: Polarizing
beam splitter.
F (L) =
Eref
Ein
=
R
(
exp
(
i ω
∆νfsr
)
− 1
)
1−R2 exp
(
i ω
∆νfsr
) , (3.6.2)
with R as the reflection coefficient of both cavity mirrors, ∆νfsr = c2L being the free
spectral range of the cavity, L is the cavity length, and c is the speed of light in
vacuum. Changing L changes the ratio, such that when the cavity is resonant, F = 0,
though in general F is a complex number that depends on how close to resonance the
cavity is. The phase of the reflected beam is changed depending on whether the cavity
is too long or too short, and so knowing this phase will let us know how to compensate
for this. We may obtain indirect knowledge of this phase through a determination of
F (L).
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Figure 3.9: A Fabry-Perot cavity with a Pound-Drever-Hall locking scheme. The input
beam is phase modulated before being sent towards the cavity. The beam reflected
by the cavity is redirected by a Faraday rotator and a polarizing beam splitter. This
reflected beam is measured by a photo detector, and the output is mixed with a sine at
the sideband frequency. This downmixed signal is the error signal, and it is forwarded
to a PID circuit, which controls the cavity length. PBS: Polarizing beam splitter, PD:
Photo detector, FR: Faraday rotator, PS: Phase shifter, PID: Servo controller.
Suppose we inject an electric field, modulated with a frequency Ω. For a plane wave,
we have the field from Equation (3.3.3),
Ein ≈ E0(J0(η)eiωt + J1(η)ei(ω−Ω)t − J1(η)ei(ω−Ω)t) , (3.6.3)
injected into the cavity. Then the reflected field is given by,
Eref = E0(F (ω)J0(η)e
iωt + F (ω + Ω)J1(η)e
i(ω+Ω)t − F (ω − Ω)J1(η)ei(ω−Ω)t) . (3.6.4)
The reflected power is measured by a photo detector, so we measure |Eref|2, which
may be expressed as,
|Eref|2 = Pc|F (ω)|2 + Ps(|F (ω + Ω)|2 + |F (ω − Ω)|2)
+ 2
√
PcPs(<[F (ω)F ∗(ω + Ω)− F ∗(ω)F (ω − Ω)] cos(Ωt)
+ =[F (ω)F ∗(ω + Ω)− F ∗(ω)F (ω − Ω)] sin(Ωt) + h(t) , (3.6.5)
where h(t) is a function that oscillates with a period of 2Ω, which is not important
for the analysis. Thus, in the rotating carrier frame, the photodetector returns a
signal which has a DC component and a component that oscillates with the sideband
frequency. Mixing this output down with the sideband frequency gives the needed
error signal. Here, the phase of the mixing is important, depending on whether it
is the real or the imaginary part of F (ω)F ∗(ω + Ω) − F ∗(ω)F (ω − Ω) that provides
the necessary information. In the case of the pumped semi-monolithic linear cavity
described in Section 3.5.2, the real and imaginary parts both contribute, in the sense
that one contains information of the pump phase and the other contains information
of the cavity length detuning.
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Figure 3.10: A Fabry-Perot cavity with a Hänsch-Couillaud locking scheme. The beam
reflected from the cavity is tapped off, and the polarization components are mixed
on a polarizing beam splitter to generate an interference signal. The interference
is measured by subtracting two photocurrents, and this error signal is forwarded to
a servo controller, which controls the cavity length. This scheme only works if the
polarization modes in the cavity spectrum are not degenerate. BRM: Birefrigent
medium, PS: Phase shifter, PD: Photo detector, PID: Servo controller.
Hänsch-Couillaud
Consider a linear cavity, as in Figure 3.10, with some birefringent quality that causes a
splitting of the polarization modes in the spectrum. As demonstrated by Hänsch and
Couillaud [120], this birefringence can be used to lock the length of a cavity without
the use of a modulation sideband. In fact, all that is required is polarization optics
and an intensity measurement.
Suppose the incoming beam is split into a horizontal and a vertical component, where
the splitting ratio is determined by the angle θ. Then we may write the incoming
field components as,
Ein,|| = Ein cos(θ) , Ein,⊥ = Ein sin(θ) . (3.6.6)
For a particular cavity length, the mode of horizontal polarization is admitted, while
for another cavity length the vertical polarization mode is admitted. In either case,
the component parallel to the cavity polarization axis fits into the cavity mode, and
so the component of it reflected by the cavity experiences a phase shift from travelling
through the cavity and back. The perpendicular component never enters the cavity,
but is instead promptly reflected and experiences no such phase shift. This phase
difference between the reflected components is exactly what is needed to generate an
error signal.
In terms of the cavity parameters, we may write the reflected field components as [83,
120],
Eref,|| = Ein,||
(√
R− TR3/2 cos(δ)−R
2 + i sin(δ)
(1−R2)2 + 4R2 sin(δ/2)2
)
, (3.6.7)
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Eref,⊥ = Ein,⊥
√
R , (3.6.8)
where R and T are the reflectivity and transmissivity for the incoupling mirror.
When the cavity is resonant we have δ = 2mpi and the field amplitudes of the re-
flected fields are real numbers, which means that they are linearly polarized. If the
cavity is off resonance, the parallel reflected field component, Eref,|| becomes complex,
and so acquires a relative phase to the perpendicular reflected component. This will
make the polarization of the reflected beam elliptic. The reflected beam is sent to a
polarizing beam splitter, which separates it into a vertical and a horizontal compo-
nent. By rotating the incoming polarization components appropriately, we can force
an interference between the parallel and perpendicular polarization components. The
intensities of these components are measured and subtracted, which gives an error sig-
nal caused by the interference phenomenon. The strength of the error signal depends
on the polarization of the incoming beam, such that an incoming beam polarized in
only one direction will not produce an error signal, so at least a small asymmetry is
required. In fact it turns out that an equal distribution of polarization components
into the cavity will maximize the error signal.
Implementing this locking scheme on the linear cavity described in Section 3.5.2 re-
sulted in a transmission spectrum and a corresponding error signal as seen in Fig-
ure 3.11. One drawback of this locking technique is that it is power dependent, so that
when the gain medium in the cavity is pumped and the pump phase is not locked,
the servo controller in the Hänsch-Couillaud lock will try to compensate the resulting
sinusoidal behaviour in the error signal. However, because of the strength of the error
signal and the moderate pump power this fluctuation was not enough to break the
lock before the locking mechanism for the pump phase could be activated.
Measurements
Homodyne detection
A conditional measurement on Gaussian states by homodyne detection was described
in terms of covariance matrices in Section 2.10. Here, we will explain how a homodyne
detection is implemented in the laboratory. The scheme is illustrated in Figure 3.12.
A strong carrier beam, the local oscillator, is sent to a 50/50 beamsplitter, to be
interfered with the signal beam. We write the ladder operators for these modes in the
form [29, 85],
Xˆ = (bˆeiφ, bˆ†e−iφ, aˆ, aˆ†)T , (3.7.1)
where bˆ is for the local oscillator mode, aˆ is for the signal mode, and φ is the relative
phase between the two modes. Applying a 50/50 beamsplitter through the symplectic
transformation SBS(T ),
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Figure 3.11: Airy peaks and corresponding error signal from the implementation of
a Hänsch-Couillaud locking technique on a linear cavity with a birefringent PPKTP
crystal. There is a strong error signal for both horizontal and vertical polarization,
but the incoming beam is only 2 % horizontal, so the transmission peak for horizontal
polarization is correspondingly tiny.
SBS
(
1
2
)
Xˆ =

1√
2
(bˆeiφ + aˆ)
1√
2
(bˆ†e−iφ + aˆ†)
1√
2
(−bˆeiφ + aˆ)
1√
2
(−bˆ†e−iφ + aˆ†)
 =

cˆ
cˆ†
dˆ
dˆ†
 . (3.7.2)
We define the photocurrent operators as proportional to the counting operators, nˆc =
cˆ†cˆ and nˆd = dˆ†dˆ, so
iˆc ∝ cˆ†cˆ , (3.7.3)
m
iˆc ∝ 1
2
(bˆ†e−iφ + aˆ†)(bˆeiφ + aˆ) , (3.7.4)
m
iˆc ∝ 1
2
(bˆ†bˆ+ bˆ†aˆe−iφ + aˆ†bˆeiφ + aˆ†aˆ) . (3.7.5)
Similarly, the photocurrent from the other photo detector is given by,
iˆd ∝ dˆ†dˆ , (3.7.6)
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Figure 3.12: A scheme illustrating a homodyne detection of the quadratures of a
signal beam. A strong local oscillator is interfered with a comparatively weak signal
beam on a 50/50 beam splitter and a relative phase controlled by a phase shifter. The
two output modes are measured by photo detectors, and the photocurrents generated
by these photo detectors are subtracted to give a measurement outcome with a high
common mode rejection. In addition, the subtraction of the DC outputs gives an error
signal for locking the relative phase as pi
2
to the local oscillator, to reliably measure
the P quadrature. PS: Phase shifter, PD: Photo detector, PID: Servo controller, LO:
Local oscillator.
m
iˆd ∝ 1
2
(bˆ†bˆ− bˆ†aˆe−iφ − aˆ†bˆeiφ + aˆ†aˆ) . (3.7.7)
If the photodetectors amplify their photocurrents by the same gain factor, subtracting
the photocurrents gives us
iˆc − iˆd ∝ bˆ†aˆe−iφ + aˆ†bˆeiφ . (3.7.8)
We may linearize this expression by rewriting the ladder operators aˆ = |α| + δαˆ
and bˆ = |β| + δβˆ. In this way we have written the operators into classical constant
parts, |α| and |β|, and fluctuating parts, δαˆ and δβˆ. We shall call |α| and |β| the
DC components, while δαˆ and δβˆ are alternating current (AC) components [114].
They represent the noise fluctuations at the sideband of interest. Assuming the noise
fluctuations to be small, we keep them only to the first order and obtain
iˆc − iˆd ∝ 2|β||α| cos(φ) + |β|(δαˆ†eiφ + δαˆe−iφ) + |α|(δβˆ†e−iφ + δβˆeiφ) , (3.7.9)
m
iˆc − iˆd ∝ 2|β||α| cos(φ) + |β|Xˆδαˆ(φ) + |α|Xˆδβˆ(φ) , (3.7.10)
where the last line has introduced a generalized quadrature operator,
Xˆaˆ(φ) = aˆe
−iφ + aˆ†eiφ , (3.7.11)
such that for φ = 0, Xˆaˆ(φ) = Qˆ, and for φ = pi2 , Xˆaˆ(φ) = Pˆ .
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The first term in Equation (3.7.10) shows how the DC output from the photocurrent
subtraction depends on the relative phase between the inputs. In practice this relative
phase is controlled by a mirror attached to a piezo electric transducer. This trans-
ducer reacts to an applied voltage, typically of some hundreds of volts, and expands
or contracts accordingly, by a distance on the order of the wavelength. This allows
for very precise control of the interference between the beams. Keeping this phase
stable is important, as any deviation means that a different marginal distribution of
the state in question is measured. Keeping the relative phase at φ = pi
2
to measure
Pˆ is fairly straightforward, in that the first term in Equation (3.7.10) should be zero.
In this way, measuring the DC output from the subtracted photocurrents exactly
provides an error signal for a locking circuit. Measuring Qˆ is slightly more involved,
in that it usually requires some auxiliary modulation to generate the error signal. If
an auxiliary phase modulation is applied and the subtraction of the two AC compo-
nents forces them to cancel exactly, then the homodyne detector must be measuring
a marginal distribution exactly orthogonal to the phase, i.e the amplitude.
The last two terms in Equation (3.7.10) show that the operator for the fluctuations in
the signal mode is amplified by |β|, and the fluctuations in the local oscillator mode
are amplified by |α|. We say that the sidebands generate a beat pattern with the car-
rier, in analogy with the terminology originally developed for radio technology [114].
Since we are not interested in measuring the noise contribution from the local oscil-
lator, we arrive at the conclusion that the requirement |β|  |α| is necessary if we
wish to resolve the quantum noise properties of the signal mode. This approximation
is sometimes called the brightness approximation.
A technical benefit of the subtraction of the photocurrents is that it allows for a very
high common mode rejection, upwards of 40 dB depending on the balancing of the
beam splitter. This means that any noise that is common to both detectors will be
cancelled out, because it appears in both photocurrents and cancels itself out, which
to some degree dispenses with the requirement that the laser source be shot noise
limited. Of course, the electronic noise arising from the photodetector circuit itself
must still be kept low, and cannot be eliminated through this particular technique.
Heterodyne detection
A heterodyne detection scheme, see Figure 3.13, is one where the signal beam is su-
perimposed with a vacuum mode on a balanced beam splitter. The two output modes
are sent to two separate homodyne detectors, that measure P and Q respectively, with
the technique described in Section 3.7.1. However, there is a more compact way of
implementing this technique, provided that certain conditions are satisfied. Suppose
that we implement a homodyne detector as described in Section 3.7.1, and that in
addition to subtracting the photocurrents, we also add them,
iˆc + iˆd ∝ bˆ†bˆ+ aˆ†aˆ . (3.7.12)
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Figure 3.13: A scheme illustrating a heterodyne detection of the quadratures of a
signal beam. The signal beam is split on a 50/50 beam splitter, and the two outputs
are detected using two independent homodyne detectors. Two strong local oscillators
are interfered with comparatively weak signal beams on 50/50 beam splitters and the
relative phases controlled by phase shifters. In one homodyne detector, the relative
phase is locked to pi
2
using the subtracted DC output. The other is locked through the
measurement of a phase modulated sideband. PS: Phase shifter, PD: Photo detector,
PID: Servo controller, LO: Local oscillator, EOM: Electro-optical modulator.
Performing the linearization as before, we get,
iˆc + iˆd ∝ |β|2 + |α|2 + |β|Qˆδβˆ + |α|Qˆδαˆ . (3.7.13)
Here, the photocurrents are a combination of the added DC outputs, the noise fluc-
tuations of the local oscillator amplified by the local oscillator strength, and the noise
fluctuations of the signal amplified by the signal strength. We see therefore, that for
this to work we require |α| to be sufficiently large in order to amplify the signal oscil-
lations. On the other hand, we saw from Equation (3.7.10) that it requires |β|  |α|.
Let us instead consider the case where |α| = |β|,
iˆc − iˆd ∝ 2|α|2 cos(φ) + |α|(Xˆδαˆ(φ) + Xˆδβˆ(φ)) , (3.7.14)
iˆc + iˆd ∝ 2|α|2 + |α|(Qˆδβˆ + Qˆδαˆ) . (3.7.15)
We see that for both addition and subtraction, we get the signal fluctuations, but at
the cost of the local oscillator noise not being cancelled. However, at the sideband
of interest, and assuming a shot noise limited laser source, Xˆδβˆ will be the vacuum
fluctuations, and so performing a heterodyne detection in this manner, the extra unit
of vacuum enters through the vacuum fluctuations of the local oscillator rather than
through a physical beam splitter, but otherwise performs as expected. This also re-
quires that both carriers are sufficiently powerful to amplify the sideband fluctuations.
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We may also consider the case where we wish to perform a generalized heterodyne
detection, a Bell detection as described in Section 2.12. Here, the operator Xˆδβˆ also
contains a signal, in addition to the vacuum noise. If both carriers are bright and
the source is shot noise limited, adding and subtracting the photocurrents once again
offers a compact alternative to a conventional Bell detection scheme, in the same way
as for heterodyne detection.
Data acquisition
As we saw in Sections 3.7.1 and 3.7.2, homodyne and heterodyne measurements re-
turn photocurrents with a frequency spectrum corresponding to the sideband noise
spectrum. This may be seen by, for example, measuring the voltage converted sig-
nal with a spectrum analyzer that shows the strength of the individual frequency
components. Another way to record the outcome of a measurement is by digitizing
it with a high speed digitizer, since we, according to Nyquists theorem [5], need to
sample with at least twice the frequency of the fastest sideband we wish to investigate.
We are often only interested in one specific sideband. The solution is then to mix the
voltage converted photocurrent with a sinusoidal signal at the frequency of interest.
This sinusoidal signal is called the electronic local oscillator (ELO). This will cause
a beat between the different frequency components. Specifically, the spectrum of the
mixer output will contain the voltage converted photocurrent sideband of interest
moved to DC, and the voltage converted photocurrent sideband moved up by the
ELO frequency because of the identity,
sin(Ω) sin(ΩELO) =
1
2
(cos(Ω− ΩELO)− cos(Ω + ΩELO) , (3.7.16)
where Ω is the sideband frequency and ΩELO is the ELO frequency. We here wish to
measure the component with the frequency Ω− ΩELO, since this enables the analog-
to-digital converter to sample near DC. To attenuate the component at frequency
Ω + ΩELO, and also to avoid the aliasing effects predicted by Nyquist’s theorem, a
low-pass filter is inserted before the analog-to-digital conversion.
A low-pass filter in this position determines the measurement bandwidth, typically
in the hundreds of kHz, but to completely avoid the aliasing a sampling frequency
higher than twice the measurement bandwidth should be selected, such that the filter
is able to properly suppress the high-frequency components in the spectrum. This
choice of frequency depends primarily on the slope of the filter and the bit depth of
the analog-to-digital converter.
Tomographic reconstruction of Wigner functions
This section introduces the concept of state reconstruction through the use of marginal
quadrature probability distributions. These techniques were initially developed for
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medical imaging, but were then applied by Smithey et al. to measurements of squeezed
states [93, 121].
Inverse Radon transformation
Suppose that we have measured a number of marginal distributions of some state
through the use of homodyne detection. We have seen in Section 3.7.1 that this
can be accomplished by changing the relative phase between the signal and local
oscillator beams. For each phase angle we may define a new marginal distribution,
and we collect these probability distributions to get the two dimensional probability
pr(X, θ). Thus, for a given angle θ, pr(X, θ) quantifies the probability of the outcome
X. We note that Wigner functions have the important property [82],
pr(X, θ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
W (X cos(θ)− P sin(θ), X sin(θ) + P cos(θ))dP . (3.8.1)
To put this in words, the marginal distributions obtained through our homodyne de-
tection with varied relative phase are given by the integral over P of a Wigner function
at an angle θ to the conventional coordinate system.
Since quantum mechanical measurements in general, and homodyne measurements
in particular, only ever produce marginal distributions, Equation (3.8.1) provides a
convenient relation between the experimentally obtained marginal distributions and
the Wigner function that uniquely describes the state. Inverting this integral is the
objective of the so called inverse Radon transform. The inversion has the form [82],
W (Q,P ) =
1
2pi2
∫ pi
0
∫ ∞
−∞
pr(X, θ)K(Q cos(θ) + P sin(θ)−X)dXdθ , (3.8.2)
where K(x) is the integration kernel,
K(x) =
1
2
∫ ∞
−∞
|ξ|eiξx dξ . (3.8.3)
The filtered back projection algorithm is a straightforward method for implementing
this inversion [82]. Given a histogram containing the obtained marginals one sets a
cutoff frequency in the kernel integral, such that it becomes
K(x) =
1
2
∫ kc
−kc
|ξ|eiξx dξ = 1
x2
(cos(kcx) + kcx sin(kcx)− 1) . (3.8.4)
Because this function is not well behaved around x = 0 one introduces a threshold
|kcx| = 0.1 such that,
K(x) =

1
x2
(cos(kcx) + kcx sin(kcx)− 1) when |kcx| > 0.1
k2c
2
(
1− k
2
cx
2
4
+
k4cx
4
72
)
when |kcx| ≤ 0.1
. (3.8.5)
51
Chapter 3: Experimental techniques
kc is a free parameter in the sense that there is no value that works for every state one
wishes to reconstruct. One may regard it as a frequency filter, such that it determines
the minimum size of the features in the Wigner function that will be resolved. If the
value is too high the reconstruction will contain characteristic ripples. If the value is
too low the reconstruction will turn into a featureless lump.
Maximum likelihood
The maximum likelihood algorithm is fundamentally different from the inverse Radon
transform. Instead of getting the Wigner function as output, the maximum likelihood
algorithm generates the density matrix most likely to be responsible for the observed
marginal distributions. This density matrix is represented in the Fock basis. Since a
harmonic oscillator is unbounded in photon number, it is necessary to truncate the
density matrix. As long as this is done at a point where the photon distribution of
the state to be reconstructed is sufficiently attenuated, this is not a problem.
This condition of suitably small photon numbers is rather easily achieved for squeezed
vacuum states and small displacements, since the mean photon number is low for these
states. However, for a thermal state with high variance the photon number decays
slowly and so maximum likelihood will likely be too slow to solve the problem. The
maximum likelihood algorithm is however preferable to the inverse radon transform
for low photon numbers because it is more likely to be numerically stable, and has no
free parameter that must be chosen rather arbitrarily by the user [122].
The problem one wishes to solve is the same as for the inverse Radon transform,
but it must be stated slightly differently. Suppose again, that we have a marginal
probability distribution for some angle θ in the Q,P phase space. This probability
distribution is described by the trace formula,
pr(θ) = Tr(Mˆθρˆ) , (3.8.6)
of the state ρˆ one wishes to reconstruct with the POVM Mˆ for the angle θ [122,
123]. In this way Mˆ represents the measurement that produces the relevant marginal
distribution. We define the iteration operator
Rˆ(ρˆ) =
∑
i
Mˆθ(Xi, θi)
pr(Xi, θi)
, (3.8.7)
which is applied with the recursion
ρˆ(k+1) = Rˆ(ρˆ(k))ρˆ(k)Rˆ(ρˆ(k)) , (3.8.8)
and normalization in each step, to guarantee that Trρˆ(k+1) = 1. It can be shown,
using variational calculus, that the likelihood functional,
L =
∏
i
prρˆ(Xi, θi) , (3.8.9)
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is maximized by this choice of iteration in most cases [122, 124]. The essence of the
algorithm is that one sets up an initial ρˆ, either a vacuum state or a maximally mixed
state, or something of the sort. Then one constructs a projection operator Rˆ(ρˆ) from
Equation (3.8.7), which depends on the observed marginals and the wavefunctions of
the relevant Fock states. These are proportional to the well known Hermite polyno-
mials, which can be generated recursively rather easily.
For each iteration the projection operator is applied to the density matrix, a new
projection operator is constructed based on the outcome of this, and this process
continues either until a certain convergence threshold has been reached or a particular
number of iterations have been performed, such that one is reasonably certain that ρˆ
has converged towards the correct answer. Figure 3.14 shows a comparison between
inverse Radon and maximum likelihood reconstruction of a squeezed vacuum state.
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Figure 3.14: Comparison of the reconstructed Wigner functions of a squeezed state,
with (a) maximum likelihood and (b) inverse Radon transformation. The inverse
Radon reconstruction has distinct ripples that are not present when using maximum
likelihood.
53
High-rate measurement device indepen-
dent quantum cryptography
Introduction
In the discussion of secure quantum communication between two honest parties, we
usually have a simple scenario where Alice wishes to communicate with Bob and Eve
is eavesdropping on the quantum channel between them that facilitates the conversa-
tion. This is the configuration considered for the development of the BB84 protocol [7],
and many subsequent developments [18, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48]. However, an important
component in the development of modern information theory is the idea of the relay.
The simplest useful configuration we can imagine without falling back to simple
point-to-point protocols consists of three parties. Two of these are the actual users,
Alice and Bob, and the third party is Charlie, who is charged with relaying infor-
mation between Alice and Bob. In quantum information theory this construction
occurs in a variety of protocols, where different levels of trust and signalling assump-
tions are distributed across the different parties, creating many interesting scenar-
ios [15, 16, 20, 35, 125, 126]. A collection of such relays could form the first iteration
of the so-called quantum internet [127].
Of particular interest is the idea of measurement device independent quantum key dis-
tribution (MDIQKD) [34, 35]. This is, in a sense, a weaker version of the powerful idea
of device independent quantum key distribution [32, 33], where the breaking of a Bell
like inequality certifies the security of the scheme independently of the sources and the
detection. This is useful if one is not willing to trust the manufacturer, but the nature
of the scheme makes it incredibly hard to realize in a practical way. Point-to-point
protocols generally assume that both sources and measurement devices can be trusted,
which is not necessarily justifiable in in-field implementations [40, 41, 128, 129]. Fail-
ure to align the implementation with the assumptions made in the security proof lead
to side channels that can be exploited by quantum hackers [130, 131, 132, 133]. These
attacks are by their very nature highly dependent on the implementation, but they
underline the fact that it is necessary to be aware of the assumptions made. There-
fore, the fewer assumptions one has to make, the stronger the system is.
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Figure 4.1: Basic relay configuration with a continuous variable Bell detection and
coherent state inputs from Alice and Bob.
Measurement device independence is a concept that allows for dispensing with the
trust assumptions on the detection hardware, though the state production must re-
main trusted. In this way it strikes the balance between standard point-to-point
protocols and the completely device independent protocols that utilize entanglement.
Despite this being a weaker property than full device independence, it is also fun-
damentally easier to achieve [134, 135, 136], and consequently can be more readily
applied in practical scenarios. One further advantage of measurement device indepen-
dence is that it allows for the construction of a more convenient network structure,
and in particular to dispense with the end-to-end networking principle [137, 138].
What we demonstrate here is the theoretical development and experimental test of the
first measurement device independent protocol in continuous variables (CVMDIQKD).
The protocol for CVMDIQKD is roughly this:
1. Alice and Bob prepare random coherent states |α〉 and |β〉.
2. Alice and Bob forward their states to a relay.
3. The relay performs a Bell-like detection on the input states and broadcasts the
outcome γ publicly.
4. With the knowledge of γ Alice can infer |β〉 and vice versa.
The scheme is illustrated in Figure 4.1. What is interesting about this protocol is
that without making any assumptions on the detection, it can be shown that Eve can
not in any way manipulate the measurement of the relay or the announcement of γ
to give herself an advantage. She can of course refuse to announce γ or announce a
wrong value, but this is a trivial denial-of-service attack that is always available, even
in point-to-point protocols.
In practice it turns out that a spatially symmetric configuration is not optimal. What
is indeed optimal is that one party is closer to the relay. This allows the other party to
be quite far away, and the total range between the parties can be much greater than
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is the case for a symmetric configuration. The theory for this protocol was developed
by Stefano Pirandola, Carlo Ottaviani, Gaetana Spedalieri, Christian Weedbrook,
Samuel Braunstein and Seth Lloyd, while the experiment was implemented by this
author and colleagues. This work was published in [139].
Theory
To make the above discussion more concrete let us derive the properties of the pro-
tocol. As mentioned, Alice and Bob prepare coherent states |α〉 and |β〉 respectively.
Now, as argued in Section 2.8, we may regard this as Alice and Bob preparing EPR
states of some magnitude, with each of them sending one mode toward the relay and
keeping the other for conditioning. We therefore have an initial covariance matrix of
the form,
ΓaAbB =

µI2
√
µ2 − 1Z 02 02√
µ2 − 1Z µI2 02 02
02 02 µI2
√
µ2 − 1Z
02 02
√
µ2 − 1Z µI2
 . (4.2.1)
The lower case modes a and b are the modes kept locally by Alice and Bob, respec-
tively. The upper case modes A and B are sent towards the relay. We choose both
EPR states to have size µ. There is no reason for Alice and Bob to pick different
values, and they can easily agree on this choice beforehand. In the density matrix
formalism this overall system is described by the state ρˆaAbBE, when we include the
modes of the eavesdropper. This global state containing all relevant modes is pure.
Now we allow Eve to implement some unitary operator Uˆ on all the modes except a
and b, as seen in Figure 4.2. This will leave the overall state pure, but there is no
requirement that this operation preserve Gaussianity. We recall that local operations
always commute because they take place in different modes. This means that we may
consider the effects of Eve’s measurement before we consider the conditioning mea-
surements of Alice and Bob. We then use the fact that [71] any Gaussian operation
may be represented as a sequence of Gaussian channels with unitary operations and
subsequent homodyne detections. We assume that the eavesdropper implements a
Gaussian detection operation, because this will maximize her information content as
argued in Section 2.13.
By extension, we simply assume that Eve implements homodyne detection, since the
transformation that takes the actual detection method into homodyne detection may
be absorbed into the unitary Uˆ . Let us call the overall state conditioned on this
measurement outcome |ΦabE|γ〉, where γ is the measurement outcome. Since Eve
implemented homodyne detection, the state |ΦabE|γ〉 is pure. It is composed of the
reduced states ρˆab|γ and ρˆE|γ. Using the self-duality property of the von Neumann
entropy from Section 2.14 we therefore conclude that,
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Figure 4.2: Generalized joint attack on the MDIQKD protocol. The modes A and B
from Alice and Bob respectively are inputs to a unitary operation Uˆ , which interferes
these modes with ancillary vacuum modes controlled by Eve. Uˆ outputs two modes
that simulate the effect of the relay measurement, and the rest of the outputs labelled
E go to a quantum memory (QM), which Eve measures once the protocol is over in
order to implement a collective attack.
S(ρab|γ) = S(ρE|γ) , (4.2.2)
since Eve is able to purify the post-measurement state of Alice and Bob. We now let
Alice encode her outgoing state by having her perform a heterodyne measurement on
mode a. Producing the outcome α˜, we get the overall state pure state |ΦbE|γα˜〉. We
therefore have the relation,
S(ρˆb|γα˜) = S(ρˆE|γα˜) , (4.2.3)
which means that Eve is limited in her information gain by the Holevo quantity from
Equation (2.14.30) expressed through the von Neumann entropies,
χ(E|γ) = S(E|γ)− S(E|γα˜) = S(ρˆab|γ)− S(ρˆb|γα˜) . (4.2.4)
This is a remarkable result because it depends only on the state ρˆab|γ. Next, we let
Bob perform his conditioning measurement, with the outcome β˜. The classical mutual
information shared by Alice and Bob is thus determined by,
I(AB|γ) = I(α˜, β˜|γ) = I(α, β|γ) . (4.2.5)
This quantity is also completely determined by the state ρˆab|γ. The secret key rate of
the protocol is therefore given by an average over the relay measurement outcomes
such that,
R =
∫
C
P (γ)R|γ d2γ , (4.2.6)
with R|γ = I(α, β|γ) − χ(E|γ) from the standard Devetak-Winter bound [109] and
where P (γ) is the probability distribution of the relay outcomes.
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We now wish to show that Uˆ can not be chosen in such a way as to compro-
mise the security of the protocol. To do this, consider the probability distribution
P (α, β, γ) = P (α, β|γ)P (γ) of the measurement outcomes, available to Alice and Bob
from observation. Given this probability distribution it is possible for Alice and Bob
to infer an optimal joint attack on their links and for them to infer the state ρˆab|γ that
results from this. Since ρˆab|γ can be inferred in this way and P (γ) is known, the rate
R is completely determined. Consequently, as long as we change Uˆ in such a way that
P (α, β, γ) stays the same, the rate is unchanged. We consider the unitary operator
representing Bell detection, which naturally fulfils the identity I = Uˆ †BellUˆBell. We may
use this unitary to change Eve’s homodyne detections into a Bell detection, as we
originally intended the relay to do. This is done by changing our arbitrary unitary Uˆ
such that Uˆ = Uˆ Uˆ †BellUˆBell, and define a new arbitrary unitary Uˆ
′ = Uˆ Uˆ †Bell.
From this argument we see that there is no difference between a properly working
relay performing Bell detection, with Eve performing a joint attack on the links de-
scribed by the unitary Uˆ ′, and Eve appropriating the relay and performing homodyne
detections directly. One may be changed into the other without changing the observed
probability distribution, and consequently without affecting the secret key rate. We
may therefore consider the relay as performing as intended and focus on the possible
attacks on the links. This is the power of measurement device independence. We
now recall, from Section 2.13, that Gaussian attacks on Gaussian protocols are opti-
mal [81], because they maximize Eve’s information gain. We may therefore construct
an upper bound on Eve’s information gain if we assume that her attack on the relay
links is of a Gaussian nature, since the Gaussian states permit the use of the covari-
ance matrix framework
Consider the post-relay covariance matrix, Γab|γ, which may acquired from Equa-
tion (4.2.1) through the proper symplectic operations which will be elaborated on
later. This state is invariant to changes in γ [140]. However, IAB|γ and χE|γ are
determined solely by Γab|γ so we may write,
I(AB|γ) = I(A : B) , χ(E|γ) = χ(E) . (4.2.7)
It then immediately follows that,
R = R|γ = I(A : B)− χ(E) , (4.2.8)
where we have assumed an ideal post processing efficiency, as this does not change
any of our further results substantially. From this, the rate is determined only by
Γab|γ, which is not surprising since we know that there exists an equivalence between
ρˆab|γ and Γab|γ when the states are Gaussian.
We now consider a particular attack, namely a two-mode version of the entangling
cloner attack [71, 141, 97]. This attack is illustrated in Figure 4.3. Consider a beam
splitter in each link, with transmissions TA and TB respectively. Eve controls a number
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Figure 4.3: An illustration of the generalized entangling cloner attack. The user out-
put modes towards the relay, A and B, are interfered on two beam splitters with two
auxiliary modes, E1 and E2, controlled by the eavesdropper. The beam splitters have
the ratios TA and TB, and the ancillary modes introduce excess noise contributions
of WA and WB in the respective modes. The eavesdropper ancillary modes are part
of a larger reservoir E1, e, E2, which defines an overall pure Gaussian state. Eve’s
output modes of this attack, E ′1 and E ′2, are stored in quantum memories that are
collectively measured once the state transfer stage of the protocol terminates.
of auxiliary modes, and in particular she has two modes, E1 and E2, which are injected
into the links via the beam splitters. The modes E1 and E2 have the general covariance
matrix,
ΓE1E2 =

WA 0 g 0
0 WA 0 g
′
g 0 WB 0
0 g′ 0 WB
 . (4.2.9)
We see that for each link WA or WB of thermal noise is injected, and these noise
injections are correlated with each other according to the coefficients g and g′. How
well correlated the modes are allowed to be is determined by the Heisenberg inequality
from Equation (2.7.3). The global covariance matrix is then,
ΓaAbBE1E2 = ΓaAbB ⊗ ΓE1E2 , (4.2.10)
where ΓaAbB is defined in Equation (4.2.1). After applying the beam splitter trans-
formations of transmissions TA and TB with a subsequent reordering of the modes we
obtain,
ΓaA′bE′1E′2B′ =
 Γab CabA′E′1 CabE′2B′CTabA′E′1 ΓA′E′1 CA′E′1E′2B′
CTabE′2B′ C
T
A′E′1E
′
2B
′ ΓE′2B′
 , (4.2.11)
where we have the diagonal submatrices,
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Γab = µ(I2 ⊗ I2) , (4.2.12)
ΓA′E′1 =
[
xAI2 x′′AI2
x′′AI2 x′AI2
]
, (4.2.13)
ΓE′2B′ =
[
x′BI2 x′′BI2
x′′BI2 xBI2
]
, (4.2.14)
with
xk = Tkµ+ (1− Tk)Wk , (4.2.15)
x′k = TkWk + (1− Tk)µ , (4.2.16)
x′′k =
√
Tk(1− Tk)(Wk − µ) . (4.2.17)
The off-diagonal submatrices, which contain the correlations are given by,
CabA′E′1 =
[√
ϕ˜TAZ −
√
µ˜(1− TA)Z
02 02
]
, (4.2.18)
CabE′2B′ =
[
02 02
−√ϕ˜(1− TB)Z √µ˜TBZ
]
, (4.2.19)
CA′E′1E′2B′ =
[√
(1− TA)TBG
√
(1− TA)(1− TB)G√
TATBG
√
(1− TB)TAG
]
, (4.2.20)
with,
G =
[
g 0
0 g′
]
. (4.2.21)
However, since we know that Eve can purify the conditioning modes, we are not
interested in Eve’s ancilla modes. We therefore truncate the global covariance matrix
to get
ΓabA′B′ =
 µI4 CabA′ CabB′CTabA′ ΓA′ CA′B′
CTabB′ C
T
A′B′ ΓB′
 , (4.2.22)
where we have the blocks
ΓA′ = xAI2 , ΓB′ = xBI2 , (4.2.23)
and the correlations
CabA′ =
[√
µ˜TAZ
02
]
, CabB′ =
[
02√
µ˜TBZ
]
, (4.2.24)
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CA′B′ =
√
(1− TA)(1− TB)G . (4.2.25)
To obtain the conditional covariance matrix Γab|γ, we need to condition ΓabA′B′ on
the Bell detection performed by the relay. We do this according to the recipe given
in Section 2.12. We first construct,
Θ =
1
2
(ZΓA′Z + ΓB′ −ZCA′B′ −CTA′B′Z) =
1
2
[
θ 0
0 θ′
]
, (4.2.26)
where θ = (TA + TB)µ + λ and θ′ = (TA + TB)µ + λ′. In addition, λ = κ − ug > 0
and λ′ = κ + ug′ > 0, with parameters κ = (1 − TA)WA + (1 − TB)WB and u =
2
√
(1− TA)(1− TB). With this matrix defined, we apply Equation (2.12.4) to get,
Γab|γ = µI4 − (µ2 − 1)×

TA
θ
0 −
√
TATB
θ
0
0 TA
θ′ 0 −
√
TATB
θ′
−
√
TATB
θ
0 TB
θ
0
0 −
√
TATB
θ′ 0
TB
θ′
 . (4.2.27)
For two mode states we may express the symplectic spectrum in terms of the de-
terminants of the sub blocks of the covariance matrix, also called the symplectic
invariants [90]. Using this, in conjunction with the definition of Equation (2.13.13),
we can conveniently express the mutual information as,
I(A : B) =
1
2
log2
(
1 + det Γb|γ + TrΓb|γ
1 + det Γb|γα˜ + TrΓb|γα˜
)
. (4.2.28)
The Holevo bound is again expressed through the von Neumann entropies,
χ(E) = S(ρˆab|γ)− S(ρˆb|γα˜) . (4.2.29)
Calculating the symplectic spectrum in the case of ideal EPR states with µ  1 we
may write,
χ(E) = S(νab|γ,1) + S(νab|γ,2)− S
(√
det Γb|γα˜
)
. (4.2.30)
In the ideal EPR state limit and for TA 6= TB, the symplectic eigenvalues of the state
ρˆab|γ are given by the expressions,
νab|γ,1 =
|TA − TB|
TA + TB
µ , νab|γ,2 =
λλ′
|TA − TB| . (4.2.31)
For the particular case where TA = TB the symplectic eigenvalues are,
νab|γ,1 =
√
λµ
2TB
, νab|γ,2 =
√
λ′µ
2TB
. (4.2.32)
Combining these expressions with Equation (4.2.8) we arrive at the secure key rate,
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Figure 4.4: Security region for the MDI protocol in terms of the two transmissions in
the joint quantum channel. The solid black line indicates where the secure key rate is
exactly zero. From this plot it is clear that an asymmetric configuration is preferred
with Alice being much closer to the relay. This plot has zero excess noise, such that
the joint quantum channel is characterized purely by the transmissions TA and TB.
R(TA, TB, ) = log2
(
2(TA + TB)
e|TA − TB|ε
)
+ g
(
TAε
TA + TB
− 1
)
− g
(
TATBε− (TA + TB)2
|TA − TB|(TA + TB)
)
, (4.2.33)
with ε = 2(TA+TB)
TATB
+ , and g(x) is the bosonic information function given in Equa-
tion (2.14.21). ε quantifies the protocol noise, and separates it into a term caused
by the introduction of quantum shot noise, and a term of size  introduced by the
eavesdropper, which we refer to as the excess noise. Further, the correlation param-
eters are chosen such that g = −g′, which turns out to be the worst case scenario
for the correlations in the injected noise. This also confirms the intuition that a joint
attack on the links is superior to two separate entangling cloner attacks, where Eve
prepares two independent EPR states and injects a mode from each into the links [71].
We investigate the secure region of the protocol by plotting the rate against TA and
TB in Figure 4.4. Any location in this transmission plane where R > 0 is deemed
secure. The preference for transmission asymmetry is very apparent from this plot,
and we will focus our experimental investigation on the scenario where Alice is in
close proximity to the relay and the distance between Bob and the relay is varied.
62
4.3 Experiment
Experiment
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EOM: Electro-Optical Modulator
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DAQ: Data Acquisition
RNG: Random Number Generator
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Figure 4.5: Experimental setup for the MDIQKD experiment. Alice and Bob have
bright separate carrier beams with shot-noise limited sidebands at 10.5 MHz. The
brightness of the carrier serves as the local oscillator. These sidebands are modulated
by independent amplitude and phase modulators controlled by random number gen-
erators. From run to run, the net effect of this is to displace both input vacuum states
into random displaced states picked from a 2D Gaussian distribution that determines
the size of the continuous alphabet. Attenuation from the channel is simulated by a
reduction of Bob’s modulation depth. The displaced states are mixed on a balanced
50/50 beamsplitter and the outputs of this interference are detected by two separate
photodiodes. The photocurrents are filtered, digitized and suitably processed to infer
the rate of secret key generation. EOM: Electro-optical modulator, PD: Photodi-
ode, PBS: Polarizing beam splitter, DAQ: Data acquisition, RNG: Random number
generator.
The experimental setup implemented a prepare-and-measure version of the entangle-
ment based scheme described above. See Figure 4.5 for a sketch of the experiment. A
1064 nm laser beam was split into two equal parts. Each path had a phase modulator
and an amplitude modulator, which had their modulations orthogonalized according
to the procedure outlined in Section 3.3. These modulators were driven by indepen-
dent Gaussian noise sources, that were white within the measurement bandwidth of
100 kHz. As explained in Section 3.3, the polarization was kept pure to minimize
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the cross quadrature correlations. The outputs from the noise generators were also
recorded such that the initial modulation could later be correlated with the relay
measurements in the post-processing.
The beams were interfered on a balanced 50/50 beam splitter, with about 99 % vis-
ibility in order to realize the Bell detection of the relay. The relative phase of the
beams was controlled by a piezo mounted mirror. The mirror position was actively
adjusted through a servo controller to equalize the power in the beam splitter output
ports. These outputs went directly to two high efficiency photo detectors. Locking
the mirror position was enabled by the zero crossing of the subtracted carrier power
measurements from these detectors, as explained in Section 3.7.1.
The AC outputs of the photo detectors were downmixed from 10.5 MHz. By locking
the relative phase in the manner described, subtraction of these outputs allowed us to
measure the phase quadrature, while adding the photocurrents gave us the amplitude
quadrature. This is the simplified Bell detection scheme described in Section 3.7.2,
which is possible because the carrier beam is bright and shot noise limited [142].
Before being digitized, the signals went through a 100 kHz lowpass filter which set
the measurement bandwidth. The digitization had a sampling rate of 500 kHz and
14 bit resolution, to enable the proper suppression and avoid aliasing. The effective
transmission was varied, not by using a beamsplitter and waveplate combination, but
by reducing the effective modulation for the corresponding party. This reduction in
modulation is completely equivalent to reducing the carrier power, but this approach
was more convenient from an experimental point of view to avoid changing the shot-
noise level.
From the data we were able to infer the classical covariance matrix, which con-
tains the modes involved in the practical implementation. We label this matrix as
Γ(QA, PA, QB, PB, X−r, X+r). Here QA ,PA, QB, and PB are the random variables
with Gaussian distributions that Alice and Bob selected their coherent states from.
We condition this matrix on the relay outcomes X−r and X+r, which are themselves
random variables of Gaussian distributions, to obtain the conditional covariance ma-
trix Γcond = Γ(QA, PA, QB, PB|γr). r is a balancing parameter that is not unity due to
a mismatch of photo detector gains. This parameter is selected to optimize the rate,
in order to simulate a perfectly working relay. As argued from the security proof, we
may always assume a perfectly working relay and so this rate maximization is justified.
Neither of these matrices that result from the initial reconstruction make any reference
to the entanglement based model. However, it can be shown that the reconstructed
conditional matrix is related to the entanglement based covariance matrix by the
transformation,
Γab|γr = η
2Γcond − I4 , (4.3.1)
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Figure 4.6: The rate of secret key generation R in terms of Bob’s transmission loss in
dB for TA = 0.98 and TA = 0.93, and β = 1. The theoretical rate under the coherent
Gaussian attack with fitted excess noise is plotted as the solid line, with ε = 0.0014
for TA = 0.98 and ε = 0.0055 for TA = 0.93.
with the rescaling parameter,
η =
√
(µ+ 1)(µ2 − 1)−1 . (4.3.2)
From this covariance matrix one may calculate a bound on the rate, by following
the standard procedure of determining the mutual information and the Holevo bound
through the symplectic spectrum.
The results are shown in Figure 4.6, where the secret key rate is calculated in bits
per channel use, which is the number of secret bits Alice and Bob share for each
coherent state they put into the channel. The plot shows the inferred secret key
rate bound for three different values of transmission from Alice to the relay. As
predicted in Section 4.2 we see that there is a strong asymmetry in the protocol,
which favours Alice being in close proximity to the relay, and the closer she is the
farther away Bob is allowed to be. The theory lines corresponding to the points
inferred from the reconstructed covariance matrices are calculated using the estimated
channel parameters and the use of Equation 4.2.8.
Concluding remarks
In conclusion this project demonstrated the first implementation of measurement de-
vice independent quantum key distribution in continuous variables. This result is
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surprising in the sense that the honest parties can connect to a completely compro-
mised untrusted relay and still maintain security.
While the present experimental implementation was done in free space, an obvious,
and indeed necessary, extension is to perform the entire experiment in optical fiber,
preferably at a telecom wavelength like 1550 nm. The challenge there is firstly to show
that it is indeed possible to implement an efficient relay, where both the interference
and the balancing of the relay can be implemented with tolerable accuracy. Secondly,
it would be ideal to perform an in-field implementation with separate laser sources to
show that synchronization of the sources is feasible without reducing the efficiency of
the relay.
Indeed, in the present experimental implementation, Alice and Bob automatically
share a local oscillator because their seed beams originate from the same laser source.
In an in-field implementation this is not likely to be practical. The local oscillator is
thus an obvious entry point for side-channel attacks. Some of these loopholes can be
closed by power monitoring [143] and filtering [35]. An additional complication when
using separate laser sources is the synchronization between the signal and the local
oscillator. These challenges may be surmounted using purely classical techniques such
as very precise atom clock synchronization and authenticated classical communication
between the parties. In general the issue of side-channel attacks on CVQKD protocols
through the local oscillator remains unresolved, though progress is being made [144].
Another exciting prospect is that of increasing the modulation frequency. As men-
tioned, the equation for the secret key rate calculates how many secret key bits are
exchanged per use of the channel, and so by increasing the modulation frequency and
corresponding detection rate, the number of channel uses per unit of time will go
up, giving a linear increase in the rate. Going to GHz sideband frequencies would
therefore allow for very fast key generation.
An interesting perspective for measurement device independent QKD in general is
the construction of more conventional network-like structure, such as an efficient star
network, where many users connecto to public access points which function like the
relays described here. One might also consider the possibility of investigating lower
optical frequency carriers, such as the infrared or microwave regime, where shot noise
limited sources are difficult to achieve. However, other work indicates that this might
indeed not be as detrimental as expected [141, 145, 146]. This might prove useful
for more localized network structures in the spirit of wireless internet connections.
Our protocol is also a step towards a network repeater structure, where only every
other node needs to be trusted, as opposed to a repeater structure constructed from
point-to-point protocols.
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Quantum Relays
Introduction
This chapter deals with a special case of the protocol for measurement device indepen-
dent quantum key distribution with continuous variables. As established in Chapter 4,
relays are fundamental devices within information theory, and specifically network in-
formation theory. We consider again the typical three party relay configuration, and
in particular the following protocols:
1. Entanglement swapping [125, 140, 147, 148]
2. Quantum teleportation [20, 149, 150, 151]
3. Entanglement distillation [126]
4. Quantum key distribution [35]. See also Chapter 4.
Entanglement distillation is known to require non-Gaussian operations [78, 79, 80],
and so the details of its implementation are outside the scope of this thesis. However,
we shall discuss the idea briefly, as far as our Gaussian framework permits, because
distillation relates to the entanglement based model of relay based quantum key dis-
tribution. Since we have a well established equivalence between prepare-and-measure
QKD and the entanglement model, that we shall elaborate on below, we are able to
make statements about entanglement swapping, distillation and teleportation through
investigations of prepare-and-measure MDIQKD.
The quantum channels that couple the user to the relay are generally considered to be
lossy and noisy. However, the noise is typically assumed to be Markovian in nature.
This means that the errors introduced by the noise are independently and identically
distributed. This is the assumption of independent and identically distributed out-
comes critical to much of classical and quantum information theory, as discussed in
Section 2.14. The objective of this work is to investigate the behaviour of quantum
relays under non-Markovian noise injection in the relay links, where the quantum
information is transferred using continuous variables. Specifically, we consider the
effects of correlated Gaussian noise injected into the links. The relay performs the
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conditioning continuous variable Bell detection described in Section 2.12. Alice and
Bob can then implement the previously mentioned protocols, which are all based on
the usage of bipartite entanglement, virtual or otherwise.
The relay configuration can be implemented in many different physical systems, for ex-
ample as quantum chips [152, 153] or superconducting circuits [154]. However, as the
quantum systems are scaled down, correlated errors become increasingly likely [155],
and in this limit having a model for non-Markovian noise becomes crucial. In larger
scale relay configurations, either in free space or in optical fibre, correlated noise and
channel memory effects arise naturally, either in high-speed communication [156],
from atmospheric turbulence [157, 158, 159] or the diffraction limit [160, 161]. As
discussed in Chapter 4, correlated errors can also occur in relay based QKD, when
Eve attacks by injecting correlated states into the quantum channels that link Alice
and Bob to the relay.
The effect of the injection of this correlated noise is to make the links entanglement
breaking [162, 163], such that none of the above protocols can work under Marko-
vian conditions. The noise is then made non-Markovian by increasing the correlations
between the injected modes, while keeping them separable. The presence of these cor-
relations can not reactivate bipartite or tripartite entanglement. There is however, a
correlation threshold for which quadripartite entanglement does become reactivated,
where the four modes involved are the modes sent towards the relay and the modes
kept locally by Alice and Bob. The measurement of the relay then conditions this
quadripartite entanglement into bipartite entanglement of the remote modes between
Alice and Bob, which can then be used for the various protocols.
Indeed, all four protocols can be reactivated, and this reactivation proceeds from swap-
ping and teleportation, to distillation and finally to QKD, in terms of the amount of
correlations in the noise. This is experimentally demonstrated by investigating the
MDIQKD protocol under this noise injection, as it is the most nested of the four.
We shall use this treatment of reactivation of relay based entanglement distribution
protocols under thermal noise, as developed by Stefano Pirandola, Carlo Ottaviani,
Gaetana Spedalieri and Samuel Braunstein, to motivate the experimental work of this
author and colleagues on an MDIQKD protocol with correlated noise. We therefore
devote a large part of this chapter to stating the main results of these theoretical
considerations. This work, with theoretical developments and the experimental im-
plementation, was published in pre-print [164].
Theory
To investigate the scenario where thermal noise is injected into the relay links, we
go back to the generalized entangling cloner attack on the MDIQKD protocol in
Chapter 4. See Figure 5.1. We recall the global covariance matrix before the action
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Figure 5.1: Alice and Bob are both in possession of quantum state generation devices
that generate Gaussian continuous variable quantum states of some form. These
devices send one output each towards Charlie who administers the quantum relay
that implements a CV protocol. The relay itself performs a CV Bell detection with
the outcome γ, which is broadcast to both users. The links between the users and the
relay constitute a joint Gaussian channel called EAB, that may or may not introduce
correlations between the links before the relay. This channel is implemented with the
use of two beam splitters with the same transmission T for both links. The beam
splitters couple modes A and B to two ancillary modes, E1 and E2. In addition to the
loss introduced by the beam splitters, these modes inject thermal noise with variance
W into both links, which is correlated according to G. This overall injected state is
described by ρˆE1E2 , which remains separable.
of the channel, where Alice and Bob prepare EPR states and Eve controls the joint
quantum channel EAB,
ΓabAE1E2B =

µI2 02
√
µ˜Z 02 02 02
02 µI2 02 02 02
√
µ˜Z√
µ˜Z 02 µI2 02 02 02
02 02 02 W I2 G 02
02 02 02 G W I2 02
02
√
µ˜Z 02 02 02 µI2
 . (5.2.1)
Again, like in Chapter 4, we consider symmetric inputs such that we have the pa-
rameter µ for the variance of the EPR states, and the definition µ˜ = µ2 − 1. We
maintain the mode labelling convention from Chapter 4, which means that a and b
are the EPR state modes kept locally by Alice and Bob respectively and the other
modes are shown in Figure 5.1. After the channel with transmissions TA and TB we
obtain the global state,
ΓaA′bE′1E′2B′ =
 Γab CabA′E′1 CabE′2B′CTabA′E′1 ΓA′E′1 CA′E′1E′2B′
CTabE′2B′ C
T
A′E′1E
′
2B
′ ΓE′2B′
 , (5.2.2)
where we have the diagonal submatrices,
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Γab = µ(I2 ⊗ I2) , (5.2.3)
ΓA′E′1 =
[
xAI2 x′′AI2
x′′AI2 x′AI2
]
, (5.2.4)
ΓE′2B′ =
[
x′BI2 x′′BI2
x′′BI2 xBI2
]
, (5.2.5)
with
xk = Tkµ+ (1− Tk)Wk , (5.2.6)
x′k = TkWk + (1− Tk)µ , (5.2.7)
x′′k =
√
Tk(1− Tk)(Wk − µ) . (5.2.8)
The off-diagonal submatrices, which contain the correlations are given by,
CabA′E′1 =
[√
µ˜TAZ −
√
µ˜(1− TA)Z
02 02
]
, (5.2.9)
CabE′2B′ =
[
02 02
−√µ˜(1− TB)Z √µ˜TBZ
]
, (5.2.10)
CA′E′1E′2B′ =
[√
(1− TA)TBG
√
(1− TA)(1− TB)G√
TATBG
√
(1− TB)TAG
]
, (5.2.11)
with,
G =
[
g 0
0 g′
]
. (5.2.12)
When G = 02, that is the injected noise modes are completely uncorrelated, the
behaviour of the noise is indeed Markovian and the links can be described as two in-
dependent Gaussian lossy and noisy channels [140, 147, 148]. However, when G 6= 02,
the noise is non-Markovian and the links are connected through this noise injection.
For this purpose we are not interested in true entangling cloner attacks, as the exam-
ples of correlated noise states mentioned in the introduction still maintain separability.
We therefore derive a number of conditions that ensure this. Firstly, we require phys-
icality of the state prepared by the environment, or Eve, such that,
ΓE1E2 + iΩ2 ≥ 0, (5.2.13)
which is exactly the Heisenberg inequality from Equation (2.7.3). By checking the
eigenvalues for the symmetrized global post channel state, where TA = TB = T , and
WA = WB = W we arrive at the conditions,
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|g| < W , |g′| < W , W |g + g′| ≤ W 2 + gg′ − 1 . (5.2.14)
Since we also wish to ensure separability of the injected noise, the environment noise
modes must also obey the PPT criterion,
Γ˜E1E2 + iΩ2 ≥ 0, (5.2.15)
where Γ˜E1E2 is the partially transposed of the covariance matrix ΓE1E2 , obtained by
the transformation,
Γ˜E1E2 = ΛPPTΓE1E2ΛPPT . (5.2.16)
In this simple two-mode case of Equation (2.9.3) we have that,
ΛPPT =

1 0 0 0
0 −1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 . (5.2.17)
From the eigenvalues of Γ˜E1E2 , we arrive at the separability condition [165],
W |g − g′| ≤ W 2 − gg′ − 1 . (5.2.18)
These conditions limit the values that g and g′ may take, such that we have a con-
strained area in the correlation plane, as seen in Figure 5.2.
With this in mind we wish to investigate the separability of the system described by
ΓaA′bB′ , in other words the system that consists of the modes of the honest parties
after the joint quantum channel. We obtain this state by tracing out the modes E ′1
and E ′2 from the global state ΓaA′bE′1E′2B′ .
For this state there is a threshold beyond which the modes a and A′ are no longer
entangled. We find this threshold by investigating under which conditions the loga-
rithmic negativity goes to zero. Since we are considering a state of two modes, the
logarithmic negativity of the reduced state ΓaA′ is determined by the smallest sym-
plectic eigenvalue of the partially transposed state Γ˜aA′ [71]. For an ideal EPR state
where µ 1 we find that this eigenvalue is given by,
ν˜−aA′ =
1 + T
(1− T )W . (5.2.19)
The state becomes separable when ν˜−aA′ = 1, which gives the threshold,
WEB =
1 + T
1− T . (5.2.20)
If the thermal noise lies beyond this threshold, such that W > WEB, and in addition
if G = 0, all entanglement between any number of parties is gone [102, 166]. In this
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Figure 5.2: Separability of the noise injected by the eavesdropper. In the gray region
the thermal noise injected in both relay links forms a separable state, while the two
wings bordered by solid black lines have correlations strong enough that the injected
noise is entangled. In the white area beyond this, the correlations are so strong as to
become unphysical. The injected thermal state is asymmetric such that WA = 2 SNU
and WB = 5 SNU.
limit, none of the four protocols described previously will function, because the noise
injected into the links degrades the correlations between the parties, such that the
EPR states distributed by Alice and Bob are no longer entangled.
Now, if the thermal noise is beyond the threshold and G 6= 0, separable correlations
are not strong enough to restore either bipartite or tripartite entanglement. However,
there exists a threshold where the separable correlations may reactivate 1× 3 quadri-
partite entanglement [102]. We will in particular be focused on reactivating this type
of entanglement between mode a and the set of modes bA′B′, which is an example of
a 1×M mode partition described in Section 2.9. See also Figure 5.3.
In what follows we will go through the protocols that can be reactivated and investi-
gate the conditions that allow for this.
Entanglement swapping
We consider the situation where Alice and Bob have two identical EPR states, ρˆaA
and ρˆbB, such that the global state of four modes is ρˆaA⊗ ρˆbB and of these four modes
a and A belong to Alice and b and B belong to Bob. See Figure 5.4 for an illustration
of this configuration.
The idea is now that the parties each keep a and b and send A and B, respectively,
to Charlie at the relay, through the relay links that may or may not be correlated as
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Figure 5.3: Correlation plane for the presence of 1×3 partitioned quadripartite entan-
glement past the bipartite entanglement breaking threshold W > WEB, with T = 0.5
and W = 1.1 × WEB = 3.3. The region with the red shading shows quadripartite
entanglement between the mode partitions A′ and abB′. The region with the blue
shading shows quadripartite entanglement between a and bA′B′. The green region
has no entanglement for any mode partitions. The white region has entanglement
in both mode partitions, and the black region denotes entangled or unphysical noise
injection.
Figure 5.4: Entanglement swapping using a relay based Bell detection. Alice and Bob
each have an EPR state of size µ. They send their modes A and B through the joint
Gaussian channel EAB. Charlie, acting as the relay, receives these modes, after they
have been transformed by the channel. The outcome of the relay measurement γ,
is announced publicly. The remote modes, a and b, kept by Alice and Bob will be
projected into the state ρˆab|γ by the conditioning of the relay measurement.
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described above. Charlie measures γ, and in announcing this outcome to Alice and
Bob, conditions the modes they kept into the Gaussian state ρˆab|γ, with mean-value
x = x(γ) and conditional covariance matrix Γab|γ. By applying Equation (2.12.4) to
the reduced global state ΓaA′bB′ we find that,
Γab|γ =
[
A C
CT B
]
, (5.2.21)
and the 2× 2 blocks are given by,
A = B =
[
µ− µ2−1
2(µ+κ)
0
0 µ− µ2−1
2(µ+κ′)
]
(5.2.22)
C =
[
µ2−1
2(µ+κ)
0
0 − µ2−1
2(µ+κ′)
]
. (5.2.23)
Rewritten in this way κ and κ′ contain all the environmental parameters that are
introduced through the beam splitters in the links,
κ = (T−1 − 1)(ω − g) , κ′ = (T−1 − 1)(ω + g′) . (5.2.24)
From this conditional state we compute the logarithmic negativity as described in
Section 2.9. Since this state has two modes, we may once again express the logarithmic
negativity purely in terms of the smallest partially transposed symplectic eigenvalue
ν˜−ab|γ. Using some standard results from the analysis of general Gaussian two-mode
states we can show that [90],
ν˜−ab|γ =
√
(1 + µκ)(1 + µκ′)
(µ+ κ)(µ+ κ′)
. (5.2.25)
How much entanglement is swapped expressed in terms of the logarithmic negativity
N will naturally depend on µ, and this is optimal in the limit of a maximally entangled
EPR state where µ 1. In this limit we find that,
ν˜−ab|γ ' ν˜−ab|γ,opt =
√
κκ′ . (5.2.26)
We say that the swapping is successful when ν˜−ab|γ < 1, since this implies non-zero
logarithmic negativity between the conditioned local modes of Alice and Bob. For
maximally entangled EPR states this leads us to the conclusion that reactivation
of entanglement swapping through environmental correlations can only occur when
κκ′ < 1.
Quantum teleportation
For this protocol, we view Charlie as a teleporter, transferring a coherent state |α〉
from Alice to Bob. See Figure 5.5 for a sketch of this scheme. The state Alice wishes to
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Figure 5.5: Quantum state teleportation using a relay based Bell detection. Bob has
an EPR state of size µ, and Alice has a coherent state |α〉, which she wants to teleport
to Bob. Alice forwards this coherent state to Charlie, and Bob sends the mode B to
Charlie, while keeping b. Both of the modes sent towards the relay go through the
joint Gaussian channel EAB. Charlie performs a Bell detection, and announces γ to
Bob. This allows Bob to perform the conditional quantum operation Qˆγ, such that
the state |α〉 is teleported into the output state ρout, which is in the mode Bob has
kept for himself. This allows Bob to recover α with fidelity F .
teleport and one mode of Bob’s EPR state are both sent to Charlie through the relay
links. Charlie communicates the measurement outcome γ to Bob, who then condi-
tionally prepares his remaining mode [12] to retrieve the teleported state ρˆout ' |α〉〈α|.
If the µ of Bob’s EPR state is chosen such that µ  1, we can use the covariance
matrix framework to show that the fidelity of this teleportation is given by the optimal
fidelity,
F ' Fopt =
√
(1 + κ)(1 + κ′)
−1 ≤ (1 + ν˜−ab|γ,opt)−1 . (5.2.27)
We see now that there is a clear connection between the performance of teleportation
and swapping, as the efficacy of both protocols can be expressed in terms of the
minimal symplectic eigenvalue of the partially transposed matrix. As noted earlier,
swapping fails when ν˜−ab|γ,opt ≥ 1, and in this case teleportation is classical, such that
the fidelity becomes Fopt ≤ 1/2 [71].
Entanglement distillation
We now consider the distillation of entanglement, as illustrated in Figure 5.6. We
imagine that Alice and Bob use Charlie to run the swapping protocol N times. After
each run they store their entangled modes in quantum memories. At the end of
this they will have a set of entanglement swapped states ρˆ⊗Nab|γ. The purpose of the
distillation is now to perform some operation that takes these N states into a single
two-mode state with more entanglement than any of the individual states.
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Figure 5.6: Entanglement distillation using relay based Bell detection. After N uses
of the entanglement swapping relay protocol, with the outcomes stored in quantum
memories, Alice and Bob can now distill their many entangled states into a single
state with improved entanglement. Alice performs the collective operation Aˆ on the
set of modes a. She forwards the classical outcome k of this operation to Bob, allowing
him to perform a conditional operation Bˆk on his set of modes b. This implements
optimal one-way distillation, but requires Bˆk to be non-Gaussian.
To do this, Alice applies a local optimal operator [109] Aˆ on herN amodes. The quan-
tum outcome of this operation, α, is a distilled system, and the classical measurement
outcomes k are broadcast to Bob. When Bob receives k, he performs an operation
conditioned on these outcomes, called Bˆk, which will transform his set of b modes into
the distilled system β. The operations Aˆ and Bˆk can not both be Gaussian if distilla-
tion is to be achieved [78, 79, 80], and as such they are outside the scope of this thesis.
It is possible to choose these operations such that the distilled system become Bell
state pairs [12]. The efficiency of the distillation is determined by how much entan-
glement is generated per relay use. To quantify the amount of entanglement that
results from this is cumbersome, but it is possible to set up a lower bound. This
bound is known as the coherent quantum information, and is related to the quantum
mutual information defined in Section 2.14 [109, 167, 168]. It further has an analogue
in the classical channel capacity, which quantifies how many bits can be transferred
per channel use without introducing errors [5]. For a bipartite state it is defined as,
IC(ρˆab) = S(ρˆb)− S(ρˆab) (5.2.28)
Because the non-Gaussian operations are local to Alice and Bob, we may postpone
their application and simply quantify the coherent quantum information fully in the
covariance matrix framework. The von Neumann entropies in Equation (5.2.28) are
therefore easily evaluated through the symplectic spectrum of the conditional covari-
ance matrix Γab|γ. When the distributed EPR states are ideal, µ 1, it can be shown
that,
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IC = − log2(eν˜−ab|γ) , (5.2.29)
which relates the performance of the distillation protocol to both teleportation and
swapping, since we may conclude that entanglement distillation is possible when
ν˜−ab|γ < e
−1 ' 0.367.
Secret key distillation
Lastly, we consider the relay based QKD scheme of Chapter 4. To reiterate, the relay
controlled by Charlie is responsible for distributing the correlations between Alice and
Bob through the swapping of their entanglement. These correlations are not visible
to Charlie, who may also be regarded as Eve. The Gaussian, and possibly correlated,
noise in the links is in this case considered to be injected by the eavesdropper. To
obtain the key material, Alice and Bob perform an entanglement distillation, where
the quantum operation Aˆ performed by Alice is a heterodyne measurement with the
classical outputs α, which constitutes the first stage of the protocol for generating
the secret key material. Her measurements also give the results k, which Bob needs
for conditioning.
Bob then performs a measurement operation Bˆk that depends on k, which gives him
the output β, allowing him to estimate the key rate. If we assume that the reconcil-
iation is perfect, the rate R increases monotonically with an increase in µ. The rate
further depends solely on µ and the environmental parameters κ and κ′. Ideally, we
have that the rate generation from the MDIQKD protocol is lower bounded by the
coherent quantum information from the distillation protocol, i.e. R ≥ IC. We may
symmetrize the expression for the secret key rate from Chapter 4 to obtain,
R =
1
2
log2
(
(1 + µ+ 2κ)2(1 + µ+ 2κ′)2
16(1 + κ)(1 + κ′)(µ+ κ)(µ+ κ′)
)
− g
(√
µ(1 + µκ)
µ+ κ
)
− g
(√
µ(1 + µκ′)
µ+ κ′
)
+ g
(√
(1 + µ+ 2µκ)(1 + µ+ 2µκ′)
(1 + µ+ 2κ)(1 + µ+ 2κ′)
)
. (5.2.30)
If we assume an ideal EPR state generation in the entanglement model we get the
simpler expression,
Ropt & log2
(
Fopt
e2ν˜−ab|γ,opt
)
+ g(1 + 2ν˜−ab|γ,opt) , (5.2.31)
which is written in terms of the minimal PPT symplectic eigenvalue. From this it
is apparent that the rate can only be positive when ν˜−ab|γ,opt . 0.192. We therefore
conclude that our practical QKD protocol is most sensitive to noise out of the four
protocols presented here, and thus requires the highest degree of non-Markovian be-
haviour from the noise to be reactivated. This is also clear from the presentation of the
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protocols, since we have seen that QKD can be regarded as a stepwise implementation
of entanglement swapping and subsequent distillation. Illustrated in Figure 5.7 is the
correlation plane, where one can see in which regions the individual protocols activate.
In Figure 5.7 there is a clear asymmetry in the plane which is caused by the chosen
Bell detection. The other obvious choice where Charlie projects the state onto the
variables Qˆ+ and Pˆ− would mirror the correlation plane with respect to the origin. We
also see that entanglement swapping reactivates well after quadripartite entanglement
is reactivated. This indicates that Bell detection might not be optimal for generating
the quadripartite entanglement or reactivating these protocols in general. Lastly, one
observes that an increase in correlations simply increases protocol performance, and
reactivates them in the order previously mentioned.
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Figure 5.7: Hierarchy of protocol reactivation in terms of correlation parameters. Pa-
rameters chosen for this plot are T = 0.9, ω = 1.02 × ωEB = 19.38 and ideal EPR
states. The values outside the black region correspond to values of g and g′ where
the thermal noise contains separable correlations. The inner grey region has no en-
tanglement for any number of parties. The white region has symmetric quadripartite
entanglement but no protocol reactivation. Entanglement swapping activates in the
yellow area and beyond, while teleportation activates in the green area and beyond.
The blue area denotes activation of entanglement distillation, while the red region
indicates reactivation of the practical QKD scheme.
Correlated additive noise
Of course, entanglement distribution is complicated in practice, and indeed as men-
tioned before, the distillation itself requires non-Gaussian operations. We therefore
wish to consider a closer to classical non-Markovian Gaussian environment. In the
following we therefore make use of the equivalence between the prepare-and-measure
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Figure 5.8: Practical QKD using a relay based Bell detection. Alice and Bob prepare
coherent states in the modes A and B, chosen from a Gaussian distribution of mean
values. These coherent states are sent to Charlie who performs the relay detection.
This creates classical correlations between Alice and Bob, which enables the genera-
tion of a secret key. As in the standard MDIQKD, Eve could replace Charlie without
compromising the security of the relay.
schemes and the entanglement model. To do this, we first discard the idea of storing
the swapped states in quantum memories, and instead use heterodyne detections for
the conditioning by Alice and Bob. As we have established previously, this is the
same as drawing a single coherent state per channel use from a Gaussian distribution
of coherent state mean values, with variance µ− 1 for both parties, though of course
Alice and Bob must select their states independently of each other. These prepared
states are sent through the relay links to Charlie who performs a Bell detection and
broadcasts the result γ ' α − β∗. See Figure 5.8 for this simplified scheme, also
described in Chapter 4.
In the limit where T → 1 and ω →∞, we define the constant parameters n = (1−T )ω,
c = g(ω − 1)−1 and, c′ = g′(ω − 1)−1. The effect of taking this limit is that the
modes A and B receive correlated classical noise, such that their quadrature operators
transform according to the rule,
(
QˆA, QˆA, QˆB, QˆB
)
→
(
QˆA, QˆA, QˆB, QˆB
)
+ (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4) . (5.2.32)
Here, ξi is a Gaussian variable of zero mean and is otherwise specified by the classical
noise covariance matrix,
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ΓCN = n

1 0 c 0
0 1 0 c′
c 0 1 0
0 c′ 0 1
 . (5.2.33)
n ≥ 0 is the variance of the additive noise and the coefficients −1 ≤ c, c′ ≤ 1 quantify
the correlations in the classical noise. In these parameters the entanglement threshold
becomes n > nEB = 2. The results for reactivation of the above protocols can be
expressed in these new parameters by taking the limits T → 1 and ω → ∞ in the
relevant expressions. The experiment described below will focus on the reactivation of
the practical MDIQKD protocol, as it remains the most difficult protocol to reactivate.
Experimental results
To show what one can achieve with non-Markovian effects, we investigate the most
nested protocol, i.e. practical relay based QKD with classical additive noise. In par-
ticular we investigate the behaviour of the secret key rate R(µ, n, c, c′) in terms of n
in the regime where the classical noise is correlated such that c = c′ = 1 and µ = 52.
The setup for the experiment is depicted in Figure 5.9. Alice and Bob generate ran-
dom coherent states, chosen from independent Gaussian distributions of the same
size. They generate these states by inputting classical Gaussian noise into pairs of
electro-optical modulators, that are fed by a common 1064 nm laser source that is
split evenly to their stations. This pair of modulators in total realizes the Weyl oper-
ator of Equation (2.4.1), since the individual modulations have been orthogonalized
according to the procedure described in Section 3.3. The generators which produce
the classical Gaussian noise also have their outputs recorded such that they may be
correlated with the relay measurements during the post-processing. This allows for
a proper estimation of the channel parameters and of the correlations between the
parties.
In addition to these signal modulations, these modulators are compromised by a side-
channel attack where Eve injects her own classical separable correlated noise into the
two pairs of modulators. She does this using two classical noise generators which
both have two highly correlated outputs. From run to run, the net effect is that Eve
displaces Alice’s input state by some unknown amount, and also displaces Bob’s input
state by the same amount. From this construction we arrive at a correlated-additive
Gaussian environment, with c ' 1 and c′ ' 1 as described above, where n is de-
termined by the amplitude of Eve’s side-channel noise generators. On average each
mode will therefore contain a thermal state representing the coherent state alphabets
of Alice and Bob, respectively, each with an extra contribution to their variance from
the side-channel attack of the eavesdropper. The signal modulation is chosen such
that it corresponds to µ = 52 SNU, corresponding to around 17 dB of modulation
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Figure 5.9: Alice and Bob prepare their quadrature symmetric coherent state alpha-
bets on two 2.8 mW laser beams, that originate from the same 1064 nm laser source.
The states are generated by pairs of electro-optical modulators fed by classical noise
signals from uncorrelated noise generators. In addition to these signals, Eve adds
correlated noise in the stations from two noise generators that each have two highly
correlated outputs. The noise injected by Eve is thus the same for both stations and
is also symmetric in the quadratures. The relay is implemented with a simplified Bell
detection that interferes the two inputs beams on a balanced beam splitter, with addi-
tion and subtraction of the down-mixed photocurrents in post-processing. The relay
has an overall efficiency of 98 %. AM: Amplitude modulator, PM: Phase modulator,
PD: Photodetector.
relative to the shot noise, with the variance n added onto this from the side-channel
attack.
The prepared states propagate to the relay operated by Eve. The first operation the
relay performs is a balanced beam splitter operation that interferes the two input
modes. The outputs of this operation are detected by a pair of photo detectors, and
the outcome of this determines the parameter γ, completing the conditional Bell de-
tection. As such the relay functions as in Chapter 4 and it implements the simplified
version of the Bell detection described in Section 3.7.2. The relay is not perfect and
so we attribute ' 2% of loss to it, which may benefit Eve, though the additive noise
model does not explicitly account for this loss. Experimentally, the loss primarily
comes from the limited visibility of the interference and the quantum efficiency of
the photo detectors. These losses are the same as for the MDIQKD implementation
described in Chapter 4.
We consider the combined effect of Eve’s side-channel attack and the relay loss as a
global coherent Gaussian attack, recognizing that this is not the optimal version of
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Figure 5.10: The secret key rate, measured in bits per channel use, in terms of the
injected correlated noise n. The solid line represents the theoretical estimate of the
rate with the noise coefficients c = c′ = 1 and a signal modulation of µ ' 52, while
the points refer to the rate calculated from experimental data. We observe a positive
secret key rate after the entanglement breaking threshold at n = 2, represented by the
solid black line. β = 1 for this calculation. Inefficiencies at the relay directly translate
into transmission loss, which the theory line does not account for in the additive noise
limit.
the attack that was considered in Chapter 4. In fact the injected noise is correlated in
such a way as to be optimal for the secret key rate generation. We compute the secret
key rate in a manner similar to for MDIQKD, by first of all inferring the correspond-
ing classical covariance matrix, which is related to the entanglement based version of
the protocol, and then assuming that Eve is able to purify the state shared by Alice
and Bob. From the generated covariance matrix the von Neumann entropies and the
mutual information between Alice and Bob may be calculated, which in turn gives an
estimate on the extractable rate.
In Figure 5.10 we plot the calculated secret key rate against the classical additive noise
n. The rate decreases with increasing n, and is strictly positive when 2 < n ≤ 4. Be-
yond this point the links become entanglement breaking, and the rate remains positive
due to of the presence of the separable correlations. This behaviour occurs in spite of
experimental imperfections, though we do see that the theoretically predicted rate of
Equation (5.2.30) is slightly higher than what is observed, as the relay inefficiency is
not included in the model. This efficiency mainly arises from the relay detection loss.
In spite of this inefficiency we confirm the non-Markovian reactivation of the QKD
protocol experimentally.
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Concluding remarks
In conclusion, we have shown that the most nested of the four entanglement based
protocols in a standard three party relay configuration can be reactivated by non-
Markovian effects in the Gaussian noise injected into the links.
In the limit where strong Gaussian noise is injected into the links, one enters a regime
where all possible forms of entanglement between the modes are broken. However, if
the injected noise is sufficiently correlated, but separable, it reactivates 1×3 quadripar-
tite entanglement, which can then by localized into ordinary bipartite entanglement
by the relay measurement. In this bipartite form, Alice and Bob can perform their
protocols as normal.
We confirm these results experimentally through a test of the corresponding relay
based prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution protocol, where we observe that
the secret key rate stays positive past the threshold of virtual entanglement breaking
when the injected thermal noise is highly correlated.
These results are interesting from the perspective of investigating non-Markovian
dynamics. Indeed, non-Markovian noise may be regarded as a resource that can be
exploitable in certain quantum networks. As previously mentioned, it is known that
these dynamics occur in both short and long distance architectures, and so these
results might be useful within a broad range of systems.
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tribution with a Noisy Laser
Introduction
This work is based on a theoretical proposal from Weedbrook et al. [141, 145], which
describes how quantum key distribution with thermal, rather than coherent, states
is feasible under certain conditions, provided that direct reconciliation is applied. A
similar result exists for reverse reconciliation [169], where it was demonstrated that a
certain amount of detection noise benefits the honest parties.
The prediction made in [145] is then that preparation noise is detrimental to security,
even if it is trusted, if reverse reconciliation is used. However, if direct reconcilia-
tion is used instead, security can be established in a parameter range where reverse
reconciliation does not allow it. Consequently, a direct reconciliation scheme is more
vulnerable to detection noise, and so relaxing the requirements on the source ensures
that the detection has to be shot noise limited.
The implication is that shot noise limited continuous variable sources are not strictly
required to achieve quantum security. Relaxing this requirement of a shot noise limited
source could lead to cheaper short range continuous variable quantum key distribution
implementations. This is particularly relevant because conventional optical telecom
equipment is typically not able to resolve the quantum nature of light, since this is
not a requirement for classical communication. This work was published in [170].
Theory
We first restate the main result of Weedbrook et al. [141, 145]. Consider the case
where Alice prepares a noisy EPR state,
Γin =
[
µI2
√
µ2 − 1Z√
µ2 − 1Z (µ+ κ)I2
]
. (6.2.1)
This EPR state has extra uncorrelated noise in the mode that is to be transmitted,
which signifies the preparation noise. In a prepare-and-measure protocol this noise
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is equivalent to the noise on the displaced states, which can be seen rather easily by
performing a measurement conditioning the noisy mode on the outcome of Alice’s lo-
cal mode. In a pure EPR state this would yield the identity matrix as the covariance
matrix, in units of shot noise, while for this noisy state it would scale the identity by
κ. When κ = 0 we recover the usual EPR state prepared by Alice. However, this
additional noise will make sure that the global state is not pure, which naturally pro-
hibits the use of the self-duality properties of the von Neumann entropy. We therefore
do not have access to identities of the form S(E) = S(AB) with this input state.
Figure 6.1: Entanglement based model, information theoretically equivalent to the
prepare-and-measure scheme. Alice prepares an EPR state, where the outgoing mode
has an additional κ of noise. Eve controls the quantum channel where she implements
an entangling cloner attack, with loss 1− T and noise W .
We now wish to investigate the effects of this preparation noise in the event of an
entangling cloner attack, to see how the parameters influence each other. See Fig-
ure 6.1 for an overview of the modes involved. To implement this particular attack,
the eavesdropper prepares a pure EPR state for her entangling cloner.
ΓE =
[
W I2
√
W 2 − 1Z√
W 2 − 1Z W I2
]
. (6.2.2)
Letting these two EPR states interact through a beam splitter with a transmission T
yields a global covariance matrix,
ΓABE =

µI2
√
T µ˜Z −
√
T˜ µ˜Z 02√
T µ˜Z (Tµκ + T˜W )I2
√
T T˜ (W − µκ)I2
√
T˜ W˜Z
−
√
T˜ µ˜Z
√
T T˜ (W − µκ)I2 (T˜ µκ + TW )I2
√
TW˜Z
02
√
T˜ W˜Z
√
TW˜Z W I2
 , (6.2.3)
with the renamed parameters T˜ = 1− T , µ˜ = µ2 − 1, µκ = µ+ κ, and W˜ = W 2 − 1,
and we have the corresponding prepare-and-measure parameter Vsig = µ − 1 for the
size of the continuous alphabet. This matrix completely characterizes the global state
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of the system. To determine the mutual information between the honest parties,
we use the definition of mutual information via the Shannon entropy as given in
Equation (2.13.13) to obtain, in the case of heterodyne detection,
I(A : B) = log2
(
(1− T )W + T (µ+ κ) + 1
(1− T )W + T (1 + κ) + 1
)
. (6.2.4)
We calculate the Holevo bound from Equation (2.14.32), without the use of purifica-
tion identities. We therefore have,
χ(E : B) = S(E)− S(E|B) , (6.2.5)
for reverse reconciliation and,
χ(E : A) = S(E)− S(E|A) , (6.2.6)
for direct reconciliation. We recover the results of [141] and [145] through the use of
symplectic invariants [90], and so we have the expression,
χ(E : X) = g(νE+) + g(νE−)− g(νE|X+)− g(νE|X−) , (6.2.7)
where X may be either A for Alice or B for Bob, depending on the method of recon-
ciliation. The symplectic eigenvalues are given by,
νE± =
1
2
(√
(eV +W )2 − 4T (W 2 − 1)± (eV −W )
)
, (6.2.8)
and the parameter eV = (1− T )V + TW , with V = µ+ κ+ 1. Additionally, we have
the conditional symplectic eigenvalues for reverse reconciliation,
νE|B± =
1
2
(
√
σT ± (σ1 − σ2)) , (6.2.9)
expressed through the symplectic invariants,
σ1 =
(1− T )V +W (T + V )
1 + TV + (1− T )W , (6.2.10)
σ2 =
1− T +W (1 + TV )
1 + TV + (1− T )W , (6.2.11)
σ3 =
√
W 2 − 1
(
1 + V
1 + TV +W (1− T )
)
, (6.2.12)
σT = (σ1 + σ2)
2 − 4σ23T . (6.2.13)
These invariants are found through the determinants of the sub-blocks in the global
covariance matrix. For direct reconciliation, the symplectic eigenvalues are,
νE|A± =
1
2
(√
(eκ +W )2 − 4T (W 2 − 1)± (eκ −W )
)
, (6.2.14)
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with the parameter eκ = (1 − T )(1 + κ) + TW . We then have the overall secret key
rate,
R = βI(A : B)− χ(E : X) , (6.2.15)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency. The security region for the protocol is shown
in Figure 6.2, comparing reverse and direct reconciliation security for varying levels
of preparation noise. From this one can clearly see that direct reconciliation actually
is superior to reverse reconciliation if the level of preparation noise is sufficiently high.
A main conclusion of the work done by Weedbrook et al. [141, 145] was that direct
reconciliation could in principle withstand asymptotic amounts of preparation noise.
From Figure 6.2(b) we see that this conclusion does not apply when the reconciliation
efficiency is below unity, such that there is in fact an optimal but non-zero amount
of preparation noise. This is a clear parallel to the results of García-Patrón and
Cerf [169].
In general, the conclusion that direct reconciliation outperforms reverse reconcilia-
tion is rather surprising because reverse reconciliation is generally regarded as being
superior to direct reconciliation [47, 48].
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Figure 6.2: Security region for the protocol in terms of transmission T and preparation
noise κ, for (a) reverse reconciliation and (b) direct reconciliation. Error reconciliation
efficiency was β = 95%, with modulation variance 32 SNU, and thermal noise injection
W = 1.11. The solid line represents the zero crossing of the secret key rate for these
parameters. The dashed lines in both plots represent the edge of the security region
in the ideal case where β = 1, excess noise is zero and modulation is high. For the
case of reverse reconciliation, when κ = 0, the rate goes to zero asymptotically with
transmission loss. However, when κ increases the security region shrinks rapidly. For
the case of direct reconciliation, the rate goes to zero near 73 % transmission because
Bob uses heterodyne detection, and this introduces an extra unit of vacuum. These
plots directly illustrate how direct reconciliation is more robust against preparation
noise.
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Figure 6.3: Sketch of the experimental setup. The first pair of modulators are used to
simulate a noisy laser, since the source is shot noise limited. This allows free control
of the quality of the source. The second pair of modulators generate the continuous
alphabet. Transmission is controlled by reducing the modulation variance relative
to the calibration variance. Bob performs heterodyne detection. AM: Amplitude
modulator. PM: Phase modulator. PD: Photo detector.
We experimentally test the predicted superiority of direct reconciliation with different
levels of preparation noise. The experimental setup is depicted in Figure 6.3. Alice
prepared a quadrature symmetric continuous alphabet of coherent states, with a pair
of electro-optical modulators coupled to two independent white noise generators. The
modulators were orthogonalized according to the procedure outlined in Section 3.3,
and in this way they realize the Weyl operator from Equation (2.4.1). The alphabet
thus consists of a Gaussian distribution of coherent states, which in total results in a
thermal state with the signal variance VS = µ− 1, relating this prepare-and-measure
implementation to the entanglement equivalent model.
The generator outputs that realized this Gaussian distribution were also recorded
with an analog-to-digital converter to be correlated with Bob’s measurements in the
post-processing stage. The determination of these correlations allowed for precise
determination of the channel parameters. In addition to these signal modulations,
the modulators received added inputs from two uncorrelated noise generators. These
outputs were not recorded and served as the preparation noise, since they effectively
reduce the correlations between the Alice’s signal and the measurements of Bob. From
this additional modulation we realized a total quadrature symmetric thermal input
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state with the variance VS + 1 + κ, where we have separated the shot noise from the
classical preparation noise.
A lossy quantum channel of transmission T was implemented by reducing the input
modulation relative to the calibration measurement, as was also the case for Chap-
ter 4. The transmitted quantum states were detected with the simplified heterodyne
described in Section 3.7.2, where the signal and LO beams each had 2.8 mW of optical
power. The benefit of reducing the relative modulation strength was that it allowed
the optical power to be kept constant, since with this simplified heterodyne detection,
the shot noise level is determined by the combined power of the carriers.
The photocurrents were mixed down from the 10.5 MHz sideband, recorded by the
analog-to-digital converter, and were then added and subtracted in the post process-
ing to generate the datasets for the respective quadrature measurement outcomes.
These measurements were correlated with the phase matched recording of the input
modulation, which was then used to determine the channel parameters. All noise
in this implementation is regarded as originating from the trusted preparation noise
modulation, and the channel excess noise is assumed to be zero.
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Figure 6.4: Data points and corresponding theory curves, with varying values for κ.
(a) is for reverse reconciliation, while (b) uses direct reconciliation. The efficiency
of the reconciliation is set to β = 0.95 %. Statistical error bars are smaller than the
point size, due to the high number of data points.
The rates for the found channel parameters are calculated, with the corresponding
theory lines as shown in Figure 6.4, plotted against the channel loss in units of dB.
Figure 6.4(a) shows the estimated rates for reverse reconciliation, while Figure 6.4(b)
shows the rates for direct reconciliation. The seven different traces represent varying
values of preparation noise. The corresponding points to these traces do not fit the
theoretical predictions exactly. This is caused by overall fluctuations in the channel
parameters. The statistical errors are comparatively tiny because of the number of
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data points, while the fluctuations in the noise parameters are the result of locking
instabilities in the local oscillator phase relative to the signal beam, which are not
statistically independent errors.
The mismatch of the correlations between the recording of the coherent Gaussian
alphabet and the actual alphabet measured at Bob was the principal source of excess
preparation noise in this setup, which caused the preparation noise to drop slower
than what would be expected from a lossy quantum channel. This mismatch in noise
levels was transmission dependent because of the way the transmission loss was imple-
mented. A reduction of the modulation depth in the signal at Alice put her recorded
signal closer to the electronic noise of the amplifier and analog-to-digital converter,
which degraded the correlations. Choosing to regard this as initial preparation noise,
we see from the results that direct reconciliation is superior to reverse reconciliation.
While the security of reverse reconciliation quickly degrades for increased preparation
noise, the secret key rate stays relatively constant using direct reconciliation.
Concluding remarks
As predicted in [141, 145], these experimental results confirm that direct reconciliation
is indeed superior to reverse reconciliation if large amounts of preparation noise are
present. One possible application of this is QKD in regimes where shot noise limited
sources are too expensive or impractical, for example using microwaves as was also
suggested in [141].
An interesting prospect is also implementing this protocol with a cheap diode laser,
preferably at a telecom wavelength, where the preparation noise is not artificial.
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Quantum Key Distribution
Introduction
In general, QKD schemes use that the states prepared by Alice are in conjugate bases,
such that the states that encode the information are not orthogonal. This is particu-
larly obvious for QKD with discrete variables [7, 17, 37, 171]. This non-orthogonality
ensures that the no-cloning theorem applies [27]. Gaussian states are automatically
non-orthogonal no matter what the alphabet is, and so the security provided by the
no-cloning theorem extends to the scenario of exchanged Gaussian states no matter
the quadrature in which they are distributed. This is the basis of the security of
continuous variable QKD [69, 70, 71].
Encoding the alphabet into a single quadrature has been investigated with a coherent
state protocol using only two states [49, 50]. We present this idea with a continuous
alphabet in a single quadrature. The security analysis considers the specific attack of
an asymmetric entangling cloner and preparation noise. We experimentally test both
homodyne and heterodyne configurations. It turns out that this single quadrature
protocol has an additional complication in terms of hidden correlations exploitable
only by the eavesdropper. This was initially discussed by Usenko and Grosshans [172].
From a practical point of view CVQKD in a single quadrature is interesting because
it simplifies the state generation for Alice, since she will only need one modulator.
The cost of this reduced complexity is that the generated secret key rate decreases
faster with noise. This work was published in [173].
Theory
The prepare-and-measure protocol developed here follows that developed in Chap-
ter 6, with one major change being that of a simplified modulation. Here, we let Alice
encode a one-dimensional Gaussian alphabet onto her phase quadrature P , which on
average generates an asymmetric thermal state in phase space. This is the essen-
tial difference between this protocol and the standard dual quadrature continuous
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Figure 7.1: Prepare-and-measure scheme and the equivalent entanglement based
model. Alice encodes a continuous Gaussian distribution of coherent states onto her
phase quadrature and sends these states through the quantum channel. In the entan-
glement scheme she prepares an EPR state and squeezes the outgoing mode by the
proper amount, before using the quantum channel. EPR: Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
source, Sqz: Squeezing operation.
alphabet CVQKD protocol, where the prepared thermal state is typically symmetric.
The prepared coherent states go through the quantum channel, and arrive at Bob
who implements a coherent quadrature detection, either with heterodyne detection
or switched homodyne detection such that he monitors both quadratures on average,
to make sure that Eve does not inject probe states into the quadrature that is not
encoded. The P quadrature measurement outcomes recorded by Bob are correlated
with Alice’s input states. These correlations form the basis of the secret key genera-
tion after error reconciliation and privacy amplification.
We address the security of the scheme using the techniques described in Section 2.14.
The equivalent entanglement based scheme is shown in Figure 7.1. Here, Alice pre-
pares an EPR state, and keeps one mode for conditioning. The outgoing mode is
squeezed through a local squeezing operation, before the mode is sent through the
quantum channel. As argued in Section 2.8, Alice performing a heterodyne mea-
surement on the conditioning mode will form a 2D Gaussian distribution of coherent
states at Bob. On the other hand, performing homodyne detection will generate a 1D
distribution of squeezed states. Therefore, if the outgoing EPR mode is squeezed with
the proper squeezing parameter, homodyne conditioning will prepare a 1D distribu-
tion of coherent states, securing equivalence with the prepare-and-measure scheme.
In the entanglement equivalent model, Alice prepares an EPR state of the form,
Γ′EPR =
[
µ′I2
√
µ′2 − 1Z√
µ′2 − 1Z µ′I2
]
. (7.2.1)
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Performing a local squeezing operation with the variance µ′ on the outgoing state we
obtain,
Γ′out =

µ′ 0
√
µ′2−1
µ′ 0
0 µ′ 0 −
√
µ′(µ′2 − 1)√
µ′2−1
µ′ 0 1 0
0 −
√
µ′(µ′2 − 1) 0 µ′2
 . (7.2.2)
The second mode of this state is propagated through the quantum channel. In this
channel, Eve is allowed to apply any unitary operator allowed by quantum mechanics.
In the asymptotic limit, the Holevo bound then quantifies the maximum amount of
information Eve can extract from this operation, as defined in Equation (2.14.32),
χ(E : X) = S(E)− S(E|X) . (7.2.3)
X is Alice or Bob, depending on the reconciliation technique used. The asymptotic
rate is given by the usual Devetak-Winter bound,
R = βI(A : B)− χ(E : X) , (7.2.4)
where I(A : B) is defined in Equation (2.13.13) and β ∈ [0, 1] quantifying the efficiency
of the reconciliation procedure. Assuming that Eve is able to purify the global state,
we have the relations S(E) = S(AB), S(E|B) = S(A|B) and S(E|A) = S(B|A), due
to the self-duality of von Neumann entropy as described in Section 2.14. From this
we get the following equations for the rate with different reconciliation techniques,
RRR = β(H(A)−H(A|B))− S(AB) + S(A|B) , (7.2.5)
for reverse reconciliation and,
RDR = β(H(A)−H(A|B))− S(AB) + S(B|A) , (7.2.6)
for direct reconciliation.
These relations are useful in the data processing of the experimental data, as we only
have access to the reconstructed modes of Alice and Bob. One difference from the
dual quadrature protocol is that the correlations between Alice and Bob in the Q
quadrature remain undetermined, because Alice does not encode in this quadrature.
This leaves us with a free correlation parameter that must be chosen in a pessimistic
fashion, because Eve can implement an attack that realizes the worst possible value.
The possible values for this parameter are bounded by Heisenberg’s uncertainty prin-
ciple, which for covariance matrices takes the form given in Equation (2.7.3).
For the specific case of an asymmetric entangling cloner attack, we investigate the
behaviour of the protocol parameters, and the dependence on the free correlation
parameter. The model for this attack is shown in Figure 7.2. This attack is chosen
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Figure 7.2: Model of the Eve’s asymmetric entangling cloner attack on the channel.
This model also includes preparation noise, with and without the assumed trust.
Trusted modes are not accessible to Eve for purification, while the untrusted modes
are. EPR: Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen entanglement, Sqz: Squeezing.
because it is the most practical Gaussian attack Eve can use on the quantum chan-
nel, as long as we are in the asymptotic limit [71], where we may make full use of
its Gaussian properties. The accessible parameters in this attack are the asymmet-
ric transmissions TQ and TP and the asymmetric noise injections WQ and WP . The
asymmetric preparation noise is described by the parameters κQ and κP .
Eve implements the attack by preparing a possibly squeezed EPR state, where she
injects one mode into the quantum channel through an asymmetric beam splitter.
The other mode of Eve’s EPR state is stored in a quantum memory. The output
mode of the beam splitter operation is also stored in a quantum memory, and the
states stored in the quantum memories are measured coherently once the state transfer
between Alice and Bob is over. The preparation noise is simulated by the environment
generating an EPR state that is interfered with Alice’s output mode before it enters
the quantum channel. It does this on a beam splitter with transmission η ≈ 1.
If the environment does not inject preparation noise into the system, the outgoing
mode is very slightly mixed with a vacuum mode. This error is largely corrected for by
redefining the parameters of the input state. Importantly, this can never overestimate
the security of the protocol, since mixing with a vacuum mode can only ever reduce
the correlations shared by Alice and Bob. When subjecting the input state to the
preparation noise we get the covariance matrix,
ΓAκ′ =
[
A′ C ′
C ′T K ′
]
, (7.2.7)
with the submatrices,
A′ =

µ′ 0
√
η µ
′2−1
µ′ 0
0 µ′ 0 −√ηµ′µ˜′√
η µ
′2−1
µ′ 0 η + η˜e
−2rκ′ 0
0 −√ηµ′µ˜′ 0 ηµ′2 + η˜e2rκ′
 , (7.2.8)
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K ′ =

η˜ + ηe−2rκ′ 0 e−r
√
ηκ˜′ 0
0 η˜µ′2 + ηe2rκ′ 0 −er√ηκ˜′
e−r
√
ηκ˜′ 0 κ′ 0
0 −er√ηκ˜′ 0 κ′
 , (7.2.9)
C ′ =

−
√
η˜µ˜′
µ′ 0 0 0
0
√
η˜µ′µ˜′ 0 0√
ηη˜(e−2rκ′ − 1) 0 e−r√η˜κ˜′ 0
0
√
ηη˜(e2rκ′ − µ′2) 0 −er√η˜κ˜′
 , (7.2.10)
where η˜ = 1− η, κ˜′ = κ′2 − 1, and µ˜′ = µ′2 − 1. µ′ and κ′ determine the initial EPR
states before the mixing operation, while r is a squeezing parameter, that determines
how asymmetric the preparation noise is. The parameters κ′P and κ′Q from Figure 7.2
are related to κ′ such that κ′P = κ′e−2r and κ′Q = κ′e2r. These initial values are
governed by the parameters used in the practical protocol, and so they must obey the
equations,
ηµ′2 + (1− η)e2rκ′ = µ2 + κP , (7.2.11)
η + (1− η)e−2rκ′ = 1 + κQ , (7.2.12)
ηµ′(µ′2 − 1) = µ(µ2 − 1) . (7.2.13)
These equations relate the entanglement-based model parameters to the parameters
in the practical implementation such that we have the variance µ2 + κP in the P
quadrature, which is used for signalling. In this way the signal variance is µ2 − 1, κP
is the preparation noise in this quadrature and µ is lower bounded at 1, representing
the shot noise. κP is thus lower bounded at zero. κQ is the preparation noise in
the Q quadrature, also lower bounded at zero. The last equation introduces a bound
on the correlations, such that they are determined purely by µ, since this parameter
represents the signal strength. This is a fully determined system of equations with
the solutions,
κ′ =
µ2 + κP − ηµ′2
(1− η) e
−2r , (7.2.14)
r =
1
4
ln
(
µ2 + κP − ηµ′2
1 + κQ − η
)
, (7.2.15)
µ′2 =
∆
6η
+
2η
∆
, (7.2.16)
where ∆ is the determinant,
∆ =
3
√
(12
√
81µ6 − 162µ4 − 12η2 + 81µ2 + 108µ3 − 108µ)η2 . (7.2.17)
These solutions allow for the expression of the entanglement-based model through the
parameters of the practical protocol.
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In the quantum channel controlled by Eve, the covariance matrix ΓAκ′ is transformed
by an asymmetric beam splitter operation with the transmissions TQ and TP . It may
easily be shown that such a beam splitter maintains the structure of the symplectic
space by confirming the condition given in Equation (2.2.5). It may also be suitably
decomposed into a combination of the symplectic operations listed in Section 2.7.
After the quantum channel, the state shared by Alice and Bob is described by the
covariance matrix,
ΓAB =

µ′ 0
√
TQηµ˜′
µ′ 0
0 µ′ 0 −√TPηµ′µ˜′√
TQηµ˜′
µ′ 0 TQκ
′′ + T˜QWQ 0
0 −√TPηµ′µ˜′ 0 TPµ′′ + T˜PWP
 , (7.2.18)
where κ′′ = η+e−2rη˜κ′ and µ′′ = ηµ′2+e2rη˜κ′. WQ andWP are quadrature asymmetric
noise injections from Eve’s asymmetric entangling cloner. We additionally define the
reflection coefficients T˜P = 1 − TP and T˜Q = 1 − TQ. We now wish to calculate the
information quantities associated with this state, assuming that the eavesdropper is
able to purify the state. We remark that in a practical implementation, there is no
way for Alice and Bob to estimate the parameter,
ΓAB,13 =
√
TQηµ˜′
µ′
, (7.2.19)
which depends solely on one channel parameter, namely TQ. What they can estimate
is the parameter,
ΓAB,33 = TQ(η + e
−2rη˜κ′) + (1− TQ)WQ , (7.2.20)
which for the most pessimistic choice of TQ in turn gives an estimate of WQ, provided
that the honest parties have some knowledge of κQ, which Alice may obtain by se-
cretly measuring some of her own output states before the channel. She may do this
regardless of the trust assumptions placed on the preparation noise, i.e. it does not
matter if the noise is produced by Eve through a side channel attack or inadvertently
created by Alice while she is preparing her output states.
The mutual information between Alice and Bob when Bob uses homodyne detection
is given by,
Ihomo(A : B) =
1
2
log2
(
(1− TP )WP + TP (µ+ κP )
(1− TP )WP + TP (η + (1− η)κ′P )
)
. (7.2.21)
Taking the limits κP = 0 and η = 1, one recovers half the information content of a dual
quadrature protocol from Chapter 6 as expected. If Bob uses heterodyne detection
the expression becomes,
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Ihete(A : B) =
1
2
log2
(
(1− TP )WP + TP (µ+ κP ) + 1
(1− TP )WP + TP (η + (1− η)κ′P ) + 1
)
, (7.2.22)
where the difference to Equation (7.2.21) is exactly the addition a unit of vacuum that
arises from the heterodyne detection as discussed in Section 3.7.2. It is worth noting
that only the transmission TP appears in these expressions, because no information
is encoded in Q. Also, only the noise injection in P will degrade the information
content, since this noise effectively reduces the signal-to-noise ratio for Bob. WQ will
naturally still influence the security, but it does so by indirectly increasing the Holevo
bound, since the physicality bound on the global state in Equation (7.2.18) is relaxed
when the noise increases.
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Figure 7.3: Plot of the physicality region in terms of asymmetric transmissions as-
suming fixed noise injections, with heterodyne detection and reverse reconciliation.
The color shows the secret key rate in bits per channel use. The black solid line is the
value of TQ that minimizes the rate for this particular noise injection. The dashed line
shows the condition TP = TQ. For plot (a) parameters are WP = WQ = 1.005SNU
, and for (b) WP = WQ = 1.05 SNU. The parameters µ = 31SNU, β = 1 and
κQ = κP = 0 are the same for both plots.
The calculation of the Holevo bound will depend on the reconciliation between Alice
and Bob, but also on the trust assumption we place on the preparation noise. If
the preparation noise is trusted we use the identity S(E) = S(ABκ), and if it is
not trusted we use S(Eκ) = S(AB). Both of these are valid due to the self-duality
of the von Neumann expression, described in Section 2.14. This added complica-
tion of the preparation noise ensures that the expression for the symplectic spectrum
of the relevant state is quite complicated. It is however easily calculated numeri-
cally. The identities for the conditional entropies relevant to reverse reconciliation
are S(E|B) = S(Aκ|B) and S(Eκ|B) = S(A|B) for trusted and untrusted prepa-
ration noise respectively. For direct reconciliation we have S(E|A) = S(Bκ|A) and
S(Eκ|A) = S(B|A). These are also calculated numerically. We investigate direct rec-
onciliation, in addition to reverse reconciliation, because we have preparation noise,
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Figure 7.4: Physicality region plotted for fixed injection noise with heterodyne detec-
tion and reverse reconciliation, in terms of asymmetric transmissions. Colour indicates
secret key rate generation in bits per channel use. The black solid line shows the choice
of TQ that minimizes the rate, dashed line is TP = TQ. Plot (a) has κP = κQ = 0.1
SNU, which is assumed to be trusted, while (b) also has κP = κQ = 0.1 SNU, but
the noise is not assumed to be trusted. The parameters µ = 31 SNU, β = 1 and
WQ = WP = 1.005 are the same for both plots.
otherwise the superiority of reverse reconciliation is well established [31, 48, 66, 70, 71].
For Alice and Bob to estimate the rate of secret key generation they need to estimate
the channel parameters. They can readily estimate TP and WP , because of their cor-
relations. They also have the variance of Q in Bob’s mode available, but this depends
on TQ and WQ, which still leaves the free parameter ΓAB,13. This free parameter is
only bounded by the requirement that the state ΓAB remains physical. Knowing the
bounds on this parameter, we can plot the security region against the other channel
parameters. For example, for fixed noise injection WP and WQ, we can investigate
how the security region, i.e. the region of positive secret key rate, varies with TP
and TQ. See Figure 7.3 for this plot, for low and high noise injection. We see very
clearly that the physicality region, i.e. the region of physical covariance matrices for
variations in ΓAB,13, grows when the noise injection goes up. Similar behaviour is
observed for the preparation noise, as seen in Figure 7.4. If there is no noise injected,
either in the preparation or channel stage, the inequality forces the transmissions to
be symmetric such that TP = TQ. The widening of the physicality for increased noise
is what causes the noise sensitivity compared to a dual quadrature protocol. If both
quadratures are encoded, there is no ambiguity in determining TQ and WQ, as well as
TP and WP .
Figure 7.5 plots the secret key rate in terms of channel loss in dB. It compares hetero-
dyne and homodyne detection strategies and single and dual quadrature encodings,
with reverse reconciliation and no preparation noise. Figure 7.5(a) has no noise in-
jection, and in Figure 7.5(b) WQ = WP = 1.01 SNU. The signal variance is optimized
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Figure 7.5: Secret key rate plotted against channel loss for four different protocols,
combining homodyne and heterodyne detection strategies and dual and single quadra-
ture encoding. Reverse reconciliation is used in both, and there is no preparation
noise. Plot (a) has no excess noise injection, and in (b) WQ = WP = 1.01 SNU. Sig-
nal modulation variance was optimized for the protocol parameters, since β = 97 %.
β = 100 % is used in the insets.
for each transmission value, because β = 97 % in the main figure. β = 100 % in
the insets. When β is not unity, the optimal signal variance depends on the other
protocol parameters, and so it is reasonable to find the optimal signal variance for
every transmission value to increase the range of the protocol.
Figure 7.6 shows the secure key rate against channel loss, but with different levels
of preparation noise. Figure 7.6(a) uses reverse reconciliation and Figure 7.6(b) uses
direction reconciliation. As expected from the results of [141] and Chapter 6, direct
reconciliation is superior for increased preparation noise.
Combining the plots of Figures 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6, the overall conclusion is that
encoding coherent states in a single quadrature can indeed provide quantum secu-
rity, with reduced practical complexity, but a somewhat reduced rate. All the Q
quadrature measurements performed by Bob do not give an increase in I(A : B), but
they are necessary for estimating the quantum channel, specifically the parameter
ΓAB,33. There are several ways to implement this in practice, for example every other
measurement could be in Q, or Bob could use random switching between the quadra-
tures. This switching need not be symmetric between the quadratures, as long as it
is faster than the time scale on which the channel parameters might change. Having
the switching be random ensures that Eve can not expect to rely on changing the
channel parameters while Bob is not looking.
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(b) Direct reconciliation
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Figure 7.6: Secret key rate plotted against channel loss, with different levels of prepa-
ration noise. Reverse reconciliation is used in (a), and it is indeed quite sensitive to
increases in κ as expected. Plot (b) uses direct reconciliation. Other parameters are
β = 1, µ = 1000 and WQ = WP = 1.
Experiments
We implemented the single quadrature protocol with both heterodyne and homodyne
detection strategies, in free space. We restrict ourselves to reverse reconciliation tech-
niques as the projected preparation noise values are so minute as to preserve the
superiority of this reconciliation technique. The schematic is shown in Figure 7.7.
Adjusting the power distribution of the signal beam relative to the local oscillator al-
lows the same setup to realize both detection schemes as as described in Section 3.7.2.
To implement the heterodyne detection scheme, the continuous wave beam was split
evenly between signal and LO, so both beams had a power of 2.8mW. To implement
the homodyne detection, the signal was chosen to be 0.1mW, and the LO was set to
2.8mW. In both cases the signal beam had the phase quadrature modulated by an
electro-optical modulator. Contrary to the protocols described in the previous chap-
ters, there was no need to ensure orthogonalization of the modulations according to the
procedure described in Section 3.3. The electro-optical modulator received a Gaussian
distribution from a white noise generator at the measured sideband. This generated
a coherent state alphabet in a single quadrature, with the variance VS = µ2 − 1. The
noise generator outputs were also recorded locally at Alice, which allowed these data
points to be correlated with the measurements performed by Bob.
Bob performed the heterodyne detection by interfering the two beams and keeping
their relative phase locked at pi/2. For the homodyne detection scheme, P and Q
were measured separately by changing the relative phase between the beams to pi/2
and 0 respectively. The switching was in this case not on-line, but rather an oﬄine
switch after sufficient data from one quadrature had been obtained.
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Figure 7.7: Experimental setup sketch. Alice splits her beam, and forwards one mode
directly as a bright local oscillator. The signal beam is modulated by a phase modula-
tor fed by a noise generator producing Gaussian white noise within the measurement
bandwidth. Bob performed heterodyne detection, while phase locking the local oscil-
lator to have a relative phase to the signal of pi/2. In this case the two beams are
equally bright. For homodyne detection the local oscillator was much brighter than
the signal beam. For both detection cases the PIN diode currents are digitized, as
well as the signal encoding from the noise generator at Alice. PM: Phase modulator,
PD: Photo detector.
For both detection schemes, the photocurrents from the detector outputs were demod-
ulated from the 10.5MHz sideband. The output of the mixer was low-pass filtered at
100 kHz and digitized with a 14 bit data acquisition card, that sampled the signal at
500 kHz. For the heterodyne scheme, the two data streams generated from the above
operation were subtracted and added to give the respective quadrature outcomes, as
shown in Section 3.7.2. For homodyning, the data streams were subtracted for two
separate runs, with different relative phases. The classical signal recorded from Al-
ice’s signal generator was scaled in the post-processing to optimize the correlations
between the honest parties. Specifically, this was done by minimizing the variance of
the subtracted data streams through a gain factor on Alice’s measurements.
A modulation variance of 15dB above shotnoise defines the 100 % transmission value,
as a calibration measurement. For the heterodyne measurement, this input modula-
tion was reduced to simulate transmission loss, to avoid changing the shot noise level
as in Section 4.3. For the homodyne measurements, the loss was implemented directly
via polarization control and a polarizing beam splitter. Each measurement run gener-
ated 106 samples. From these samples, the post-processing generated the covariance
matrix shared by Alice and Bob after the quantum channel in the entanglement-based
equivalent model, as shown in Equation (7.2.18). A sample covariance matrix for the
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entanglement-based equivalent model was generated from this data, and for TP = 77%
it was found to be,
ΓAB =

3.172 0 ? 0
0 3.172 0 −3.567
? 0 1.019 0
0 −3.567 0 5.056
 . (7.3.1)
The question marks in Equation (7.3.1) represent the correlation parameter from
Equation (7.2.18), which is undetermined by the data processing. The mutual infor-
mation between Alice and Bob is calculated using,
I(A : B) =
1
2
log2
(
VB
VB − C2AB/VA
)
, (7.3.2)
where VA is the signal strength as determined by the size of Alice’s modulation, VB
is the second moment of Bob’s measurements, and CAB determines the correlation
between the parties. Calculating the Holevo bound using the purification assumptions
and applying Equation (7.2.5), the secret key rate bound using reverse reconciliation
was calculated, while the correlation parameter was chosen to minimize this rate.
Setting β = 97%, the results of the data processing are plotted in Figure 7.8 for both
detection schemes.
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(a) Heterodyne detection
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(b) Homodyne detection
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Figure 7.8: Plot of the secret key rate bound obtained from the data versus channel
loss in dB, assuming β = 97 %, µ = 31.2 SNU and reverse reconciliation. The
measured noise was modelled as a combination of untrusted preparation noise and an
entangling cloner attack, and the red solid line is a fit of the theoretical rate equation
to find the noise parameters. The blue line is the rate one would obtain from a dual
quadrature protocol with the same noise parameters. The statistical error on the
data points is smaller than the point size because of the number of points. Plot (a)
uses heterodyne detection. The noise parameters are found to be WQ = 1.0135 SNU,
WP = 1.0000 SNU, κQ = 0.0435 SNU, κP = 0.0422 SNU. Plot (b) uses homodyne
detection. The noise parameters here are WQ = 1.0164 SNU, WP = 1.0000 SNU,
κQ = 0.0119 SNU, κP = 0.0098 SNU.
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The theoretical model represented by Equation (7.2.5), with untrusted preparation
noise, reverse reconciliation and β = 97 %, was used to find suitable values for the
noise parameters in the quantum channel by running a fit routine. The results of this
fitting are visualized by the red solid lines in both plots. This is compared to the
behaviour of a protocol using dual quadrature encoding, with the same noise param-
eters. The dual quadrature protocol has the advantage of twice the alphabet size,
and the ability to certify that TP = TQ. From these plots and the fitted model we
can infer a theoretical maximum range equivalent to just below 10 km in an optical
fiber with an attenuation 0.2 dB per km for heterodyne detection and slightly above
30 km for the homodyne detection. The reason for this is that the noise parameters
are better for the homodyne detection, especially for the untrusted preparation noise.
The noise contributions in this implementation mainly come from a mismatch be-
tween the recorded signal from the noise generator, and the state that is actually
produced. In other words these two supposedly identical outputs are limited in how
well correlated they are and this results in noise. For the heterodyne detection scheme,
when the signal strength is lowered to simulate loss, the clearance to the electronic
noise in recording Alice’s modulation became smaller, increasing the mismatch to
the measured signal, where this decreased clearance was insignificant because of the
brightness of the carrier. Further, in Figure 7.5 the modulation variance was opti-
mized for a given channel loss. This was not done in the experimental implementation.
While the statistical error bars on the data points are tiny, due to a sampling of 106
points, the inferred rates still deviate from the theoretical prediction. This is caused
by channel parameter fluctuations that arise from systematic errors in the setup, such
as fringe instability of locking circuit drifts. Thus, from point to point, the channel
parameters are slightly different and the theory line represents the choice of parameter
values that best fits this trend.
Concluding remarks
We have theoretically and experimentally demonstrated the security of a CVQKD
scheme which is considerably simpler to implement than dual quadrature protocols.
An important point made here is that encoding in conjugate bases is not a require-
ment for security. What is a requirement is that the encoded states are not orthogonal,
which is trivially the case when the alphabet consists of coherent states, as shown by
Equation (2.6.3).
The security of the single quadrature scheme was investigated against a collective
asymmetric cloner attack in the asymptotic limit with preparation noise, and the
security was demonstrated through purification assumptions on data obtained from
implementations of the protocol with heterodyne and homodyne detection schemes.
We find that the protocol is more sensitive to excess noise, but does provide secu-
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rity for certain parameter ranges. An outlook for this protocol is a genuine fiber
implementation at 1550 nm, to investigate how low the excess noise can become.
104
Information Leakage in Lossy Quan-
tum Information Channels
Introduction
In this work we consider a conventional point-to-point protocol where Alice and Bob
exchange coherent states. When Eve intercepts information from the quantum chan-
nel shared by Alice and Bob, she will generate correlations between all parties. These
correlations are what reduce the rate of the secret key generation. The purpose of
post-processing and privacy amplification is to so to speak filter out the compromised
data [62, 63]. It does this by suppressing the correlations between the honest and
dishonest parties [31, 70]. This technique only works if the secret key rate, predicted
through the Devetak-Winter bound from Equation (2.14.33), is already positive, i.e.
R > 0. Alternatively the correlations can be suppressed by using entanglement based
protocols, where the honest parties distill their entanglement [30, 46, 174]. The quan-
tum channel forces the entangled state ideally shared by Alice and Bob to be a tripar-
tite entangled state between Alice, Eve and Bob. To ensure security the state should
be purified to a two-party entangled state shared by Alice and Bob. This will com-
pletely eliminate the correlations with Eve, but there exists a no-go theorem stating
that non-Gaussian operations are required for this [78, 79, 80].
The purpose of the protocol presented here is to provide a different approach to re-
ducing the correlations with the eavesdropper, without using either post-processing
or non-Gaussian operations. While this seems to be as strong as an entanglement
distillation operation, it only works for a very specific type of attack, and so there
is no conflict with the no-go theorem, since we can not use our approach to reach
the same level of security. We achieve this reduction in eavesdropper correlations by
designing the input states used by Alice in such a way that Eve is unable to extract
any information from the quantum channel. While it has already been established
that modulated squeezed state alphabets are superior for certain parameters [53, 97],
we show that if Alice prepares a squeezed state and selects her coherent state alphabet
in a way constrained by the squeezing she can force the Holevo information of Eve to
go to zero if the quantum channel is purely lossy.
The subtleties in the security proof of the single quadrature quantum key distribution
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of Chapter 7 are largely ignored here. We stress that the purpose of this work is
not to demonstrate a fully working, absolutely bulletproof security proof for this
variation on squeezing based QKD [42, 43, 44, 45, 53]. Instead we wish to emphasize
that, under the specific assumptions made, it is possible to decouple Eve from the
quantum channel using simple Gaussian operations, and that this effect seems to
have no analogue in the DV regime. The theoretical part of this work is largely the
product of the efforts of Vladyslav Usenko and Radim Filip. This work is published
in pre-print [175].
Theory
We consider a protocol where the standard Gaussian distributed state alphabet is
encoded in the Q quadrature, exactly like the single quadrature protocol described in
Chapter 7. The difference is that the initial state that is being modulated is not a
vacuum, but a squeezed vacuum state, which is squeezed in the Q quadrature. Instead
of a coherent state alphabet, we therefore rather have a squeezed state alphabet along
a single direction in phase space, namely the direction of the squeezing quantum noise
reduction. In the EPR based scheme we have the initial state, before the channel,
SQZAM
(b)
(a)
Figure 8.1: (a) Information quantities between the two honest parties and the eaves-
dropper. The decoupling eliminates the information content between Bob and Eve.
(b) Illustration of the zero information leakage scheme. A distribution of squeezed
states along the squeezing direction is prepared such that the overall variance is equiv-
alent to the shot noise. Eve controls a purely lossy channel, and Bob performs a
homodyne detection. Eve also uses homodyne detection for her measurements. In
practice the modulator was before the squeezer to minimize loss on the squeezing. The
operations of squeezing and displacement do not commute, but this trivially corrected
for through a suitable parameter change.
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Γin =

µ 0
√
V (µ2 − 1) 0
0 µ 0 −
√
µ2−1
V√
V (µ2 − 1) 0 V µ 0
0 −
√
µ2−1
V
0 µ
V
+ Vε
 , (8.2.1)
where µ is the EPR variance, V is the variance of an auxiliary squeezing operation on
the outgoing mode, and Vε is an extra variance contribution that arises from excess
anti-squeezing, rendering the global state non-pure. Purification assumptions and the
use of self-duality, derived in Section 2.14, are not necessary to show the idea of this
protocol, and so this will not be a concern. µ and V are related to the prepare-and-
measure parameters such that,
V µ = Vsqz + Vsig ,
µ
V
=
1
Vsqz
, (8.2.2)
where Vsqz is the squeezing variance and Vsig is the variance of the continuous Gaussian
alphabet in the prepare-and-measure scheme. Vε corresponds directly to the excess
anti-squeezing in both frameworks. In this way this input state is equivalent to the
prepare and measure protocol where we only encode information in Q, but unlike in
Chapter 7, the alphabet consists of a 1D distribution of squeezed states. This distri-
bution of states is transmitted through the quantum channel, and after the channel
Bob uses homodyne detection for his measurement. Assuming that Eve implements
the usual entangling cloner attack through a lossy and noisy quantum channel, we
have the state shared by Alice and Bob after the channel as,
ΓAB =

µ 0
√
TV µ˜ 0
0 µ 0 −
√
T µ˜
V√
TV µ˜ 0 TV µ+ (1− T )W 0
0 −
√
T µ˜
V
0 T
(
µ
V
+ Vε
)
+ (1− T )W
 , (8.2.3)
where we have defined the parameter µ˜ = µ2 − 1. The state shared by Eve and Bob
is,
ΓBE =
[
B CEB
CTEB E
]
, (8.2.4)
where we, with W˜ = W 2 − 1, have the blocks,
B =
[
TV µ+ (1− T )W 0
0 T
(
µ
V
+ Vε
)
+ (1− T )W
]
(8.2.5)
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E =

(1− T )V µ+ TW 0
√
TW˜ 0
0 (1− T ) ( µ
V
+ Vε
)
+ TW 0 −
√
TW˜√
TW˜ 0 W 0
0 −
√
TW˜ 0 W
 (8.2.6)
CTEB =

−√T (1− T )(V µ−W ) 0
0 −√T (1− T ) ( µ
V
+ Vε −W
)√
(1− T )W˜ 0
0 −
√
(1− T )W˜
 , (8.2.7)
which are 2× 2, 4× 4, and 4× 2 respectively. From this result we find that the corre-
lations between Eve and Bob in the Q quadrature are determined by the expression,
CEB,11 = −
√
T (1− T )(Vsqz + Vsig −W ) , (8.2.8)
as expressed in terms of the prepare-and-measure parameters. For a purely lossy
channel, we have W = 1 and so the correlation parameter becomes,
CEB,11 = −
√
T (1− T )(Vsqz + Vsig − 1) . (8.2.9)
From this we see that the requirement for Eve to be correlated to Bob is that
Vsqz + Vsig = 1. As in Chapter 7, Bob will have to monitor both quadratures, so
he needs to change his measurement to be in the P quadrature for at least some of
the channel uses. The reconciliation procedure [67, 71] can, as usual, be either direct
or reverse, but for reverse reconciliation the correlation parameter CEB,11 is what de-
termines the information leakage to Eve. For direct reconciliation we can not realize
a similar condition.
Figure 8.1(a) shows a schematic for the cancellation of the information leakage from
the quantum channel. In general, for any protocol, the classical quantities I(A : B),
I(A : E) and I(E : B) are non-zero. When Eve is uncorrelated with Bob we achieve
I(E : B)′ = 0, but more surprisingly we also achieve χ(E : B)′ = 0. Therefore, using
reverse reconciliation Alice and Bob can decouple Eve from the quantum channel if
she can only perform the simple pure loss attack as seen in Figure 8.1(b). It should
be emphasized that Eve is only decoupled from the classical information encoded
onto the states. Her quantum mutual information will be non-zero unless the quan-
tum channel receives a vacuum state from Alice. Further, for a direct reconciliation
scheme, Eve can never be completely decoupled from the classical information unless
there is no loss or noise. Interestingly, for reverse reconciliation, this phenomenon of
decoupling is independent of the transmission loss, which means that the reduction of
the rate generation simply follows the reduction of the mutual information between
Alice and Bob. We also show that this does not depend on the purity of the squeezed
state.
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We show the properties of Eve’s Holevo information by directly computing it through
the formula given in Equation (2.14.32). For a purely lossy channel Eve’s auxiliary
mode is a vacuum mode and so it may be safely disregarded. Letting Bob perform
homodyne detection in Q, we see that the conditional state ΓE|B is given by,
ΓE|B =
[
(1− T )V µ+ T − T (1−T )(1−V µ)2
TV µ−T+1 0
0 (1− T ) ( µ
V
+ Vε
)
+ T
]
. (8.2.10)
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Figure 8.2: (a) Contour plot of Holevo information against transmission and modu-
lation variance, with Vsqz = 0.5 SNU. The solid black line indicates where the Holevo
quantity is minimized. (b) Contour plot of Holevo information against transmission
and modulation variance, with Vsqz = 0.5 SNU, but with W = 1.5 SNU. The solid
black line indicates the minimum value of the Holevo information.
With an expression for this conditional state we can computing the Holevo quantity
is relatively straightforward. We see from Equation (2.14.32) that the requirement
for χ(E : B) = 0 is equivalent to SE = SE|B. Because the states are Gaussian, we
know that these entropies are determined by the symplectic spectra of the respective
covariance matrices. Therefore, the covariance matrices need to have the same sym-
plectic eigenvalues to enforce the condition. However, since Bob performs homodyne
detection, only the measured quadrature is conditioned. We can therefore simplify
the condition to be ΓE,11 = ΓE|B,11 where the additional subscript indexes the covari-
ance matrix. One way to fulfil this is to introduce detection noise at Bob into the
calculation, and let this detection noise go to infinity. This noise contribution will
then enter into the conditional entropy. This will have I(A : B) go asymptotically
to zero as the noise goes to infinity, though there is known to be an optimal amount
of detection noise for reverse reconciliation [169]. Another way to fulfil the condition
is to have Vsqz + Vsig = 1, which confirms our intuition that eliminating the correla-
tions suffice to decoupling the eavesdropper from the encoded signal. We see from
this expression that the alphabet size should be determined by Vsig = 1 − Vsqz. This
result also confirms the independence on squeezing purity and channel loss, as they
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Figure 8.3: Sketch of the setup that implements an alphabet of squeezed states.
Alice prepares her asymmetrical thermal state through an amplitude modulator, and
squeezes this state. The output is sent through a purely lossy quantum channel of
transmission T controlled by Eve who measures the tap-off using quadrature switched
homodyne detection. The transmission through the quantum channel is measured by
Bob who also uses quadrature switched homodyne detection. The measured signals
are correlated with Alice’s input alphabet, recorded by an analog-to-digital converter.
AM: Amplitude modulator, PD: Photodetector.
are included in Equation (8.2.10).
Figure 8.2 shows contour plots of the Holevo information χ(E : B) in terms of modu-
lation variance and channel transmission, when Vsqz = 0.5 SNU. The solid black line
indicates where the Holevo quantity is minimized. In Figure 8.2(a) we see that the
minimization condition is independent of transmission and that the Holevo informa-
tion is exactly zero when Vsig = 0.5 SNU. Figure 8.2(b) extends the analysis to the
case where Eve injects noise into the quantum channel, such that W = 1.5 SNU.
Here, the minimization condition is transmission dependent, and indeed also heavily
dependent on W . We also see that complete decoupling of the eavesdropper from the
quantum channel is not possible in this generalized entangling cloner scenario.
Experiment
We implemented a purely lossy channel and an alphabet of displaced squeezed states.
The setup is sketched in Figure 8.3.
Experimentally, Alice prepared her state by squeezing an asymmetric thermal state,
where the P quadrature had a variance of 1 shot noise unit (SNU), and Q had a
variance varied around the condition Vsig + Vsqz = 1. The thermal state was gener-
ated by an electro-optical amplitude modulator driven by a noise generator that was
white within the measurement bandwidth. The modulator modulated sidebands at
4.9 MHz, with a 90 kHz bandwidth. This thermal state represented an alphabet of
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coherent states. The generator output was recorded to be correlated with Bob’s and
Eve’s measurements in post-processing to establish correlations between the parties.
The prepared ensemble of coherent states was injected into the bowtie cavity described
in Section 3.5.1, with a pumped PPKTP crystal functioning as the non-linear element
of an optical parametric amplifier, squeezing the Q quadrature. While this ordering
of displacement and squeezing is not equivalent to squeezing before displacement, a
suitable change of parameters can make the state production equivalent. The modu-
lation was chosen to be before the squeezing to minimize loss on the squeezed state,
since the loss on the modulation induced by the cavity coupling can be rescaled such
that the modulation after the squeezer is regarded as the signal. The PPKTP crystal
was driven with a 532 nm pump, and we achieved 3 dB of sub shot noise squeezing.
The alphabet modulation was varied around this point to test the behaviour of the
decoupling. The modulated squeezed state was also exposed to various transmissions
before being detected at a homodyne detector by Bob. The tap-off was directed to a
quadrature switched homodyne detector that represented Eve.
The modulation depth of the asymmetric thermal state was chosen such that the
overall variance corresponded to one unit of shot noise. The transmission loss of
the lossy quantum channel was implemented through a wave plate and beam splitter
combination. Eve’s homodyne detector had an overall efficiency of 95 %, while Bob
had an overall efficiency of 85 %, mostly due to limited diode efficiencies. Both Eve
and Bob measured both quadratures P and Q, for different combinations of channel
loss and alphabet size. The photocurrents generated by the photo detectors were
mixed down from their 4.9 MHz sidebands, low-pass filtered at 90 kHz and digitized
on a 14 bit depth data acquisition card. The data sets were normalized to shot
noise in post-processing. The classical signal recorded for Alice was scaled appro-
priately in post-processing, to optimize the correlations between Alice and Bob. For
each parameter combination this allowed us to reconstruct a 6× 6 covariance matrix,
that completely characterized the global state. This reconstruction was achieved by
calculating the second order moments of the recorded data, and the corresponding
covariances between the appropriate parties, essentially calculating the elements of
a matrix similar to the one in Equation (2.4.8). From this matrix the Holevo and
Shannon information quantities were easily calculated following the recipe outlined in
Section 8.2.
Figure 8.4 shows the results for the calculated Holevo information, with correspond-
ing theoretical estimates for the given channel parameters. We clearly see elimination
of the Holevo information when Vsig = −3 dB, which directly fulfils the condition
Vsqz + Vsig = 1 SNU, since the squeezer produced 3 dB squeezing. Figure 8.5 shows
the data for the secret key rate plotted against modulation variance.
The Holevo information is minimized at Vsig = −3 dB, but the rate is not maximized
for this modulation depth. This is because the mutual information between Alice and
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Figure 8.4: Plot of the Holevo information versus modulation, with different lines
representing theoretical rates for different transmission values, and their correspond-
ing data points. These results are compared to the expected results from a normal
coherent state protocol with 58% transmission, represented by the black solid line.
Modulation depth is in units of dB relative to shotnoise.
Bob initially goes up faster for increasing modulation than the Holevo information
does. There is therefore an optimal choice for Vsig higher than set by the condition
Vsqz+Vsig = 1, and this value will depend on the reconciliation efficiency β. The lower
the value of β, the more the rate favours eliminating χ(E : B) completely, rather than
having a larger alphabet. In general, when the Holevo bound becomes zero, we can
ensure that R > 0 quite easily because I(A : B) goes to zero asymptotically with
channel loss, as long as β 6= 0. Thus, it should always be possible to extract a secure
key under these conditions, provided of course that Eve is limited to the pure loss
attack and the asymptotic rate limit assumption can be justified. In this case we
do not, however, consider the additional complication of the correlation parameter
from Chapter 7, since we assume a purely lossy channel with quadrature symmetric
transmissions.
Concluding remarks
This work theoretically and experimentally demonstrated that not only can one
achieve security by generating an alphabet of squeezed states, it can outperform a
coherent state protocol with identical parameters. Indeed, for purely lossy quantum
channels, a properly chosen modulation depth can completely eliminate the informa-
tion leakage that typically takes place in the quantum channel as it mixes Alice’s
outgoing mode with the eavesdropper mode.
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Figure 8.5: Plot of the key rate versus modulation, with different lines representing
theoretical rates for different transmission values, and their corresponding data points.
These results are compared to the expected results from a normal coherent state
protocol with 58% transmission, represented by the black solid line. Modulation
depth is in units of dB relative to shotnoise. β = 0.95.
We confirm these predictions experimentally with a setup producing 3 dB squeezing
and homodyne detection at Bob and the eavesdropper. This is the first demonstration
of a complete deterministic decoupling of the eavesdropper from the classical encoding
in the quantum channel without the use of entanglement distillation, in other words
using purely Gaussian operations. The decoupling is independent of channel loss and
squeezing purity.
Combining this protocol with a simple Gaussian error correction protocol such as [156]
to remove non-Markovian excess noise, could potentially extend the range of the
protocol, in the cases where the assumption of a purely lossy channel can not be
satisfied.
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crypted Data
Introduction
This work is inspired by the concept of homomorphic encryption from the world of
classical information theory [176]. The idea of homomorphic encryption, and what
conditions are necessary to achieve it, was first worked out by Rivest et. al. [177]. Ho-
momorphic encryption is concerned with the encryption of sensitive data, where one
wants an untrusted party to be able to manipulate the information, for example by
indexing, sorting or searching in vast amounts of data, while keeping the data secret
from this untrusted party. In other words, the untrusted party, or server, should be
able to evaluate a function on the data, without knowing the plaintext of the data.
An algorithm for how to achieve this encryption was first developed by Craig Gentry
in 2009 [178]. This is useful in the context of cloud computing, where privacy con-
cerns are increasingly prevalent. As an example, it would allow for searching using
the Google search engine, without Google knowing the plaintext search term supplied
by a client.
Generalizing this homomorphic encryption in the context of quantum information
theory is an interesting prospect. It has been shown to be possible to hide a constant
fraction of the information, with polynomial overhead in terms of the amount of data,
provided that the performed quantum operations are limited to a certain class [179].
On the other hand, deterministic fully homomorphic quantum computing, that offers
information theoretical security, has been shown to require exponential overhead [180].
Allowing multiple rounds of communication between the server and the client can
relax this requirement. Childs [181] developed the idea of delegated quantum com-
putation, where we consider a server that is able to implement universal quantum
computing, and a client who wants access to these capabilities, but who does not
trust the server. The idea is to for the client to hide some combination of the input
state, the program she wants to run on the quantum computer and the output. The
idea of delegated quantum computing has been embraced by IBM in a recent initia-
tive [182].
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Using cluster states Broadbent et al. [183] developed this idea further, coining the
term universal blind quantum computing. This is a protocol that can hide all three
of the previously mentioned items. The only requirement put on the client is that she
is able to prepare single qubits from a certain simple set. This original idea has since
been developed significantly [184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190].
Intuitively, one would expect to be able relax these requirements if, for example, the
program did not need to be hidden from the server. This intuition was confirmed by
Fisher et al. [191], where it was demonstrated that pre-existing agreement on what
program to implement lowers the amount of classical and quantum information to be
exchanged during the actual protocol. This relaxed version of universal blind quantum
computing is called quantum computing on encrypted data, and this is the protocol
that we wish to implement. However, unlike previous work, we are interested in doing
this with continuous variable states, which in principle allows for universal quantum
computing [192]. However, restricting ourselves to Gaussian operations, we can not
achieve universality [193]. The theoretical work presented here is due to the efforts of
Kevin Marshall and Christian Weedbrook. The theoretical developments as well as
the experimental implementation are published in pre-print [194].
Theory
Client
Gaussian
Lossy
Channel
Input Encryption
Server
Decryption
Gate
Figure 9.1: Scheme illustrating the protocol for quantum computing on encrypted
data. The input is an ordinary coherent state. The encryption procedure is a random
displacement operator on the initial state. The quantum channel connecting the
client and the server is a purely lossy channel. After the channel, the server applies
the gate, in this case a displacement gate. The output is sent through the same
quantum channel back to the client, who recovers the actual output by performing
the decryption operation.
The protocol for quantum computing on encrypted continuous variable states takes
place in four stages, see Figure 9.1.
1. State preparation. The client prepares her input states that she wishes to
put through the quantum computation.
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2. Encryption. The client encrypts her input state by displacing it in phase space
by some random amount. This limits the amount of information available to
the server.
3. Program. The server receives the encrypted input state from the quantum
channel. It performs an operation representing one or several gates from the
universal set G, to be defined further in Equation (9.2.2), and sends the output
of this back through the quantum channel.
4. Decryption. The client applies a decryption operation that depends on the
program implemented by the server. This recovers the intended output.
We use the Weyl operator defined in Equation (2.4.1) as the encryption operation.
Consider an alphabet of coherent states as an input to the universal quantum com-
puter. Each coherent state represents a letter in this alphabet. Displacing the input
state randomly transforms the input into a different letter, and so hides the actual
input. On average, these random displacements over the entire phase space will make
the input look like a thermal state, since,
1
pi
∫
R2
Dˆ(X)|ψ〉〈ψ|Dˆ†(X)d2X = I , (9.2.1)
where X = (Q,P )T , and the identity holds as long as the input state |ψ〉 is normal-
ized. This means that on average, the quantity produced by the encryption operation
is proportional to the identity, and so is fully mixed. However, such a uniform distri-
bution of displacements over the entire phase space is not possible to realize physically,
since we are limited in how large displacements we can make. Instead, we choose a
Gaussian distribution, because, as we have seen in Section 2.13, a Gaussian distri-
bution maximizes the entropy out of all the probability distributions with the same
covariance matrix, which is equivalent to assuming some physical energy threshold.
Intuitively, maximizing the entropy is exactly what is necessary to hide the input
state, because higher entropy implies that the server is less correlated with the en-
crypted input states.
This will limit the security of the scheme in the sense that it will depend on the width
of the Gaussian distribution used for the encryption operation. This width should
therefore be as high as possible under the technical constraints encountered in the
implementation, i.e. we should have as high an energy threshold as is practically fea-
sible. Formalizing this security analysis to show in what sense it offers security and
how well it does this in an experimental setting where displacements are finite is an
open problem that we will not attempt to solve in the present work.
We now wish to show that this protocol can decrypt outputs resulting from a universal
quantum computation. To do this, we consider the universal set of quantum gates in
the CV formalism [192],
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G = {DˆQ(Σ), DˆP (Σ), Uˆ2(Σ), Uˆ3(Σ), Fˆ , CˆZ} , (9.2.2)
where Σ is the relevant gate parameter. DˆQ(Σ) and DˆP (Σ) are the displacement
gates,
DˆQ(Σ) = exp(iΣQˆ) , DˆP (Σ) = exp(−iΣPˆ ) . (9.2.3)
Uˆk(Σ) is the k’th order phase gate,
Uˆk(Σ) = exp(iΣQˆ
k) . (9.2.4)
Fˆ is the Fourier gate,
Fˆ = exp
(
ipi
4
(
Qˆ2 + Pˆ 2
))
, (9.2.5)
and CˆZ is the controlled phase gate,
CˆZ = exp(iQˆ1 ⊗ Qˆ2) . (9.2.6)
With this set it is possible to implement universal quantum computing in a CV
setting [192]. We therefore wish to show that we can reliably decrypt outputs from all
these operations. Of this set, only the gate Uˆ3(Σ) is non-Gaussian [195, 196], and it
turns out that one needs at least one non-Gaussian gate to achieve universal quantum
computing [193].
Gate Correction
DˆQ(Σ) DˆP (−Q)DˆQ(−P )
DˆP (Σ) DˆP (−Q)DˆQ(−P )
Uˆ2(Σ) DˆP (−Q)DˆQ(−2QΣ− P )
Uˆ3(Σ) DˆP (−Q)DˆQ(3Q2Σ− P )Uˆ2(−3QΣ)
Fˆ DˆP (P )DˆQ(−Q)
CˆZ DˆP,1(−Q1)DˆQ,1(−Q2 − P1)⊗ DˆP,2(−Q2)DˆQ,2(−Q1 − P2)
Table 9.1: Corresponding decryption operations for the single mode encryption oper-
ator Dˆ(X) and the two-mode encryption operator Dˆ1(X1)Dˆ2(X2) for each gate in
G, where X = (Q,P )T .
The corresponding decryption operations for each gate are listed in Table 9.1. For all
gates except Uˆ3, the decryption operation consists purely of displacements. Consider
for example the DˆQ(Σ) gate. Encryption for this gate is Dˆ(X), which can be separated
into two operations such that Dˆ(X) = e−
i
2
QP DˆQ(P )DˆP (Q). Decomposed in this way
we see that the DˆQ(P ) part obviously commutes with DˆQ(Σ), and DˆP (Q) commutes
up to a phase shift such that
DˆP (Q)DˆQ(Σ) = e
−iQΣDˆQ(Σ)DˆP (Q) . (9.2.7)
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From this, the decryption DˆC(Q,P,Σ) for the gate DˆQ(Σ) is determined by the re-
quirement that,
DˆQ(Σ)D(X) = Dˆ
†
C(Q,P,Σ)DˆQ(Σ) . (9.2.8)
Rearranging this we find that,
DˆC(Q,P,Σ) = exp[i(QP/2−QΣ)]DˆP (−Q)DˆQ(−P ) . (9.2.9)
We see that the decryption depends on the encryption parameters Q and P , and that
it further depends on the classical gate parameter Σ. We also confirm that this de-
cryption can be realized by displacement alone, such that we do not need to assume
that the client has quantum resources at her disposal.
Applying arguments similar to the above we may arrive at the results listed in Ta-
ble 9.1 and we see that for the Gaussian gates the decryption operations are pure
displacements. However, the above approach is not successful for the Uˆ3(Σ) gate,
since the commutation relations are more complicated. This also explains why this is
the only gate that requires squeezing resources on the part of the client. If the client
wants the server to execute Uˆ3(Σ) she has to forward two modes, one containing the
encrypted input state and the other the squeezed and displaced momentum eigenstate
Uˆ2(A)DˆQ(Q
′)|P 〉, with random parameters A and Q′. The server then implements
Uˆ3(Σ) using the teleportation circuit [10],
Dˆ(X)|ψ〉 Fˆ †Uˆ3(T ) • Pˆ = m1
Uˆ2(A)DˆQ(Q
′)|P 〉 • Dˆ(X ′′) Uˆ2(B)
The client sends the aforementioned two modes and the value B to the server. The
server runs the circuit and measures one of the output modes with the outcome m1,
which needs to be communicated back to the client to allow her to correct for the
encryption operation correctly. The correction operator the client needs to implement
for the decryption of the Uˆ3(Σ) gate output is,
DˆC,Uˆ3(Q,P,Σ) = DˆP (−Q)DˆQ(3Q2Σ− P )Uˆ2(−3QΣ) . (9.2.10)
Similarly to the simple case of the displacement gates, we see that the decryption
depends on the encryption parameters Q and P , and on the gate parameter Σ. How-
ever, unlike for the case of the displacement gate, the Uˆ2 gate now enters into the
decryption operation. In addition to this, there is also the requirement that the
server communicates the measurement outcome m1 to the client. This requirement of
an extra round of classical communication is essentially what causes this scheme to
not be homomorphic. Interestingly, Dulek et al. [197] have considered a similar prob-
lem with the Clifford set of DV quantum computing gates and the T gate [198, 199],
where the T gate needs special treatment to implement homomorphically encrypted
118
9.3 Experiments
delegated quantum computing. It is possible that the CV scheme described here could
be extended in a similar fashion, but this too remains an open problem.
More complicated quantum operations in continuous variable quantum computing can
be implemented by generating Hamiltonians that are polynomials of arbitrary order in
Qˆ and Pˆ . This is possible by proper manipulation of the gates in the universal set [192,
200]. Thus, an arbitrary program can be approximated by a proper composition of
gates [192]. The individual decryption operations that arise from the application of
the individual gates can be pushed to the end of the composition of gates to form an
overall decryption operator for the entire program, such that executing a program in
this way does not require multiple uses of the lossy quantum channel, up to an overall
change in phase due to the commutation relation between displacements in P and Q.
This is possible because of the simple nature of the decryption operations. Many of
the gates in the universal set have been realized [201, 202, 203, 204]. Of these the
non-Gaussian gates are the most challenging and their implementation is outside the
scope of this thesis.
Experiments
Encryption efficiency
We experimentally implement the CV quantum computing gates DˆP (Σ) and DˆQ(Σ).
We also implement a squeezing operation on a displaced state which is equivalent to
the Uˆ2(Σ) gate up to a phase shift.
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Figure 9.2: Two electro optical modulators are used to modulate the phase and ampli-
tude quadratures. They are driven by two sets of independent Gaussian white noise
generators. The modulators output an alphabet of encrypted coherent states at a
10.5 MHz sideband, which is demodulated and digitized by a data acquisition card.
PD: Photo Detectors, AM: Amplitude modulator, PM: Phase modulator, DAQ: Data
acquisition.
We first investigate the efficiency of the encryption, using the setup sketched in Fig-
ure 9.2. The client initially generates a Gaussian distribution of coherent states of
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light, as defined in Section 2.6, to store quantum information. This is done using
electro-optical modulators, and on average it produces the ensemble,
ρˆin =
∫
R2
Gin(X)Dˆ(X)|0〉〈0|Dˆ†Xd2X , (9.3.1)
distributed according to the Gaussian distribution G(X) with the variance Vin in
both quadratures. This distribution is generated by two independent white noise
generators. The input states were encrypted by adding another Gaussian distribution
of displacements through the same modulators, but with independent Gaussian noise
generators, with symmetric variance Venc. The state ensemble after the encryption
therefore becomes,
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Figure 9.3: A plot of the mutual information I(serverenc :clientin) between the server
and the client for a Gaussian alphabet of coherent states with variance Vin = 0.6
SNU, versus encryption variance Venc. If the alphabet size stays constant, an increase
in encryption variance will decrease the information between server and client. The
statistical error bars are smaller than the point size.
ρˆenc =
∫
R2
Genc(X)Dˆ(X)|0〉〈0|Dˆ†(X) dX , (9.3.2)
which in phase space is described by the Gaussian Genc(X) with the total symmetric
variance Vin + Venc. These encrypted quantum state were measured by the server
with homodyne detection. The Gaussian distribution generating the input states was
recorded, to be correlated with the server measurement outcomes. These correlations
determine the classical mutual information, defined in Section 2.13, between the server
and the client and the information content available to the server should follow the
expression,
I(serverenc :clientin) =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
Vin
Venc
)
. (9.3.3)
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The results of this investigation are shown in Figure 9.3. Ideally, I(serverenc :clientin)
should go to zero, which only happens in the limit where Venc → ∞. In practice,
what we require is that the encryption variance is much larger than the alphabet size,
Venc  Vin.
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Figure 9.4: Experimental setup for the implementation of encrypted computing with
displacement gates. The modulators prepared an ensemble of encrypted input states
using two electro-optical modulators each fed by two uncoupled Gaussian white noise
generators. The prepared encrypted states were sent to the server through a lossy
quantum channel with transmission T , which was implemented through a waveplate
and polarising beamsplitter combination. After the channel the server implemented
DˆQ and DˆP gates. The server implemented an ensemble of displacement gates, using
another pair of modulators with uncoupled Gaussian white noise generators. These
displaced quantum states were sent back through the lossy quantum channel with
transmission T . The client decrypted these returned states using a phase shifted
signal from the initial encryption noise generator. AM: Amplitude modulator, PM:
Phase modulator.
The setup where the server implements both displacement gates is shown in Figure 9.4.
The client split a 1064 nm seed beam into two parts, designated as signal and LO
respectively. The LO went immediately to the homodyne detector controlled by the
client.
Two electro-optical modulators at the client side prepared the encrypted input states
on the signal beam. This was done through a phase and an amplitude modulator,
which each received two uncorrelated noise inputs. One of these noise signals rep-
resened the continuous alphabet the client uses to encode her quantum information.
The other noise signal represented the encryption noise. Both noise signals were white
within the measurement bandwidth of 1 MHz around the 10.5 MHz sideband. The
input states consisted of a Gaussian alphabet with variance Vin = 0.3 SNU, with
121
Chapter 9: Practical Quantum Computing on Encrypted Data
−4 −2 0 2 4
Q
−4
−2
0
2
4
P
(a) No encryption
−4 −2 0 2 4
Q
(b) With encryption
Figure 9.5: Wigner functions for the delegated displacement gate output, (a) without
encryption and (b) with an encryption of Venc = 31 SNU and subsequent decryption.
The input state ensemble had the variance Vin = 0.3 SNU and the gate operation
adds an additional distribution with variance Vgate = 0.6 SNU.
Venc = 31 SNU of encryption noise on top. With this ratio between input and en-
cryption, we expect the server to be able to recover I = 0.005 bits/use of information.
Figure 9.6(a) shows the signal-to-noise ratio for each protocol step. The purely lossy
quantum channel between the client and the server was implemented through a beam
splitter and wave plate combination, which gave an effective transmission T through
the channel. Because this experiment only dealt with coherent states, the intrinsic
loss at the client and the server was scaled out, and loss was assumed to only occur
in the quantum channel.
When the states arrived at the server, another pair of electro-optical modulators im-
plemented DˆQ and DˆP gates with the gate parameters chosen by a white noise signal.
In this way the experiment tested an ensemble of gate parameters, and so the server
also implemented a symmetric Gaussian distribution of displacements with variance
Vgate = 0.6 SNU. The overall state after the gate operation therefore had the variance
Vgate + Vin + Venc for a lossless channel.
On the return trip to the client, the gate output states were sent through a lossy
quantum channel with the transmission T . A last pair of electro-optical modulators
was located at the client receiver, where the client applied a phase shifted encryption
operation, exactly anti-correlated to the encryption signal, to recover the decrypted
output of the server’s quantum computation, before this output was measured by
a homodyne detector. Ideally, the client should recover the state DˆQ(P )DˆP (Q)|φ〉.
However, imperfections in the decryption procedure in fact gave her an output state
with variance Vin + Vgate + Vres. The residual noise also followed a Gaussian distribu-
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tion, and was measured to be Vres = 0.072 SNU. This high degree of noise cancellation
was enabled by a custom noise generator, where the outputs for the encryption and
decryption were highly correlated at the sideband frequency in question. Further,
the relative phase between these signals was essential for proper noise cancellation.
To control this phase a DB64 Coax Delay Box from Stanford Research Systems was
inserted in the connection between the noise generator and the decryption modulator.
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Figure 9.6: (a) Signal-to-noise ratio from the point of view of the server, for each step
of the protocol. Each step is measured with homodyne detection. The channel is
calibrated such that T = 1, and an ensemble of coherent input states was prepared.
The green stage shows the reduced SNR for the encrypted input state. The server
performs a displacement in the yellow stage, which increases the SNR. This state is
returned to client who decrypts it to receive the output with increased SNR in the
blue stage. The upper trace in the last step is a measurement without the encryp-
tion routine, which has an increased SNR because the decryption operation slightly
degrades the output. The input state, which has a small amplitude relative to the
encryption is prepared in the red stage. (b) Plot of the fidelity between the output
states generated using the encrypted input state and the output states generated from
plain-text states, as a function of channel transmission T . Statistical error bars are
smaller than the point size. The fidelity variations arise from systematic errors in the
tuning of the relative phase between the encryption and decryption operations, which
limits the efficiency of the decryption.
After the decryption, the client performed scanned homodyne detection, with a vis-
ibility of 92 %. The low visibility was primarily caused by the 6 modulator crystals
distorting the beam profile relative to the local oscillator. The homodyne detection
output was mixed down from the 10.5 MHz sideband and sent to an analog-to-digital
converter after being low-pass filtered at 1 MHz to set the measurement bandwidth.
The acquired marginal distributions were then put through the maximum likelihood
algorithm described in Section 3.8, in order to reconstruct the respective density ma-
trices.
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The Wigner functions from the ensemble states reconstructed with and without en-
cryption are shown in Figure 9.5. In order to better quantify the performance of
the decryption, Figure 9.6(a) shows the SNR for the different protocol stages and
Figure 9.6(b) shows the fidelity between the output generated by the encrypted en-
semble of input states and the unencrypted ensemble of input states. The fidelity
was calculated using Equation (2.3.6), where ρˆ0 was the ideal output state without
encryption and subsequent decryption and ρˆ1 was the result of the protocol. Thus,
the fidelity measure exactly quantifies how well the decryption could be performed,
without referencing the performance of the gate or the channel. For the tested channel
transmissions, the fidelity stays above 94 %.
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Figure 9.7: The experimental setup where the server implemented a squeezing oper-
ation. The encrypted coherent input state was injected into a linear semi-monolithic
squeezing cavity. The output of the cavity was redirected by a Faraday rotator, and
interfered with a strong coherent beam on an asymmetric beamsplitter to implement
the decryption operation. The decryption noise was adjusted with gain factors g1 and
g2 that depend on the squeezing. AM: Amplitude modulator, PM: Phase modulator.
The experimental setup shown in Figure 9.7 had the server implement the amplitude
squeezing operation,
Sˆ(r) = exp
(r
4
(aˆ2 − aˆ†2)
)
, (9.3.4)
with squeezing parameter r, which is equivalent to the Uˆ2(T ) gate up to a phase
shift [204]. The experimental setup is shown in Figure 9.7. In this experiment the
client prepared a single coherent state as the input, not an ensemble. The encryption
operation was still a Gaussian distribution.
The states were prepared by first splitting the 1064 nm seed beam into three parts,
designated signal, LO and decryption. The LO went directly to the homodyne de-
tector controlled by the client. The decryption went to the decryption modulators,
where a thermal state exactly anti-correlated to the encryption state was prepared.
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The signal beam was displaced, such that the input state was a single coherent state,
which was then encrypted by a Gaussian noise distribution as was also the case for
the displacement gate experiment. This encrypted coherent state was sent through
the quantum channel with transmission T . After the channel the input state went
through a Faraday rotator and a halfwave-plate in order to ensure that the input
polarization was primarily vertical, though a small horizontal polarization component
is required for the locking scheme described in Section 3.6.2.
Following the polarization optics the encrypted displaced state was sent into the
pumped linear semi-monolithic optical parametric amplifier described in Section 3.5.2,
from the non-HR side of the cavity. In this way the encrypted input state was squeezed
and returned to the client. This is the first demonstration of squeezing directly on
quantum information, so-called in-line squeezing. Until now squeezing transforma-
tions have been applied in an off-line manner [204]. The vacuum squeezing generated
in this way is plotted in Figure 9.8. From this result we were able to determine the
performance of the gate itself and conclude that it encounters a total of 43 % of trans-
mission loss from the generation of the squeezing to the homodyne detection.
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Figure 9.8: Variance of the squeezed state used for the quantum gate, with a scanned
local oscillator. The green trace represents shotnoise.
The encrypted squeezed coherent state exited the cavity through the non-HR side. A
2 % tap-off was redirected to a 50/50 beam splitter. One mode of this splitting was
detected directly by a photo detector and the AC output of this was mixed down to
serve as an error signal for the pump phase lock. The other mode was directed to a
wave plate and beam splitter combination with a subsequent photo detector detection
on both these split beams, which is then subtracted. This subtraction generates an
error signal at DC, which is used to lock the cavity length. The remaining 98 % of the
output went back to the wave plate and Faraday rotator combination. Propagating
through these components in the reverse direction ensured that the polarization after
the rotator was horizontal, meaning that the beam was reflected by the polarizing
beam splitter. After this beam splitter, a lossy quantum channel of transmission T
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was implemented. Subsequent to this, the output beam was interfered with the afore-
mentioned decryption beam, where the relative phase of these beams was controlled
by a piezo actuated mirror. The beams were locked around destructive interference
through a measurement of the 36.7 MHz sideband also used for the pump phase lock,
which was optimal for the noise cancellation. Controlling the offset of this error signal
gave very precise control of the relative phase. In turn, having control of this relative
phase allowed for more precise cancellation of the decryption noise than in the experi-
ment with the displacement gates. Similarly to the experiment with the displacement
gates, the client used scanned homodyne detection using the LO from before.
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Figure 9.9: For each step of the protocol, the corresponding Wigner function is shown
to illustrate the state. For each step, the state is measured with homodyne detection
and mixed down from the 10.5 MHz sideband where it resides. In the last step, the
black outline denotes the FWHM of the squeezing ellipse that would result from the
server acting on a plaintext input state.
The reconstructed Wigner functions for each of the protocol steps are shown in
Figure 9.9. The Wigner functions are reconstructed by homodyne detections with
scanned relative phase between the signal and local oscillator, to collect marginal dis-
tributions as described in Section 3.8. The filtered back projection algorithm was used
for the states where the mean photon number was too large to admit reconstruction
by maximum likelihood. Figure 9.9(a) shows the initial displaced state prepared by
Alice. Figure 9.9(b) shows this state as encrypted by an ensemble of random dis-
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placements. In Figure 9.9(c) the encrypted displaced state has been squeezed, such
that the second order moments are no longer symmetric in the quadratures. However,
none of the variances are below shotnoise because of the encryption. In Figure 9.9(d),
the client recovers the displaced squeezed state after decrypting the state received
through the quantum channel. The squeezing is now below shot noise.
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Figure 9.10: (a) The signal-to-noise ratio from the point of view of the server in
each quadrature for each step of the protocol. The prepared input state is displaced
most in the P quadrature. The next step reduces the SNR in both quadratures, but
the signal remains stronger in P . After the squeezing operation, the SNR is slightly
increased in both quadratures. The decrypted output features a lower SNR than
the plaintext output. Ideally the SNR should correspond to the input state as the
gain factor in the squeezing also affects the coherent excitation in the displaced state.
Thus, the difference between the levels quantifies the performance of the gate. (b)
Plot of fidelity between encrypted and plain-text output states in terms of encryption
noise. Plotted with lossless channel and 63 % transmission channel, equivalent to 10
km of optical fiber at 1550 nm. Statistical errors are smaller than the point size, due
to the number of data points.
The performance of the squeezing gate and the associated decryption operation are
quantified in Figure 9.10. Figure 9.10(b) shows the fidelity between a decrypted out-
put and a plain-text execution of the protocol. This fidelity is plotted in terms of
encryption noise, both for a lossless quantum channel and 5 dB ' 63 % transmis-
sion loss, equivalent to using 10 km of fiber at a telecom wavelength as the channel.
The measured fidelities vary against the encryption noise in the same way as it was
observed in Figure 9.6(b). These variations are caused by systematic errors in the
tuning of the noise cancellation that implements the decryption operation. Addition-
ally, the reconstruction of the Wigner functions is quite sensitive to the quality of the
interference fringes at the homodyne detector, and any errors introduced by these im-
perfections are not statistically independent, but are correlated via the environment
surrounding the experiment. Lastly, the encryption noise is not perfectly correlated
with the signal used for the decryption operation. This results in residual noise which
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also reduces the fidelity. Even with these sources of error, the fidelity is shown to stay
above 98.5% for the investigated parameters, with a slight increase towards lower en-
cryption noise. This is because the outputs of the noise generator for the encryption
and decryption are better correlated for low voltages.
For the case of increased channel loss, the fidelities are slightly higher. This is caused
by the loss forcing the states closer to vacuum, such that when everything is close
to a vacuum state, fidelity naturally goes up. These measurements demonstrate the
delegated universal quantum on encrypted quantum states is possible, and is largely
independent on the quality of the implemented gates. In Figure 9.10(a), the signal-
to-noise ratio in both quadratures is plotted for all protocol steps. This measure takes
the quality of the gate into account, in the sense that for an ideal gate and lossless
channel one would expect to recover the input SNR in the last step of the protocol.
This is because the coherent excitation of the input state is affected by the same
gain factor as the noise is, and so the signal and the noise change by same amount,
the net effect being no change in SNR. The difference between the observed level
for the plain-text output state and the input SNR quantifies the gate performance.
The difference in SNR between the plain-text and decrypted outputs quantify the
decryption performance as the fidelity plot in Figure 9.10(b). This shows that the
gate implementation is quite lossy, 43 %, but the decryption operation performs quite
well, almost independently of this. The losses in the gate implementation occur
primarily on the server side. The mode matching of the encrypted input state into
the squeezer was 97 %, as a consequence of the polarization asymmetry required for
the Hänsch-Couillaud lock. The beam sampler for the locking signals introduces 2
% loss on the output by default. The Faraday rotator also incurred 3 % of loss on
the squeezed output. There are also loss contributions on the client side, notably
from the decryption operation which incurs another 2 % from the beam sampler, and
the visibility of the homodyne detection was around 98 %. The quantum efficiency
of the photodiodes in the detector was 99 %. These contributions do not bring the
total loss of squeezing to 43 %, but it is possible that polarization impurities have
contributed more than was originally anticipated. Polarization control was especially
important on the server side and these impurities would not be readily apparent
through measurements of the carrier power.
Concluding remarks
In this work we developed a protocol for universal quantum computing on encrypted
continuous variable states. This protocol requires the use of a quantum channel and
transfer of classical information for the implementation of the cubic phase gate Uˆ3(T ).
All Gaussian transformations in the universal set can be implemented without this
additional cost of classical information. The client needs to have arbitrary displace-
ments within some energy threshold as a classical resource, and limited squeezing as
a quantum resource.
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9.4 Concluding remarks
Gates from the universal set can be composed and the output of the program can be
decrypted by an overall correction operator that depends on the operations within
the program. Quantum computing on encrypted data has, until now, never been
theoretically investigated in the regime of continuous variables. In addition, it is
the first time that secure delegated quantum computing has been performed over a
lossy quantum channel, in either the DV or CV regime. Extending the range of this
protocol will require some type of quantum repeater or relay structure [205], but the
present work is an important first step towards delegated continuous variable quantum
computing with provable security.
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Conclusion
In this thesis a number of QKD protocols were developed and discussed. Of particular
interest was the first ever proof-of-principle demonstration of CVMDIQKD, where we
demonstrated that an asymmetric relay configuration is able to exchange correlations
between the honest parties in order to provide quantum security, and the relay need
not be trusted. The implementation of the protocol gave a bound for the secret key
rate which indicates that this configuration is especially useful in metropolitan net-
works where distances are rather short. The idea is that CVQKD is generally more
susceptible to loss, and thus degrades faster. However, when the distances are mod-
erate higher modulation frequencies are easier to achieve than high repetition rates
for the corresponding DVQKD implementation.
A number of outstanding challenges associated with this protocol still remain. For
a simplified detection scheme as the one used in this experimental implementation a
synchronization of the laser frequency of two sources, rather than one, presents an
issue equivalent to what a local oscillator travelling through the quantum channel in
a standard protocol implies. A mismatch in optical frequency will first of all lead
to reduced interference between the beams at the relay, but it will also complicate
the measurement process as the carrier and signal beats will be shifted with a time-
dependent frequency. The net effect of this is the introduction of excess noise which
degrades the secret key rate. As such, a field implementation of CVMDIQKD will
most certainly require some sort of synchronization technique. This problem is of
a purely classical nature, and technology derived from the field of classical optical
communication should suffice to provide the necessary solution.
An additional concern has been whether the efficiency of the relay is sufficiently high,
as any loss encountered here should be ascribed to Eve in a practical setting. The
limiting factors here are the interference of the signal beams, which is again related
to the synchronization issue, and the coupling losses of the optical fibers that will
almost certainly be used in an in-field implementation, the alternative being a free
space implementation in an atmospheric channel. Of course, atmospheric channels
are also a viable option, for example with a low-orbit satellite acting as an untrusted
relay. In either scenario the efficiency of the relay is important, but this is largely
a technical consideration and does not provide a fundamental limitation to the per-
formance of the protocol. Interference visibilities above 99 % are routinely achieved,
and coupling losses can likely be lowered through anti-reflection coatings. Further,
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the detection efficiencies of the photodetectors can also go above 99 %, depending on
the wavelength, though this will inevitably increase the cost of the hardware.
The same CVMDIQKD protocol was experimentally investigated under the addition
of correlated thermal noise, simulating a weaker version of a generalized joint en-
tangling cloner attack on the relay links. Since the practical MDIQKD protocol has
an equivalent entanglement-based model, we may regard the action of the practical
relay as distributing virtual bipartite entanglement between Alice and Bob. This
equivalence allows us to investigate other protocols that use entanglement, notably
entanglement swapping, teleportation and distillation and relate them to the perfor-
mance of the MDIQKD protocol. We find that increasing correlations in the thermal
noise injected into the joint quantum channel reactivates the protocols in the order
swapping, teleportation, distillation and MDIQKD. We see experimentally that the
MDIQKD protocol maintains security well past the threshold for the breaking of vir-
tual entanglement. This result may be applicable to physical systems where correlated
noise is prevalent, and we make the argument that these correlations should be seen
as a resource to be exploited wherever possible.
Another way to consider noise in the context of QKD is the concept of prepara-
tion noise. In addition to the concept of excess noise that results from the quantum
channel, we consider the situation where Alice’s preparation of coherent states in a
point-to-point QKD protocol has some additional noise that she does not control,
which makes it harder for Bob to estimate which states she actually prepared. If
we make the standard assumption that Alice’s station is secure from eavesdropper
tampering, we may regard this noise as trusted, and in this case it is not detrimen-
tal to the secure key rate, if direct reconciliation is used. This superiority of direct
reconciliation is intuitively appealing because it is easier for Alice to estimate what
Bob will receive than it is for Bob to estimate the prepared states, provided that
the preparation noise is strong enough. We remark that the converse scenario with
trusted detection noise at Bob has been considered in the literature before, and re-
inforces the standard superiority of reverse reconciliation [169]. The confirmation of
this prediction is promising for the idea of implementing short range CVQKD with
cheap noisy laser sources, which may simplify practical implementations and reduce
their cost.
A further simplification of CVQKD is the concept of the single quadrature encoding.
Security of CVQKD is, like for DVQKD, guaranteed through the non-orthogonality
of the signal states and the no-cloning theorem. This fact is also exploited in the
two state protocol with coherent states [49, 50], but a similar idea has never before
been applied to a continuous alphabet of coherent states. Careful theoretical consid-
erations [172] have shown that this requires a minimization over a channel parameter
that cannot be estimated in practice, but otherwise the protocol still provides quantum
security, with a very simplified implementation. This fact should come as no surprise
to those well versed in the theory of CVQKD, but we have now conclusively demon-
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strated this in a proof-of-principle experiment in the asymptotic limit of infinite state
exchanges where coherent attacks are equivalent to collective attacks and Gaussian
extremality applies. A potential outlook for this protocol is a fiber implementation
with a local local oscillator, which would represent a simple and cost-efficient way to
implement quantum security while eliminating an important loophole in the security
proof.
A straightforward variation on the single quadrature protocol is to use squeezed states
for the alphabet rather than coherent states. Rather than focus on the superior se-
cret key rate this alphabet provides, we instead emphasize an interesting advantage
that the use of squeezing may provide. If the quantum channel is purely lossy, we
have shown that the use of squeezing can force the Holevo bound to zero. By mon-
itoring the correlations between Bob and Eve in a configuration where the channel
is purely lossy, it was possible to show experimentally that these correlations indeed
go to zero. Following the reconstruction of the global covariance matrix, we confirm
that the Holevo bound also goes to zero. This is a demonstration of eavesdropper
decoupling without the use of entanglement distillation, in fact only through the use
of Gaussian operations. Additionally the decoupling was shown to be independent of
transmission loss and squeezing purity. While this protocol is perhaps too involved to
be a commercially viable solution to CVQKD, it is nevertheless an interesting effect
that is not known to be achievable in the regime of discrete variables.
The last way we considered security was in the concept of delegated quantum comput-
ing through a weaker version of homomorphic encryption. This delegated quantum
computing on encrypted data was demonstrated for the first time using continuous
variables by implementing the displacement and squeezing operations from the uni-
versal quantum computing set for continuous variables. We do this, for the first time,
over a simulated lossy quantum channel. The results indicate that, at least for Gaus-
sian operations, this protocol is feasible for delegated quantum computing. While
proving the security of the scheme remains an open problem, we have shown that
the encryption operation reduces the classical mutual information between the client
and the server. The reduction is asymptotic such that a complete decoupling would
require infinite energy, but in practice there exists an optimal value that balances the
need for security with low residual noise from the imperfect decryption.
We show that for reasonable values of this encryption noise, the quantum gate output
can be recovered with high fidelity compared to the output that would be received
by the client in an unencrypted setting. We implement the decryption using two dif-
ferent techniques, one with direct transmission through the optical modulators that
decrypt the state, which causes a distortion of the spatial beam profile. Another tech-
nique interferes the state returned from the server with a strongly modulated beam
that carries the coherent state that decrypts the output. This approach seems to be
favourable because it allows for more precise control of the relative phase between
encryption and decryption which is highly crucial for obtaining a good fidelity.
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In conclusion we have experimentally demonstrated a number of novel quantum com-
munication protocols in the CV regime that provide some form of security using
Gaussian operations and measurements. We have investigated the effects of noise
with Gaussian distributions and shown how this might be beneficial to the honest
users in some configurations.
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